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 i 
Abstract 
 
New Zealand is currently the third largest global producer of kiwifruit and thus plays an 
important role in the international market. Exports of kiwifruit are also of significant 
horticultural value for New Zealand and in 2007 the kiwifruit industry accounted for export 
values of NZ$790 million.  
 
The global kiwifruit market has experienced substantial changes in recent years and is likely 
to change significantly in the near future due to developments in production sources, 
adjustments to trade policy settings and shifts in consumer preferences. The New Zealand 
kiwifruit industry needs to consider what the impacts of these changes might be so that future 
strategies can be constructed effectively.  
 
Little quantitative modelling has been done in New Zealand to consider the impacts of 
changes to the global kiwifruit industry. The major contribution of this research was the 
development and calibration of a kiwifruit industry-specific partial equilibrium trade model. 
The model was then used to examine the impacts on New Zealand producers of these trade-
related changes in the global kiwifruit market. Three relevant scenarios were developed for 
this purpose. They include a drop in EU demand through the introduction of a stricter Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary policy, an expansion of the Chinese kiwifruit industry where production is 
doubled by year 2013 and finally a trade liberalisation scenario where current import tariffs 
on kiwifruit were removed worldwide.  
 
It is clearly observed, through both the Chinese expansion scenario and the trade liberalisation 
scenario, what a potential impact and future role China has as a world market player. 
Increased availability of Chinese kiwifruit appears to affect New Zealand producer returns 
and exported quantities negatively, albeit not as significantly as the EU introduction of an 
SPS policy. A trade liberalisation scenario, on the other hand, proves to increase New Zealand 
grower returns significantly for all varieties.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The New Zealand kiwifruit industry may have to face several trade-related issues in coming 
years as the global industry is confronted with strategic and structural challenges. These 
changes include different regulatory requirements on kiwifruit production methods and the 
growth in production in several competitor countries. New Zealand is currently the third 
largest global producer of kiwifruit and thus plays an important role on the international 
market. Exports of kiwifruit are also of significant horticultural value for New Zealand. 
Therefore, the objective of my thesis is to quantify and analyse the possible effects that these 
changes might have on the kiwifruit industry especially in New Zealand. 
 
Kiwifruit is grown and traded internationally and the world market is dominated by a few 
main players.  The world‟s three largest producers have until recently been represented by 
Italy, New Zealand and Chile. China has recently overtaken Chile and New Zealand as the 
largest producer. Trends in global exports are consequently heavily influenced by the 
production levels in the top producing countries. A significant part of this thesis will therefore 
consider potential changes in those countries with the largest impact on the world kiwifruit 
market. 
 
The thesis initially concentrates on a descriptive analysis of the growth and structure of the 
kiwifruit industry in New Zealand and overseas. It investigates some of the most relevant 
trade-related issues concerning the global industry in general and the New Zealand kiwifruit 
industry in particular. In particular the growth and potential changes in Chinese and EU 
industries will be assessed. The thesis will then review the economic theory and the literature 
to assess how these changes may affect the kiwifruit industry. A new kiwifruit trade model 
will be described, using industry specific countries and varieties based on the Lincoln Trade 
and Environment Model (LTEM). It is a partial equilibrium trade model, which can simulate 
effects that various domestic agriculture and border policy changes would have on price, 
supply, demand and net trade.  
 
The thesis will focus on trade-related issues facing the global kiwifruit industry through a 
trade modelling approach. This work appears to be the first application of such a method to 
analyse trade issues affecting this specific industry. This research will utilise an established 
method (the LTEM) and the core of the thesis will concentrate on scenarios concerning a 
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potential EU import ban on conventional kiwifruit, a trade liberalisation scenario and a case of 
Chinese industry expansion. In every case the impact on New Zealand producer returns will 
be estimated. 
 
1.1 Hypotheses 
The specific hypotheses being assessed are as follows: 
1. A drop in EU imports and consumption, due to a stricter Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) policy, of all New Zealand kiwifruit will decrease New Zealand 
export values. 
The expected result of this scenario, according to theory, would suggest that the drop in EU 
consumption will reduce imported quantity of kiwifruit. Producers in the EU are better off, 
since the SPS policy restricts imports and thereby protects domestic producers from 
international competition. Consumers in the EU are worse off, due to fewer products at a 
higher price. Producers in the exporting country (New Zealand in this case) suffer from 
reduced exports and hence lower returns. New Zealand producers are hence negatively 
affected by a potential EU introduction of a stricter SPS policy. 
 
2. An expansion in Chinese production will lead to reduced NZ producer returns. 
If China, being considered as a major producing and exporting country, contributes to an 
increased supply of kiwifruit on the world market, theory suggests that world prices of 
kiwifruit will be reduced due to the significant increase of supply. If New Zealand kiwifruit is 
considered homogenous with Chinese kiwifruit, and compete for the same market share, a 
Chinese expansion will have a negative impact on New Zealand producers in terms of lower 
returns. 
 
3. A trade liberalisation scenario will reduce New Zealand producer returns. 
This scenario will be examined through changing all import tariffs in all relevant countries in 
the model to zero. With all import barriers eliminated worldwide, an increase in import 
demand will occur. Exporters respond to the change by offering exports at a higher price. 
World prices in kiwifruit consequently increase and, as a result, New Zealand producers are 
better off through higher producer returns.  
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1.2. Description of chapters 
This thesis is organised into nine chapters. Chapter one introduces the research problem, the 
objective of the thesis and finally the specific scenarios developed in order to fulfil the 
objective. 
 
Chapter two provides a detailed background of the history and development of the New 
Zealand kiwifruit industry. Other significant players on the global market are introduced 
along with the current issues concerning the international industry. 
 
Chapter three presents the rationale for trade and the theoretical consequences of relevant 
trade restrictions.  
 
Chapter four defines the analytical framework of this research and conclusively presents the 
most relevant structure. 
 
Chapter five reviews present literature relevant to this research and how similar studies have 
been carried out in the past. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part presents 
literature focused on the kiwifruit industry. The second part reviews analytical approaches 
used in relevant trade modelling analysis. It explains how they contribute to this study and 
also provides an understanding of the gaps in the literature where this research will be of 
significant value. 
 
Chapter six explains the methodology used in this research. It discusses underlying theory of 
the industry-specific trade model developed, data sources and assumptions. 
 
The main scenarios investigated in this research are presented in chapter seven. 
 
Chapter eight describes the results of each scenario and provides a further understanding of 
the outcome through a detailed discussion. 
 
The final chapter presents the key conclusions of this study and the implications of these 
results for the New Zealand kiwifruit industry and policymakers, and subsequently discusses 
limitations and recommendations for future research.
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2. Background 
 
This chapter will provide an extensive analysis of the growth and structure of the New 
Zealand kiwifruit industry. It subsequently puts New Zealand in an international context by 
describing the country‟s role on the global market and describing other players with a 
significant impact on the world industry. The chapter concludes with an introduction to the 
essence of the thesis: the potential strategic and structural challenges ahead. 
 
2.1. History 
2.1.1. Early history 
Actinidia Chinesis, the botanical name of the plant, was first found along the border of the 
Yangtse River valley in China (Yerex and Haines 1983). The first foreign collectors of the 
plants were of British and American origin, discovering and sending the first plants home in 
1847 and 1904, respectively. One of the Englishmen chose to call the fruit “Ichang 
gooseberry” consistent with the name of the city Ichang, where the botanical findings were 
first made. The name was later changed to simply “Chinese gooseberry”, to clearly illustrate 
its country of origin (Yerex and Haines 1983). 
 
During the 1920s and 1930s in New Zealand, the still unpopular vine was generally planted in 
random unoccupied spaces, mainly because it was easy to grow and had an ornamental value. 
It gained some minor appreciation on the New Zealand market for three reasons: it was the 
only fresh fruit that ripened in June or July (in New Zealand), it was easily managed and it 
had a novel and characteristic appearance and flavour. The first commercial plantings were 
established in 1937, according to official records (Yerex and Haines 1983). 
 
In 1940, because of the Second World War, the New Zealand Government decided to ban all 
imports of fresh fruits, effectively forcing people to search for substitutes on the domestic 
market. There were only a few varieties of apples in winter, which contributed to the sudden 
interest in Chinese gooseberries (Yerex and Haines 1983). 
 
In the 1960s, New Zealand shipments of not only fruits, but also plants and seeds, were being 
carried out to new destinations such as Germany, Italy, Spain, India, South America, 
Morocco, Israel and South Africa. Plants were quickly distributed worldwide and by the early 
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1970s New Zealand nursery keepers struggled to meet foreign demand (Yerex and Haines 
1983). 
 
2.1.2. Kiwifruit in New Zealand: the development of the industry 
The progression of new kiwifruit plantings was relatively slow in the 1970s but advanced 
dramatically in 1979 when almost 1500 hectares were planted within a year. Over the period 
of 1972 to 1982 sales activity and farmland values increased dramatically (Johnston and 
Sandrey 1990) and demand for land for the purpose of planting kiwifruit increased by 54 
percent between 1983 and 1986 (Lees 1993). This followed as a consequence of the existing 
and expected high market returns during this period (Johnston and Sandrey 1990).  
 
The original plantings of kiwifruit were almost entirely concentrated to Te Puke in the Bay of 
Plenty and by 1973, the Bay of Plenty area accounted for 90 percent of total domestic 
production (ZESPRI 2004). However, as land got scarce in the region, land prices increased in 
the early 1980s. Other areas were consequently explored and developed for kiwifruit 
production. Land prices in other regions such as Auckland, Northland, Nelson, Hawkes Bay, 
Poverty Bay, Lower North Island and Waikato were significantly lower and thus invested in 
to a greater extent (Yerex and Haines 1983). It was not until the 1990‟s that total orchard 
yield started to approach commercial levels (Lees 1993).  
 
In the 1970s the proportion of total production that was exported was only 60 percent, mainly 
because the domestic market absorbed much of the fruit and the management and marketing 
efforts towards the global market were still in their development stages. By 1978, exports had 
increased to over 80 percent of total output and continued to increase during the 1980s (Lees 
1993).  
 
In 1993, the average orchard size was small. Eighty percent of farms were less than five 
hectares, 40 percent were less than two hectares and smaller orchards were also common 
(Lees 1993). In 2006, New Zealand had approximately 3200 kiwifruit orchards with an 
average size of 3.43 hectares (Belrose Inc 2006). Most orchards are still situated in the Bay of 
Plenty with its 8600 hectares of kiwifruit
1
, accounting for 72 percent of the country‟s total 
production. The area of planted kiwifruit in this region has increased by six percent since 
                                                 
1
 as at June 2002. 
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1994 compared to a two percent decrease for New Zealand in general (Statistics New Zealand 
2002). 
 
Figure 1: New Zealand kiwifruit exports 1999-2005.  
Metric tons
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Source: (Belrose Inc 2006) 
 
Europe (EU-15) and Japan are by far the most valuable export markets for New Zealand 
kiwifruit. In 2005, 56 percent of New Zealand kiwifruit (by value) was sold in Europe and 18 
percent was sold in Japan (Belrose Inc 2006). 
 
Early investments 
A couple of decades ago New Zealand agriculture experienced a major change in the 
composition of agricultural production as the interest in growing kiwifruit dramatically 
expanded. Citrus and tobacco plantings were transformed into kiwifruit orchards and dairy 
farms were sold in favour of finding land to plant kiwifruit. Entrepreneurs and professional 
investors contributed to the investment rush between 1979 and 1983 (ZESPRI 2004). 
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The New Zealand industry developed rapidly in the 1980s, stimulated by high commodity 
prices and tax incentives. Several investors borrowed heavily in order to buy orchards at 
prices based on forecasts of continued high producer returns. However, returns fell 
dramatically in 1987 forcing many new growers out of business. In addition, orchard values 
fell, leaving growers with minimal equity, or even worse, no equity at all. With interest rates 
(and hence debt servicing costs) simultaneously increasing to record levels, the industry was 
in need of restructure to stay viable (Lees 1993). 
 
Lower orchard values after 1986 enabled new entrants on the market to borrow less to 
establish an orchard and enter with high equity. Interest rates were also significantly lower 
and these factors combined allowed the industry to be viable, even with lower market returns 
(Lees 1993). 
 
Since kiwifruit plants take up to six years to reach full production, the increase in plantings 
did not affect supplies until the late 1980s. The results of investments in the 1980s became 
clear in 1990 when production statistics showed an increase of 400 percent from 1982 (Lees 
1993). 
 
Orchard profitability 
Orchard profitability is one of the most significant factors behind changes in the industry and 
the government plays an important role through its financial policies including interest rates, 
taxation, exchange rates and inflation (Lees 1993).  
 
In 1976, orchard profitability was at its highest, presenting real returns of 27.83 New Zealand 
dollars
2
 per tray. Returns have decreased steadily ever since because of increased kiwifruit 
volumes on the world market and, in the 1970‟s, also because of high inflation compared to 
other main markets (Lees 1993). Returns peaked in 1982, which was subsequently reflected in 
land values in the Bay of Plenty expanding by over 800 percent between 1972 and 1982 
(Johnston and Sandrey 1990). Following the 1982 peak in per-tray return, the demand for land 
increased and kiwifruit plantings grew by over 54 percent in three years. The devaluation of 
the New Zealand dollar against the yen and the deutschmark combined with a relatively low 
crop compared to the previous season generated high New Zealand dollar returns in 1986 
(Lees 1993). 
                                                 
2
 Calculations were based on the base year of 1991. 
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The emergence and development of competitors in Italy, France, Japan and the USA proved 
to have long-term negative effects for New Zealand producers (Lees, 1993) and lead to a 
significant decline in world prices for kiwifruit between 1982 and 1988 (Zwart & Moore, 
1990). By 1988, an even larger threat appeared with the development of a Chilean kiwifruit 
industry, representing direct competition with New Zealand's marketing season from April to 
December (Willis, 1994). 
 
Another challenge for the global kiwifruit industry occurred between 1987 and 1989 and was 
caused by monetary instability (both in interest rates and exchange rates) and an expansion of 
world supply. The latter reduced producer returns for existing producers such as New Zealand 
(Willis, 1994). 
 
2.1.3. Impacts of New Zealand reforms (in the mid-late 1980s) 
In July 1984, the New Zealand Government introduced an extensive economic liberalisation 
programme that would allow the economy‟s overall efficiency and sustainable growth rate to 
increase by reducing or simplifying total government interventions. The pressure for reform 
was derived from a number of problems threatening the New Zealand economy, including the 
agricultural sector. The country‟s overseas debt was growing, industries illustrated poor 
growth performance and agriculture was heavily dependent on governmental compensation, 
support and border protection (Wallace 1990). The unsustainable situation in the agricultural 
sector led to an increased supply of low value commodities, an industry separated from actual 
market demand, inappropriate use of resources and inhibited innovation (Sayre 2003). When 
the United Kingdom entered the European Union in 1973, New Zealand lost significant 
market access to its dominant export market for dairy. The United Kingdom had always taken 
special consideration of agricultural products from its fellow Commonwealth member, but 
was to be part of an even larger trading agreement leaving New Zealand with lower 
guarantees. Combined with existing agricultural protectionism overseas, this would result in 
major impacts on New Zealand‟s agricultural export returns (Rayner 1990).  
 
New Zealand was one of the first developed countries to completely deregulate its agricultural 
sector by removing all forms of price supports and subsidies in 1984. At first, the reform had 
a strong impact on the sector and on farm profitability. Land values, commodity prices and 
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farm profitability finally stabilised or at least increased steadily in 1990, after a difficult 
transition period of six years (Sayre 2003). 
 
Overseas exchange rates and inflation 
Exports of kiwifruit, and consequently New Zealand producer prices, have always been 
dependent on financial situations in export markets. The level and volatility of foreign 
exchange rates play a significant role in determining the returns to New Zealand kiwifruit 
producers. A depreciating home currency (i.e. the New Zealand dollar) has – ceteris paribus – 
a favourable impact on domestic farmers who export, since it implies that overseas sales are 
worth more in terms of New Zealand dollars. However, the precise consequence of a currency 
change on commodity prices and returns is dependent on which countries those commodities 
are exported to (Reynolds and Moore 1990). 
 
The two main currencies influencing and partly determining New Zealand producer prices of 
kiwifruit are the European euro and the Japanese yen, currently accounting for more than 74 
percent of New Zealand‟s total export sales (Belrose Inc 2006). Between 1980 and 1986, the 
New Zealand dollar was heavily devaluated against both the then deutschmark and the yen. 
The New Zealand currency was finally fully floated in mid-1985. Between 1986 and 1993, 
the New Zealand dollar fell by 14 percent against the deutschmark and 11 percent against the 
yen (Lees 1993). The pre-float devaluations and subsequent floating of the New Zealand 
dollar significantly affected the domestic kiwifruit industry during these years by maintaining 
a certain level of returns for growers while being challenged by falling prices and rising 
margins overseas. After the liberalisation of the country‟s economy the value of the New 
Zealand dollar strengthened in 1987, leading to a decrease in exports, which consequently 
affected the profitability of New Zealand farmers. The removal of agricultural subsidies a few 
years earlier also influenced the low orchard profitability between 1987 and 1989 (Zwart and 
Moore 1990).  
 
The New Zealand economy suffered from relatively high inflation throughout most of the 
1980‟s, which rose significantly above the average of most trading partners between 1984-
1988 (Wallace 1990). The Consumer Price Index (CPI) increased by an average annual rate of 
15 percent and inflation peaked in 1986 at a level of 18 percent. The horticultural products 
price index followed a similar development, peaked however in 1985 and increased annually 
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by 5 percent until 1990. This resulted in a decrease in real kiwifruit prices by 76 percent 
between 1980 and 1991 (Lees 1993). 
 
High interest rates throughout the 1980‟s had a major effect on the profitability and viability 
of the kiwifruit industry. As previously mentioned, investing growers had to borrow heavily 
to afford covering initial orchard development and production costs. High inflation and 
government deficits forced interest rates to a peak in 1987 at a level of 18 percent. An 
industry suffering through a high amount of debt at a high level of interest could only survive 
through compensating high returns via a substantial export yield. However, since kiwifruit 
takes five to six years to reach full production, the newly-developing orchards did not manage 
to achieve satisfactory harvests in time. Not only did the kiwifruit producers suffer from 
record high debt servicing costs, but they also struggled with falling kiwifruit returns and 
decreasing orchard values. As a result, many producers were forced into an equity crisis (Lees 
1993). Orchard costs, however, had decreased by 66 percent between 1982 and 1991 (Lees 
1993).  
 
Interest rates and inflation fell dramatically between 1987 and 1993, relieving the industry 
from high debt servicing costs, which allowed growers to stay viable under lower returns. 
Gains in commodity prices and a small decline in the real exchange rate after 1988 improved 
the terms of agricultural trade and the New Zealand kiwifruit industry (Lees 1993). 
 
As international competition increased, more pressure was put on the New Zealand kiwifruit 
industry to continuously perform better than its competitors. The decline in world price for 
kiwifruit, due to more players and further supply on the global market, had a negative impact 
on the domestic industry. With increased world competition in the 1990‟s the selling period 
for the New Zealand kiwifruit industry was constricted to a shorter period where New 
Zealand had to sell more kiwifruit and also directly compete with European summer fruit 
(Lees 1993). According to Zwart and Moore (1990), the need for a stronger position in the 
marketplace and the lack of appropriate incentives in the previous licensing system caused the 
demand for a statutory marketing board to control industry exports.  
 
2.1.4. Current industry structure 
In 1970, the need was expressed by growers and the industry for an agency to promote 
kiwifruit worldwide. As previously mentioned, the export share of total production only 
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accounted for 60 percent and the establishment of a global management and marketing agency 
was believed to be able to increase that quantity (Lees 1993). The Kiwifruit Export Promotion 
Committee (KEPC) was established in 1970 to make marketing of the fruit more professional. 
This was going to be achieved through a promotion fund, based on money extracted from a 
compulsory levy of ten cents per tray (six cents from the grower and four cents from the 
exporter) (Lees 1993). Multi-language brochures were produced emphasising the advantages 
of the fruit with some technical information and the history behind the fruit. These catalogues 
were subsequently delivered to retail stores (ZESPRI 2004). Since the KEPC was the only 
kiwifruit organisation at the time, it ended up operating further than its original purpose and 
acting as an important decision maker in the industry (Lees 1993).  
 
The New Zealand industry developed quickly in the 1970‟s and so did the number of potential 
exporters interested in promoting New Zealand kiwifruit overseas. This consequently put the 
growers in a vulnerable position, as the grower-funded marketing no longer was in their direct 
control and could be exploited by anyone interested in making profits as an exporter (Lees 
1993). The need for coordination between marketing and promotion had become apparent and 
potential exporters needed to be better controlled. Based on this need the New Zealand 
Kiwifruit Authority (NZKA) was founded in 1977, represented by five growers, two exporters 
and a government nominee. The primary purposes of the authority were to licence exporters, 
promote the fruit and to set standards for quality, grading and packing. The funding of the 
authority was set up as previously. The three major export companies in the 1960s – Turners 
and Growers, Fruitgrowers Federation and Auckland Export – still remained the main players 
on the global market. Together they accounted for over 60 percent of New Zealand kiwifruit 
exports (Lees 1993). 
 
After the peak in grower returns in 1982, they kept falling and the need for a changed 
marketing system grew stronger (Lees 1993). A report by Coopers & Lybrand in 1988 
investigated the marketing, selling and distribution system of the industry and concluded that 
there was an urgent need for a restructure if potential earnings of kiwifruit exports were to be 
reached. This could only be accomplished if a new marketing strategy was implemented. In 
1988, the NZKA was reformed into the New Zealand Kiwifruit Marketing Board (NZKMB) 
and the New Zealand Kiwifruit Marketing Regulations were established to allow the NZKMB 
as the single seller of kiwifruit internationally, except for Australia (Lees 1993). 
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In 1992, the NZKMB radically overestimated the value of the crop that year, which resulted 
in overpaying growers early in the season and subsequently incurring a debt of over NZ$93 
million (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 1996). The financial difficulties arising from 
this problematic situation put pressure on the Government to review the entire structure of the 
kiwifruit industry. Consequently, the Government instigated a three-stage review process.  
 
The development of the NZKMB 
The first step emphasised the need for grower representation within the industry. Through 
changing the NZKMB into a corporate structure, the growers would be given direct equity 
involvement. The new company structure would not only provide total grower control but 
would also encourage potential partners and investors from outside of the industry to take part 
as stakeholders (New Zealand Kiwifruit Growers Inc Forum 1995). Growers were previously 
represented in the industry through representatives on the NZKMB and through the 
Fruitgrowers Federation (Campbell, Fairweather et al. 1997). In order to provide growers with 
more authority within the industry an independent grower representative forum was 
established in 1993 (New Zealand Kiwifruit Growers Inc n.d.). The New Zealand Kiwifruit 
Growers Incorporated (NZKGI) now represents growers in discussions on industry issues. 
The forum consists of representatives from all over the country and has played an important 
role in negotiations concerning topics such as contract options and payment systems (ZESPRI 
2004). During the industry review, the NZKGI was given the important roles of appointing 
members of the NZKMB and representing the group to which the Statutory Board is 
responsible (New Zealand Kiwifruit Growers Inc Forum 1995), p.50). 
 
Collaborative marketing 
In October 1994, the University of Auckland presented an independent marketing review to 
the kiwifruit industry. Several recommendations from this report were taken into 
consideration during the ongoing review of the kiwifruit industry and came to establish the 
second step of the industry review: restructuring the marketing within the industry. 
 
The report suggested that strategic marketing development should focus on “retail marketing 
rather than commodity trading” (Brookes, Cartwright et al. 1994). It was also recommended 
that the scale of the industry should be increased globally, through sourcing of internationally 
grown kiwifruit and by linking New Zealand kiwifruit to other fruit markets (Brookes, 
Cartwright et al. 1994).   
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These recommendations suggested a development of a joint marketing strategy, which would 
be implemented by a marketing subsidiary separate from the NZKMB. The Kiwifruit Industry 
Review adopted most recommendations and subsequently suggested that export marketing 
should be collaborative and performed by a marketing subsidiary to the NZKMB, cooperating 
with innovative organisations and marketing firms. This committee should be formed in order 
to receive and process applications and to make recommendations to the statutory NZKMB 
(New Zealand Kiwifruit Growers Inc Forum 1995).  
 
The review distinguished several specific advantages of having a marketing subsidiary 
separated from the NZKMB to control and carry out the international marketing operations. 
Firstly, transferring any commercial issues from the tasks of the NZKMB to a specific 
marketing subsidiary would contribute to the execution of a more reliable and accountable 
power of corporate governance. Secondly, the new structure would improve the overall focus 
of the organisation, since the NZKMB would concentrate exclusively on statutory, legal and 
policy issues and the subsidiary would concentrate on international marketing, rather than one 
organisation managing all activities and issues facing the industry. It would also enable the 
marketing subsidiary to enter potential joint ventures and appoint collaborative marketers 
without distracting from the core business (New Zealand Kiwifruit Growers Inc Forum 1995). 
The NZKMB was consequently transformed into the new entities Kiwifruit New Zealand 
(KNZ), managing the statutory issues, and the ZESPRI International Ltd controlling the 
international marketing of the industry (Campbell, Fairweather et al. 1997). 
 
The third part of the industry review included several additional suggestions of how the 
industry could improve its overall performance. The recommendations were not as explicit as 
in the first two stages of the review, but provided a framework for how to develop the best 
production structure. It suggested that marketing and production management should be 
separated as far as possible and that the current marketer (NZKMB) should be restructured 
into a „marketer focused‟ organisation. This separation would encourage the marketer to 
predict market requirements and behaviour and the supplier to meet market demand and 
product quality (New Zealand Kiwifruit Growers Inc Forum 1995). 
 
The future regulatory environment would provide growers and other players with more 
flexibility concerning time options of supplying fruit to marketers. The removal of any legal 
 14 
distinction between packhouses and growers would encourage the development of contractual 
relationships between NZKMB and „supplier entities‟ (Campbell, Fairweather et al. 1997). A 
supplier entity is a group of growers and post harvest facilities (such as packing, coolstorage 
and ship loading) cooperating to deliver a certain volume of packed kiwifruit with a certain 
quality (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 2002). 
 
The industry review also stated that the responsibility of fruit standards and quality assurance 
would belong to the NZKMB, but that the grower would be responsible for picking the fruit at 
the best time, with the incentive of receiving premiums or being punished with penalties, 
depending on the quality of the fruit (New Zealand Kiwifruit Growers Inc Forum 1995). 
 
The ZESPRI story 
The name ZESPRI was chosen with the purpose to establish a new image for kiwifruit 
worldwide, based on a protected trademark (ZESPRI International Limited 2005). The 
industry was fully re-structured in 2000 and the NZKMB was converted into the public 
company ZESPRI Group Ltd, in which the growers became shareholders. This was in 
accordance with the Kiwifruit Industry Restructuring Act 1999. The possession of shares was 
originally restricted exclusively to grower suppliers (New Zealand Fruitgrowers Federation 
2004), whereas these days a significant proportion of shareholders are no longer supplying 
fruit (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 2005). In November that year, the growers 
approved the creation of a cooperative style mechanism within a commercial operating 
structure (Regulations Review Committee 2002). 
 
In this restructuring phase of the industry the Kiwifruit Export Regulations were established 
recognising ZESPRI Group Ltd as a single desk exporter. This exclusively authorised 
ZESPRI Group Ltd to export and market New Zealand kiwifruit overseas, excluding the 
Australian market (Hardie Boys 1999). According to the Kiwifruit Industry Restructuring Act 
1999 (New Zealand Government 1999) and the Kiwifruit Export Regulations 1999 (Hardie 
Boys 1999), Kiwifruit New Zealand was established as the regulatory board controlling 
ZESPRI Group Ltd and its compliance with the single desk structure (Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry 2005). 
 
The Kiwifruit Export Regulations were tightened in 2004 by the Horticultural Export 
Authority (HEA). Australia was the only market that ZESPRI did not control as a statutory 
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export monopoly. However, the Australian market had to be regulated as well since the 
country had become a gateway for illegal kiwifruit shipments further to other New Zealand 
export markets, such as China, undercutting New Zealand‟s prices (USDA Foreign 
Agricultural Service 2004). Every exporter is now entitled to apply to HEA for export licenses 
to Australia (New Zealand Horticulture Export Authority 2004).  
 
ZESPRI was determined to move the New Zealand kiwifruit industry away from the stagnant 
kiwifruit category into competing with the entire market for fresh fruit (ZESPRI 2004). The 
different varieties competing on the international market today include the ZESPRI™ Green 
(green), the traditional Hayward cultivar; ZESPRI™ Green Organic (green organic), grown to 
meet the quality standards of the company; ZESPRI™ Green Jumbo, falling under the 
category of larger kiwifruits; ZESPRI™ Gold (gold), the newer variety with yellow flesh and 
sweeter flavour (ZESPRI 2004). 
 
The New Zealand kiwifruit industry has developed and grown significantly over the past 
decades since its inception. In 1975 exports were valued at NZ$4.3 million and in 1990, the 
value was NZ$539 million – New Zealand‟s sixth largest food export sector at the time 
(Campbell, Fairweather et al. 1997). In 2005, exports to over 60 countries were worth 
NZ$720 million and was by far the most valuable horticultural export product in New 
Zealand
3
 (HortResearch 2005). In 2007 kiwifruit exports were worth NZ$790 million 
(Statistics New Zealand 2007). 
 
Distribution channels  
Over the last couple of decades specialisation has occurred in the New Zealand kiwifruit 
industry. The orchards used to manage both growing and packing, but with a continuously 
expanding production the supply chain has been divided into separate specialised units to 
enable the management of larger quantities. The orchards now concentrate only on growing 
kiwifruit and special packhouses and cool storages are dedicated to the downstream steps in 
the supply chain.  
 
The number of packhouses has continuously decreased since 1988 due to intense competitive 
pressure (Campbell, Fairweather et al. 1997) and in 1991 only 22 percent of them packed less 
                                                 
3
 Kiwifruit NZ$ 720 million, wine NZ$433 million and apples NZ$387 million HortResearch (2005). 
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than 25,000 trays annually. As production increased, so did the size of the average packhouse. 
Most had an upgraded capacity of 200,000 trays by 1991 (Lees 1993) and also managed a 
significant number of orchards. The packhouses either leased orchards to guarantee sufficient 
supplies or they solicited growers to be part of a packhouse cooperative. The first stages of the 
kiwifruit supply chain have thus changed during the last decades from being based on family-
owned entities managing several tasks, into separate units with different economic interests 
(Campbell, Fairweather et al. 1997). 
 
Coolstore facilities enable an extension of the packing season through the storage of fruit in 
bulk to be packed at a later point (Campbell, Fairweather et al. 1997). The number of 
coolstores has not increased significantly since 1988, but most of them have expanded their 
capacity to receive a larger input of fruit (Lees 1993). 
 
2.1.5. Industry strategies 
As described above, New Zealand has developed its kiwifruit industry over several decades 
and currently enjoys a competitive advantage in several areas. A few of the main strategies 
and production programmes leading to these advantages are described below and some of 
them constitute the reason for the relatively high international price premiums that New 
Zealand kiwifruit benefits from today. 
 
KiwiGreen 
The New Zealand kiwifruit industry had to confront a severe crisis in 1990-1992 when Italian 
retailers threatened to take the entire industry to court. They argued that New Zealand 
kiwifruit contained pesticide levels exceeding local standards, while New Zealand claimed 
that they in fact were well within the requirements for European regulations. Since Italy 
belonged to one of  New Zealand‟s most important export markets with annual fruit imports 
of three million trays, for the value of NZ$30 million, the decision had a severe impact on the 
New Zealand industry. The kiwifruit industry formed a partnership with HortResearch, 
aiming to develop an integrated pest management (IPM) programme, called KiwiGreen, to 
reduce the use of chemicals through careful and comprehensive inspections (Growing Futures 
n.d.). 
 
Research towards an IPM programme had started already in the 1980‟s to control the number 
of pests through the use of less environmentally harmful sprays (Campbell, Fairweather et al. 
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1997). The long-term goal with the new programme was to convince all kiwifruit orchards 
producing export fruit to apply the environmentally sustainable KiwiGreen system as soon as 
feasible. The first trial production of 262 000 trays under the new management scheme was 
successfully accomplished in 1992. During the following years the number increased 
continuously
4
 and in the season of 1996/1997 all kiwifruit exported from New Zealand were 
produced using the new KiwiGreen system. It has been used nationwide within the entire 
industry ever since. Such a fast and efficient adoption of a new production programme by an 
entire industry, without government intervention, was considered unique for its time 
(Growing Futures n.d.). The system was expanded in 2000, under the name ZESPRI System, 
introducing additional environmental factors, hygiene and ethical trading practices, inspecting 
the entire supply chain from orchard to market. The production management system now also 
includes requirements on environmentally friendly coolstores and transports, certain 
temperatures during transport, managing reject fruit and the use of recyclable packaging. The 
stages of the system are monitored and audited by the Ministry of Agriculture and enables the 
traceability of commodities (ZESPRI n.d.). The implementation of KiwiGreen has contributed 
to the advantage that New Zealand kiwifruit can be sold at relatively large premiums, 
compared to other countries. 
 
Traceability 
Competitive global trends and challenges influence product quality and safety throughout the 
supply chain and in international food trade. As a consequence of growing concerns from 
food scares, consumers and other stakeholders are putting pressure on requirements about 
how food is grown and managed on its way to the consumer, in terms of agricultural practice, 
animal welfare and environmental impact (Opara and Mazaud 2001). Satisfactory food 
quality requires a certain level of transparency throughout the supply chain, which acts like a 
guarantee to the consumer (Opara and Mazaud 2001). Several agricultural management 
programs and regulations have been implemented worldwide recently to ensure a certain level 
of quality and safety demanded by consumers (Opara and Mazaud 2001) and the KiwiGreen 
system is one of them. 
 
Traceability refers to the availability of information of all processes and stages of the supply 
chain, which certifies the origin and journey of a specific product. Traceability adds value to 
the quality and safety regulations by providing “the communication linkage for identifying, 
                                                 
4
 4.7 million trays in 1993, 6.8 million trays in 1994 and 63 million trays in 1996/1997.  
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verifying and isolating sources of non-compliance to agreed standards and customer 
expectations” (Opara and Mazaud 2001).  
 
Implementing EurepGAP standards 
In May 2003, ZESPRI gained the certification for having a Produce Marketing Organisation
5
 
system that meets the requirements of the internationally recognised standards of EurepGAP. 
According to the regulations, growers must comply with terms such as minimising the 
damaging impact on the environment, reducing the use of agrichemicals, using appropriate 
resources and recognising an acceptable level of health and safety for workers (Patel 2003). 
 
EurepGAP was established in 1997 as an initiative by mainly British and continental 
European retailers to take more responsibility and react to concerns from both consumers and 
producers. The consumers were worried about product safety, environmental sustainability 
and labour principles and producers were concurrently interested in developing a common 
certification standard. The EurepGAP consists of a set of normative standards and 
internationally recognised certification criteria that demonstrate compliance with consumer-
focused Good Agricultural Practices (EurepGAP n.d.). Many of the principles within 
EurepGAP are not new to New Zealand growers, as they are incorporated in the already 
practiced Integrated Crop and Pest Management (ICM and IPM) systems (Agriquality n.d.). 
 
The Gold story 
The story of ZESPRI™ Gold began in the late 1970s when seeds for the research project of 
developing a new variety were collected in the Beijing Botanical Gardens in China. These 
were subsequently planted in the research orchard in Te Puke, New Zealand. A couple of 
years later further seeds were collected in China. These seeds and the second generation of the 
earlier collected seeds were crossed because of their attractive characteristics. They created 
fruits with yellow flesh and sweet flavour and large luscious fruits. A generation later in 1992 
one single plant was selected from this new family (ZESPRI n.d).  
 
The first stage was completed and next followed the development of the characteristics of the 
new fruit. Commercial considerations like taste, colour, size, storage and shelf life had to be 
                                                 
5
 A Produce Marketing Organisation is a co-operative or a group of growers with a legal entity to manage the 
EurepGAP implementation for associated and contracted growers (EurepGAP, n.d). 
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taken into account. In 1997, almost 400 hectares of Te Puke land was dedicated to the new 
variety and the first 4000 trays were exported the following year. In 2000, the kiwifruit was 
launched and received the name ZESPRI™ Gold (gold); Plant Variety Rights were taken out 
in order to protect it internationally. The purpose of developing gold was never to substitute it 
for the green variety, but rather to act as a complementary product to extend the options for 
customers and consumers (ZESPRI 2004). New Zealand is the world sole exporter of golden 
kiwifruit and this variety currently accounts for almost 18 percent of total kiwifruit exports 
from New Zealand (Belrose Inc 2006).  
 
Twelve month supply 
Plantings of green and gold kiwifruit grown under the ZESPRI brand have currently been 
established in eight different countries. The fruit must reach the premium brand and quality 
standards established by ZESPRI in order to be sold on the respective markets. Italy and 
Japan are experiencing successful Gold plantings in particular, whereas the Californian 
growers are suffering from inability to reach the quality standards. Approximately 840 
hectares of the gold cultivar are currently planted for commercial purpose in Italy, USA, 
Chile, Japan, France and Korea. Trial plantings have also been established in Australia and 
China (ZESPRI 2004-2005).   
 
In efforts to develop a twelve-month supply system for ZESPRI‟s green and gold varieties, 
Italy has been selected as a major partner. In the season of 2005-06 Italy produced two million 
trays of green kiwifruit and 1.2 million trays of gold kiwifruit for the account of ZESPRI 
(Belrose Inc 2006). 
 
ZESPRI is taking advantage of its premium brand by planting high quality fruit in other 
countries and thereby securing supply from those ZESPRI plantings when kiwifruit will not 
be available from New Zealand. Other marketers have duplicated this strategy of essentially 
supplying the market with more fruit from a single brand than what is provided at the 
moment. Their challenge is consequently to ensure that there is a sufficient demand among 
consumers to meet the extra supplies. 
 
In 2006, ZESPRI announced their ability to export their gold variety from New Zealand 
between June and August and from Italy between December and January. The gaps in 
 20 
between will be filled by exports from Chile, where ZESPRI recently started growing gold 
(Freshinfo 2006).  
 
Aragorn 
Aragorn is the processing subsidiary of ZESPRI, formed in 2002 (Gardiner 2004), which 
focuses on transforming particularly gold kiwifruit. Aragorn is not part of the fresh whole 
fruit programmes of ZESPRI. The company processes kiwifruit into food ingredients and 
preparations. Aragorn will remain a unit under development over the next couple of years, 
concentrating on growing the markets in Europe and Asia. In these markets, ingredients 
developed by Aragorn have been mainly used in dairy, beverage and dessert products 
(ZESPRI 2004-2005). 
 
Taste Japan 
The importance of taste in consumer preference and repeat purchase levels has long been 
advocated by marketers and reinforced through consumer research. Such research conducted 
on the Japanese market some years ago clearly demonstrated that Japanese consumers prefer 
high dry matter fruit and were also willing to pay more for taste (McAneney n.d.). Dry matter 
strongly influences the taste of the fruit and is defined by the ratio of dry weight to fresh 
weight of the fruit (ZESPRI 2005). These specific consumer preferences were clearly 
supported by a 50 percent decline in exported volumes of the green kiwifruit over the last 
decade (from 15 to 7.4 million trays in 2001) (McAneney n.d.). Japan is an important and 
valuable market for ZESPRI. As the highest earning market in the world they are willing to 
pay premium price for kiwifruit (ZESPRI 2004) and should therefore be considered a 
significant source of profit. The Japanese taste issues gave rise to founding the programme 
Taste Japan, which was implemented in 2001. Research proved that Japanese kiwifruit 
consumers would pay 12 percent more in sales price for an extra one percent improvement in 
dry matter. Research was carried out to establish the relationship between dry matter levels 
and orchard management and subsequently provide guidelines of how to improve dry matter 
content. It was confirmed that dry matter is influenced by the supply of carbohydrates, which 
for example depends on the amount of sunlight captured (ZESPRI 2005). Under this 
programme, kiwifruit growers that manage to grow high quality fruit are rewarded with a 
payment premium (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2004). ZESPRI aims to increase the 
dry matter content of the entire kiwifruit crop in New Zealand by encouraging growers to 
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apply growing programmes maximising dry matter content (USDA Foreign Agricultural 
Service 2005). 
 
Taste issues in 2004 seem to have been partially solved in 2005, when total volumes sold in 
Japan reached almost 16 million trays. In 2004, ZESPRI expanded its program to other 
markets, including Korea, Taiwan and China, by introducing the Taste ZESPRI campaign 
(ZESPRI 2004-2005).  
 
Thus far, the history and development of the New Zealand kiwifruit industry has been 
described. A number of historical global and domestic events and „shocks‟ have played a 
significant role in shaping the nature of the New Zealand kiwifruit sector. Today, New 
Zealand enjoys a price premium advantage on the world market that can be explained and 
justified through industry specific strategies and a well-developed production management 
system. 
 
2.2. Overview of New Zealand and world markets 
2.2.1. Size of global market 
Two thirds of the total world production of kiwifruit enters the global market and relatively 
few main players account for the vast bulk of international trade in kiwifruit. The OECD 
member countries accounted for almost 85 percent of world imports of kiwifruit in 2004 
(Belrose Inc 2006) and world exports are currently dominated by Italy (35 percent), New 
Zealand (32 percent) and Chile (15 percent) (HortResearch 2005). All players in the 
international marketplace are highly influenced by and dependent on circumstances and trends 
in the individual markets. 
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Figure 2: Top ten kiwifruit producing countries 2003-05  
China 23%
New Zealand 20%
Italy 28%
Chile 10%
South Korea 1%
Japan 3%
USA 2%
France 5%
Iran 1%
Greece 3%
Others 4%
 
Graphic: (HortResearch 2006) 
 
The world‟s three largest producers have until recently been Italy, New Zealand and Chile. 
China has overtaken Chile and New Zealand in the production stakes, but the original three 
countries are currently still the three largest exporters and account for more than 80 percent of 
total global exports. Since China has a relatively large domestic market to supply, the 
country‟s future potential on the export market is yet unknown (Belrose Inc 2006). 
 
Italy and New Zealand have constantly been the top two exporters. Since the 1992-93 season 
Italy has been leading the exports in ten seasons and New Zealand in five. Italy‟s exports 
exceeded New Zealand‟s until 2004, when New Zealand supplied the global market with 
more kiwifruit than Italy. The third largest exporter, Chile, has produced a stable and slightly 
increasing export volume. Iran‟s export volumes have grown from a small base to become the 
world‟s fourth largest exporter in 2004. Greece‟s exports have fluctuated significantly over 
the recent years due to poor weather conditions affecting the crop and subsequently export 
numbers. Three other export countries, France, the United States and Spain, have presented 
relatively stable statistics from 1999 and onwards. China has grown from providing the global 
market with insignificant numbers of fruit to become the second largest producer and the 
ninth largest exporter in the world in the 2003-05 period (Belrose Inc 2006). In 2005, all three 
major exporters sent most of their exports to the European market (EU-15), yet differed in 
their second most significant export market. Italy focused on the rest of Europe and Russia, 
whereas New Zealand and Chile concentrated on the Asian market and North America 
respectively (Belrose Inc 2007).  
 
Italy 28% 
China 23% 
New Zealand 
20% 
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2.2.2. EU’s role in world trade 
Out of the producing and exporting countries in the EU, Italy has always been, and remains, 
the largest kiwifruit producing nation with a significant influence on the world market. The 
EU also constitutes the largest consuming market in the world. 
 
Italy is the leading supplier of kiwifruit on the international market. Italy‟s kiwifruit 
marketing strategy differs considerably from the one in New Zealand and is performed by 
numerous organisations of different structures and sizes. Since there are no trade barriers 
within the European Union, Italy‟s domestic market effectively consists of 460 million 
European citizens. This can be seen as an immediate advantage, but Italy has also encountered 
some difficulties in applying a nationwide control over exported volumes and quality. This is 
a concern that the centralised New Zealand system controls better. To increase its 
competitiveness, Italy has recently invested in improving every stage of the supply chain 
through introducing the latest technology, strong brands, new varieties and forming alliances 
with suppliers in other countries such as France and Chile (Belrose Inc 2006).  
 
Italy experienced a large over-supply in the 2004-05 season, which resulted in the price of 
Italian fruit falling by over 30 percent on the European market. This issue had large 
implications on the entire international kiwifruit industry and illustrates the impact and 
important role of Italian circumstances internationally. Italy‟s latest contribution to new 
kiwifruit varieties is the Summerkiwi cultivar. This fruit can be harvested up to 40 days before 
the Hayward variety, which provides Italy with the opportunity to supply the world market 
with fruit earlier than relevant competitors (Belrose Inc 2006). 
 
2.2.3. China’s role in world trade 
While the rest of the world has steadily increased kiwifruit plantings, China has increased 
kiwifruit production more than tenfold over the past decade. In 1999, the total production of 
kiwifruit from China reached 165,000 metric tonnes and was estimated to have reached 
400,000 metric tonnes per year by 2006. If productivity approaches the level of other 
countries, Chinese annual production could potentially reach 700 000 metric tonnes per year 
(Huang and Ferguson 2001). Currently, almost all domestically produced kiwifruit is sold 
within the country and between one fifth and one third is being processed. Exports presently 
account for only two percent, a number that is likely to change as existing orchards mature 
(Huang and Ferguson 2002). China is facing a few challenges mainly concerning quality 
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issues and coordination of marketing and production (Huang and Ferguson 2001). The 
country also needs to be prepared for a significant production expansion within the next few 
years and consequently improve present storage and transport facilities (Belrose Inc 2006). 
Another issue concerns planting more commercially demanded varieties. At present, the 
Chinese kiwifruit industry produces varieties that are not as desirable to either Chinese or 
international consumers (Huang and Ferguson 2001). Even though the Hayward variety has 
not been extensively planted in China, the country is still the world‟s fourth largest producer 
of the variety, which could have a significant impact on world trade as more Hayward 
orchards are being planted (Huang and Ferguson 2002). 
 
Chinese kiwifruit production did not become globally significant until the late 1990s and is 
growing rapidly (with production more than trebling since 1999). In 2003-2005 official 
statistics positioned China as the second largest producing country in the world. The industry 
concentrates on supplying the domestic market first of all and then on export markets. Only 
small volumes have been exported to Asian markets and some trial shipments have been sent 
to European and North American markets (Belrose Inc 2006).  
 
The industry faces two main obstacles to exporting its kiwifruit. Firstly, the majority of 
commercial plantings are of less desirable varieties (not Hayward). Secondly, the production 
is divided among many small sections managed by individual farmers. This has caused 
difficulties in controlling the chemical use and compliance with quality requirements (Belrose 
Inc 2006).   
 
Several indicators suggest that trade (both imports and exports) of kiwifruit with China could 
grow rapidly over the next couple of years. Since the country previously managed to solve the 
quality problems facing the apple and pear industries (Belrose Inc 2006), it is likely to 
perform similarly in the kiwifruit industry. The effects of both increased economic standards 
and the rapid spread of supermarket chains are likely to create a strong Chinese demand for 
supplies of fresh fruit all year around (Belrose Inc 2006). This could potentially benefit New 
Zealand, from where China imports several thousand tonnes of kiwifruit annually already 
(Huang and Ferguson 2001).  
 
China has invested in several breeding programmes, focusing on new varieties suitable to the 
Chinese growing conditions. These have resulted in two new cultivars; the Jintao, which is 
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more or less equivalent to the New Zealand gold variety and commercialised in Italy, and the 
Red Sun; with hairless green skin, yellow flesh and red locules. The latter variety is expected 
to reach production of commercial levels in 2007 (Belrose Inc 2006). Since the Jintao variety 
is notably similar to the New Zealand gold variety, they could be seen as direct competitors 
for the same market shares. Even if New Zealand enjoys plant variety rights to the gold 
variety, and the Gold and Jintao are hence not completely substitutable, they will still both be 
considered as golden kiwifruit in this research. 
 
2.2.4. Other main players 
Chile 
The kiwifruit industry of this South American country was profoundly damaged in the 1980s 
by an overexpansion that led to a stagnated production in the 1990s. The plantings expanded 
again in the early years of the new millennium. Chile carries out marketing through a number 
of exporting firms, like the Italians, and in the 2005 shipping season exports from 128 
different companies were identified (Belrose Inc 2006). The larger export companies have 
allied with Northern hemisphere traders and established marketing and promotion contracts 
with major retailers  (Belrose Inc 2006).  
 
Chile is currently striving to get the domestic quality standards, Chilgap, recognised as 
equivalent to EurepGAP and thereby upgrade the country‟s international competitiveness. The 
Chilean government has also aggressively pursued free trade agreements with countries 
worldwide over the last couple of years to improve market access of Chilean fruits (Belrose 
Inc 2006). Chile is still the third largest exporter of kiwifruit, but for how much longer is 
unclear, since China appears to have the capability to compete for international market share.    
 
France 
Many small producers form the French kiwifruit industry and the export marketing is divided 
between four large exporting firms. Just like Italy, France benefits from the geographical 
advantage of having the largest consuming countries as neighbours within the EU, thereby 
facing zero tariffs into these key markets. The country remains vulnerable to competition 
from Italy and was heavily affected by the Italian expansion in the 2004-05 season. France is 
currently the world‟s sixth largest exporter (Belrose Inc 2006). 
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Greece 
Due to several years of crop failures starting in 2001, Greece lost its position as an important 
player on the European market. However, the country regained its status in 2004, 
unfortunately concurrent with the excess supply in the Italian market sold at minimum price. 
Due to relatively low production costs Greece managed to survive the setback and maintain 
access to the markets in Eastern Europe and in Russia. Consumers in these countries and 
domestically are increasingly demanding higher quality food products, due to advancing 
economic standards. This puts severe pressure on the Greek kiwifruit industry and in order to 
maintain its market share in those countries fruit quality needs to be improved to meet 
demand (Belrose Inc 2006).  
 
The United States 
Kiwifruit plants were originally exported to the United States from New Zealand. The first 
commercial grower was established in 1960 in California, the state where 95 percent of total 
U.S. kiwifruit production is represented (California Kiwifruit Commission 2000). In 2005, the 
domestic kiwifruit crop had increased with 55 percent compared to the last season. This new 
situation introduces the country to challenges of both increasing domestic consumption and 
expanding exports. Since the country recently increased its awareness and concerns regarding 
health, diet and obesity matters, the kiwifruit industry should have an essential message to get 
across (Belrose Inc 2006). Domestic marketing and promotion efforts should focus on and 
emphasise the unique health benefits of the kiwifruit (Belrose Inc 2006). 
 
2.2.5. Trade restrictions 
International trade in kiwifruit is currently distorted by several measures. Import tariffs 
constitute the most common trade restriction, and are imposed by several major importing 
countries. China imposes a relatively high import tariff of 20 percent (New Zealand Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 2006), although it is possible that these tariffs may be reduced on New 
Zealand imports once the near-complete New Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement is 
concluded. Kiwifruit imports to the United States and the EU face tariffs of 8.5 percent  and 8 
percent respectively (European Commission 2006), (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
n.d.). Japan‟s import tariff reaches 6.5 percent (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2000). 
Other countries with high import tariffs include Taiwan (25 percent) (New Zealand 
Fruitgrowers Federation 2003) and South Korea (46.5 percent) (New Zealand Fruitgrowers 
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Federation 2003). The latter two will not be considered in this research due to their relative 
insignificance on the international market. 
    
Another commonly exercised non-tariff policy falls under the classification of a Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) measure, established by the WTO. This is an agreement recognising what 
measures a government can execute in order to protect domestic animal and plant health and 
food safety (World Trade Organisation 2005). According to Voss (2005), these are very 
efficient measures in order to prevent substandard kiwifruit from entering currently health 
aware and environmentally and safety concerned markets and are the reason for several trade 
disputes in progress. Biosecurity policies are common SPS measures. Biosecurity is a major 
issue for isolated islands and countries as Australia, Japan and New Zealand. Although their 
isolation acts as a natural deterrent to biosecurity risks, these countries also actively protect 
and control against several pests and diseases in order to avoid the potentially severe 
economic consequences that the introduction of these might have on their domestic 
agricultural industries (Anderson 2004). 
 
An example of such SPS non-tariff barriers is the introduction of a stricter phytosanitary 
measure in Japan, which was executed through increased fumigation of imported New 
Zealand organic kiwifruit at the Japanese border (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 2002). 
New Zealand has, since 2000, had ongoing disputes with Japan concerning the trade 
restriction targeting imported organic kiwifruit. These measures were argued to comply with 
the regulations established in the SPS agreement within the WTO and Japan fumigated 
imported commodities more frequently than other WTO members (New Zealand Fruitgrowers 
Federation 2002). In order to avoid any possible risks Japan chose to fumigate large imported 
shipments, and according to New Zealand (2002), routinely started fumigating imports that 
even contained insect species already present in the country (New Zealand Fruitgrowers 
Federation 2002). 
 
2.2.6. New Zealand production trends 
The kiwifruit industry in New Zealand was the earliest and among the most proactive players 
to position itself on the global market. The country is consequently the second largest 
producer and exporter of kiwifruit today. From starting out as an insignificant source of 
returns/investment in the early 1970‟s, the New Zealand kiwifruit industry expanded 
dramatically to become a highly important agricultural sector and the sixth largest export 
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earner in 1991 (HortResearch 2005) and subsequently the most valuable horticultural exporter 
in 2007 (NZ$790 million) (Statistics New Zealand 2007). Marketing and exports are carried 
out by the single desk seller ZESPRI Ltd. This constitutes a significant advantage to New 
Zealand, through the combination of resources and marketing efforts. The New Zealand 
strategy is also subject to ongoing trade disputes within the World Trade Organisation, where 
it is considered by some WTO members as a State Trading Enterprise and hence a trade 
distorting measure that may be subject to removal as multilateral trade negotiations progress. 
 
Trends by variety 
The Green kiwifruit variety remains the most widely produced and consumed kiwifruit 
variety. By 1997 all New Zealand kiwifruit was grown under either KiwiGreen or organic 
production systems. Plantings have been established overseas in order to ensure a twelve 
month supply of New Zealand kiwifruit. Most of these orchards (mainly in Italy) are joint 
ventures between New Zealand supplier groups and overseas landowners (New Zealand 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006). 
 
The volumes in the organic kiwifruit sector remains steady despite a few issues smaller fruit 
size and more significant yield fluctuations. The organic grower returns for the 2005 crop was 
NZ$1.88/tray higher than for Green kiwifruit (NZ$5.46/tray)  (New Zealand Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2006). Through extensive market research the programme Taste Japan has 
aimed at increasing sales of kiwifruit on the Japanese market. The strategy implemented to 
reach this goal includes increasing the dry matter content of the kiwifruit crop. Growers are 
encouraged to do so through higher returns of fruit with dry matter (New Zealand Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2006). 
 
The Gold kiwifruit sector is expanding more than the other varieties and, as mentioned earlier, 
overseas plantings have been established of this variety as well (Freshinfo 2006). For Gold 
kiwifruit the grower returns for the 2005 crop was NZ$2/tray higher than for Green kiwifruit 
at NZ$5.46/tray (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006). The plant variety rights and 
brand name are owned by ZESPRI, which makes it impossible for competitors to replicate. 
However, it does not prevent them from inventing other new varieties that could compete for 
the same market share. Research and breeding programmes like these are being carried out in 
both Italy and China, where new cultivars have also been developed (Belrose Inc 2006). 
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Change in export markets 
As outlined above, traditional kiwifruit producers and exporters such as Italy, New Zealand 
and Chile are facing significant changes in global market conditions. The most fundamental 
challenge for these countries is the rapidly increasing global supply of kiwifruit and the 
potential for losses in market shares as other producers such as China become more 
prominent. In addition, the global marketplace for soft fruits more generally is becoming 
increasingly crowded – creating additional competition for kiwifruit exporters. It is argued 
that the global kiwifruit industry should focus on marketing and promotion in both its 
traditional rich country markets and newer emerging country markets (Belrose Inc 2006) in 
order to remain competitive and profitable. 
 
With China as an upcoming competitor on the world market, the distribution of market shares 
among current players are most likely to change. China has already passed New Zealand‟s 
production statistics and indications suggest that the country‟s role as an exporter will 
increase significantly as well. This will subsequently affect New Zealand‟s market share in 
current export markets. 
 
Countries such as Chile (New Zealand‟s most noteworthy competitor in the Southern 
hemisphere) are currently undergoing free trade negotiations with several countries. Free 
trade agreements that give New Zealand‟s competitors preferential market access to 
significant kiwifruit consuming markets could potentially damage New Zealand export 
returns.  
 
Intense New Zealand marketing has been carried out in important export markets. Taste 
Japan has already proven successful in Japan where ZESPRI‟s market research and marketing 
efforts have resulted in significantly higher volumes sold. The campaign has therefore 
continued in other countries as well (ZESPRI 2004-2005).  
 
2.2.7. Producer price for exporters 
Out of the net exporting countries, New Zealand is currently the country that enjoys the 
highest producer price on all varieties. These prices include the premiums that the New 
Zealand industry, due to several industry developed advantages (such as KiwiGreen, the 
twelve moth supply system and plant variety rights of Golden kiwifruit), can add to a regular 
price. Because of the higher premiums, New Zealand has always been the country other 
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exporters compare their price standards against (Belrose Inc 2006). Italian producers have 
received a relatively lower price than New Zealand in 11 years out of 15 between 1990 and 
2004. Italian producers were hence price leaders for four of these years. New Zealand has 
managed to maintain the price premium, despite the higher transfer costs New Zealand suffers 
in order to reach the Northern hemisphere. U.S. prices have struggled to keep a high level 
over the past decades and did not reach acceptable levels until 2003, after a gradual increase 
from the lowest levels in 1992. Greece targets most kiwifruit exports towards lower-income 
markets, which consequently affects the level of prices received by producers. Chile is 
another significant exporting country which also faces high transfer costs to the Northern 
Hemisphere. The producer prices in Chile have always been lower compared to both Italy and 
New Zealand and constitutes almost as little as a tenth of New Zealand‟s producer price in 
2003 (Belrose Inc 2006). The values for producer prices in 2003 reflect the price levels for 
different varieties and different countries. The position of the different countries relative to 
each other, in terms of producer prices, gives an indication of the price situation for most 
years (not just 2003). See appendix for further information on basedata for all countries in 
2003.  
  
Table 1: Producer prices for net exporters in 2003 
 Producer price (US$) 
Varieties New Zealand Italy Greece Chile 
Green 1715 1115 677 128 
Gold 2120 1438 874 165 
Green organic 2141 1572 955 180 
Source: Faostat 
 
Quantities for exporters 
As mentioned earlier, significant world production of kiwifruit is carried out in a few 
countries. These producers (apart from China) heavily dominate foreign trade as well. 
Quantities produced and distributed on the world market have increased steadily over time, 
with a few exceptions of dramatic seasonal peaks. Some years‟ unexpected increased 
production subsequently affected world prices significantly. See appendix for further 
information on the base data for all countries in 2003. 
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Table 2: Quantities produced for net exporters in 2003 
 Quantities produced (metric tonnes) for net exporters 
Varieties New Zealand Italy Chile Greece 
Green 261 323 125 60 
Gold 31 0 0 0 
Green organic 8 16 6 3 
Source: Faostat 
 
 
Table 3: Quantities traded for net exporters in 2003 
 Quantity traded (metric tonnes) for net exporters 
Varieties New Zealand Italy Chile Greece 
Green 237 208 111 15 
Gold 31 -2 0 0 
Green organic 7 -6 6 2 
Source: Faostat 
 
New Zealand appears to be most dependent on trade out of the net exporting countries as 237 
out of 261 metric tonnes of green kiwifruit contributes to exports. Italy is the largest producer 
but consumes about one third of its produced green kiwifruit domestically. Chile does not 
produce as much, but is also heavily dependent on exports. 
 
2.3. Key current and future market drivers 
The global kiwifruit industry is undergoing changes on both the demand and supply sides and 
some of the issues will be further discussed in the following section.  
 
2.3.1. Supply side 
Some countries are now implementing a variety of strategies to prepare for increasing global 
supplies and to address the threat of losing global market shares. Unless carefully managed, 
some of these strategies may create further demand/supply imbalances, at least in the short-
term, and the industry needs to take caution in order to avoid these problems.  
 
New Zealand and Italy have initiated growing programmes in foreign countries in order to 
secure a twelve-month supply of products with their brand. With many different marketers 
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now following similar strategies, the effect will be increased global supply of kiwifruit in 
every month of the year. 
 
Italy has recently commercialised the Summerkiwi variety, which can be harvested long 
before the Hayward. This could give a timing advantage before competitors but there might 
be an issue with early supplies simply adding to the overlap of supplies between the Northern 
and the Southern hemisphere. With more kiwifruit on the market, the prices will drop causing 
reduced returns for the global industry. 
 
The most fundamental challenge the industry will be confronted by shortly is the increasing 
global supply of not only kiwifruit, but also of other competing fruits. It is argued that the 
global kiwifruit industry should focus on marketing and promotion in both its traditional rich 
country markets and newer emerging country markets (Belrose Inc 2006). As mentioned 
earlier, China constitutes the country with the most potential to increase the supply of Green 
kiwifruit on the world market in the nearest future. 
 
 Not only is total supply expected to increase, but productivity and technological 
improvements are most likely to improve as well. This is currently being experienced in most 
producing countries. 
 
The import tariff is still the most widely applied trade restriction within the kiwifruit industry. 
However, other non-tariff trade barriers such as the SPS measure are becoming more 
commonly used and one of the focus points of this research will be how a potential 
introduction of such a trade barrier would affect the New Zealand kiwifruit industry. 
 
The major retailers now dominate the food distribution system. This brings into question 
whether multiple players can continue to operate effectively in the supply chain. Retailers 
require continuous communication between them and the supplier and the existence of 
numerous players in the market makes this more difficult. The competition is tough and the 
marketers increasingly need to confirm to retailers the ability to build enough cooperation and 
communication into the present supply system in order to become the preferred supplier 
(Belrose Inc 2006). 
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There are also domestic industry structure challenges for the New Zealand kiwifruit industry 
at the moment. First of all there are an increasing number of corporations working as 
intermediate suppliers to ZESPRI. These are constantly growing and there are presently 
negotiations in progress between two of the largest supplier cooperatives, Satara and 
EastPack, to merge and thereby create the largest kiwifruit packing and cool storage business 
in the country (Freshinfo 2006). As these companies become larger, it is possible that some of 
them may seek to extend their own access to international markets, rather than selling through 
ZESPRI. ZESPRI is therefore under constant pressure to perform better than potential 
substitutes for growers (Belrose Inc 2006).  
 
A considerable risk to intellectual property rights owned by ZESPRI is China‟s use of illegal 
use of counterfeit labels. The ZESPRI label has been copied and put on Chinese kiwifruit in 
certain domestic markets. The counterfeit attempts are of concern for both Golden and Green 
kiwifruit. Commercial plantings of Gold kiwifruit in China will consequently not commence 
until local Chinese laws are able to protect the intellectual property rights (HortNews 2004). 
 
Some of these trends and challenges are not necessarily specific to the kiwifruit sector. They 
also apply to other horticultural sectors, and are perhaps best addressed through joint action 
and global cooperation. This has recently been recognised by the fresh apple and pear 
industries in the Southern hemisphere where, following a significant downturn, better sharing 
of information now benefits all global players (Belrose Inc 2006). The kiwifruit industry has 
so far not experienced the very severe conditions faced by the apple and pear industries, but 
the indicators are identical; increased supplies and increased power of retailers and 
distributors (Dalgety 2003). 
 
2.3.2. Demand side 
Trends in consumption are changing globally. Consumers demand not only products that 
benefit health, but also products that have been produced in an environmentally friendly 
manner. The market therefore puts pressure on producers to implement strategies and 
production systems that minimise the negative affect on the environment. Terms such as 
carbon footprints, food miles and sustainability work as incentives for producing countries to 
continuously perform better.  
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Producers also need to respond to the higher demand of product diversity and the constant 
demand for novelties and substitutes to current commodities. Research and breeding 
programmes are being developed worldwide in kiwifruit producing countries to meet 
consumer preferences. New Zealand, Italy, China and Chile belong to the world‟s top 
producers and have all recently developed new varieties that differ from each other.  
 
Multilateral and regional trade liberalisation is also of current interest of many countries 
relevant to kiwifruit trade. New Zealand and China are currently taking part in negotiations 
regarding a Free Trade Agreement. Chile, New Zealand‟s direct competitor, is another 
country currently seeking new trade partners after signing an Association Agreement with the 
EU in 2002 (European Commission 2004).  
 
The second reason why the New Zealand kiwifruit sector may face significant change is due 
to the nature of its single desk seller structure. ZESPRI, with its single point of entry system, 
has been mentioned in multilateral trade liberalisation negotiations within the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). Some countries, such as the United States, regard the single point of 
entry strategy as being discriminatory and trade distorting and consider that it should be made 
illegal under the WTO trading rules
6
.  
 
2.4. Conclusion of chapter 
New Zealand was the first country to start growing and selling kiwifruit commercially. This 
chapter has examined the formation and early development of the New Zealand kiwifruit 
industry. It describes how it endured the deregulation of the agricultural sector in the 1980s 
and how other economic factors affected the industry. It goes through how the development 
and improvement of the New Zealand industry structure has lead to the establishment of 
ZESPRI. Recent strategies have differentiated New Zealand as an innovative market player 
that enjoys price premiums on all exported kiwifruit. 
 
The main issues for New Zealand consist of production threats from China, both in terms of 
increasing quantity and varieties; trade restrictions such as SPS measures and a potential loss 
of the single desk seller structure. This chapter introduced the development of the global 
industry and its challenges ahead. The global kiwifruit market is changing rapidly on both the 
                                                 
6
 However, at the time of writing, the outcomes of current WTO negotiations are unclear. It is possible that the 
negotiations may go “on hold” for a period of time, in which case, the immediate pressure on ZESPRI may be 
delayed (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2007). 
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demand and supply sides, and is therefore a good candidate for further qualitative and 
empirical investigation. The following chapter will provide an understanding of the 
underlying trade theory and how it explains the potential issues. 
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3. Trade theory: Theoretical framework 
 
Countries may choose to participate in international trade because of the following two 
reasons: non-availability of factors of production (natural resources) and demand for product 
differentiation (different quality) (Gandolfo 1998). The reasons clearly contribute to the gains 
from trade and explain how the countries benefit from free trade rather than autarky. The 
following section on the theory of trade will elaborate the issue and explain how and why 
countries gain from trade.  
 
3.1. Theory of trade 
3.1.1. Mercantilism   
The first economic philosophy of mercantilism was established as some European countries 
developed into modern nations where trade had a significant importance and value. The core 
of this theory was essentially that a country could become rich and powerful by exporting 
more than it imported. Mercantilists also supported strict government control on all economic 
activities by encouraging national output and employment through restricted imports and 
stimulated exports. The export surplus would be exchanged for precious metals such as gold 
and silver, which were considered real national wealth indicators. This theory implied that a 
country only could gain from trade at the expense of another, since it is impossible for all 
trading countries to have an export surplus. Because mercantilism advocated economic 
nationalism and severe government regulation the early theory was to become heavily 
criticised by several trade economists in the following centuries (Salvatore 1999). 
 
3.1.2. Adam Smith 
Adam Smith (1776) established in The Wealth of Nations that countries would gain from 
shifting from a situation in autarky to free trade. His argument was based on the law of 
absolute advantage, which suggests that if a country has an absolute cost advantage in the 
production of one commodity and the other country has an absolute cost advantage in the 
production of the other, both countries would gain from free trade if specialising in the 
production thereof and subsequently exporting these commodities (Gandolfo 1998). 
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3.1.3. Ricardo 
In 1817 David Ricardo published the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, where 
the trade law of absolute advantage was developed into the law of comparative advantage. 
The law of comparative advantage was first illustrated as a two-nation, two-commodity world 
and demonstrates how a country could gain from trade through specialising in the production 
of the commodity in which it is relatively cost efficient compared to the other country. This 
country would subsequently export the commodity in which it has a lower opportunity cost 
and import the commodity in which it does not. Opportunity cost is defined as the value of 
other potential options given up for a certain alternative (Seitz, Nelson et al. 1994). The 
theory also assumes, given one country has a comparative advantage in producing one 
commodity, that the other country consequently must have a comparative advantage in 
producing the other commodity. This differs from Smith‟s principle of absolute advantage: 
even if a country has an absolute disadvantage in producing both commodities, it can still be 
beneficial for that country to specialise in the production of the least inefficiently produced 
commodity. Both countries are hence better off specialising in their comparatively 
advantageous commodity, even if one country enjoys absolute advantage in the production of 
both commodities. Ricardo explained his theory through the difference in labour productivity 
and that countries engage in trade because of different levels of technology (Salvatore 2005).   
 
J.S. Mill (1848) developed the equation of international demand, with which it is possible to 
calculate the terms of trade by establishing that the value of exports from one country equals 
the value of imports of another country. The value of supply and demand will therefore adjust 
to equalise and represent each other. This was further elaborated by Alfred Marshall (1879) in 
his theory of international reciprocal demand, by which he introduced the graphic illustration 
and tool of Marshallian offer curves, or supply and demand curves, to graphically indicate the 
different terms of trade (Gandolfo 1998).  
 
 
3.1.4. Heckscher-Ohlin 
The previous section explained classical theory through international differences in 
comparative advantage. The reason why these characteristics appear was further developed by 
Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin. They established that the comparative advantage of a country, 
and thus trade, originates from different factor endowments, by assuming a market with two 
commodities, two countries and two factors of production (Krauss and Johnson 1974). The 
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book Interregional and International Trade, published in 1933 (Salvatore 1999), presents an 
extension of standard trade theory. The fundamental assumptions behind this theory are that 
factors of production are immobile between countries (mobile between industries though) and 
that these factors are used differently in the production of two different commodities. The 
difference in technology between countries is explained by different levels of capital (Leamer 
1987). The core of the general Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) theory was further developed and 
explained in four different theorems; the H-O theorem, which predicts the patterns of trade; 
the factor price equalisation theorem, which explains the effect of international trade on 
factor prices; the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which states the relationship between changed 
production and real returns; and the Rybczynski theorem illustrating the impact a change in 
factor endowment will have on output (Leamer 1987). 
 
The first theorem, according to Heckscher and Ohlin, seeks to explain the reason behind 
comparative advantages by suggesting that a country will use its relatively abundant resource 
to produce and subsequently export a commodity. The commodity that requires the intensive 
use of the relatively expensive and scarce factor of production will consequently be imported. 
This theorem thus develops the classical theory of comparative advantage by explaining trade 
patterns and relative commodity prices through the physical availability of factor endowments 
among nations. The theorem is therefore often referred to as the factor-proportions or factor-
endowment theory and also emphasises the differences between commodities through the 
intensities of which these factors are used (Salvatore 2005).  
 
The factor price equalisation theorem, developed by Lerner and Samuelson, states that 
international trade will contribute to an equalisation of homogenous factor prices across 
trading nations. The theorem thus proves that as trade expands the difference is reduced 
between wages of the same type of labour and earnings of the same type of capital (Salvatore 
2005).  
 
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem describes how a rise in the relative price of one commodity 
will increase the real returns of the factor that is used intensively in the production of that 
commodity. This will consequently lead to a decrease of real returns of the other production 
factor (Choi, Harrigan et al. 2003). Real returns, influenced by free international trade, will 
therefore increase in the factor used intensively in production and decrease in the factor of 
production used less intensively. 
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The Rybczynski theorem assumes production of two goods under constant factor and 
commodity prices. This implies that an increase in one factor endowment will consequently 
increase the production of the commodity in which that factor is used and decrease the output 
of the other commodity. So, an increase in a factor endowment generally causes one industry 
to expand at the expense of the other (industry) (Choi, Harrigan et al. 2003).  
 
The assumptions behind Ricardian theory are rather restrictive and the theory of comparative 
advantage is limited in terms of immobile factors of production between countries. The H-O 
theory is similarly restricted utilising the same assumptions. Despite these restrictive 
assumptions the H-O theory still belongs to one of the most dominant frameworks for 
analysing trade. However, the assumptions changed over time in order to facilitate the 
development of further trade theories, which are often referred to as the neoclassical theories.  
 
 
3.1.5. Modern trade theories 
The fundamental assumptions of classical trade theory include perfect competition and 
homogenous commodities across countries. However, reality illustrates an opposite situation 
where commodities are differentiated and market structures diverge from the theory of perfect 
competition by being based on structures such as monopolistic competition and oligopoly 
(Gandolfo 1998).  
 
Falvey (1981) developed a theory based on vertical differentiation, which explained how 
production is not homogenous, but that commodities differ in quality and consumers require 
different qualities based on their income level. The second point of this theory suggests that 
capital is specific to each industry, rather than homogenous, and because of its specificity also 
immobile (Gandolfo 1998). The theory thus suggests that demand differs between countries 
and provided demand cannot be met with domestic production, a country is better off 
engaging in trade.  
 
Krugman (1979) developed the theory of horizontally differentiated goods, which refers to 
products of the same quality but with different characteristics that are valued differently 
among consumers. This theory is based on the assumption that consumers generally enjoy 
variety. This is explained in Barker‟s (1977, cited in(Gandolfo 1998)) variety hypothesis. He 
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argues that “as real income increases, purchasers are enabled to buy more varieties of a 
product; and since a greater number of these extra varieties are available from abroad rather 
than at home, the share of imports in demand tends to increase”. The variety hypothesis 
originates from the theory of demand based on the characteristics of goods according to 
Lancaster (1966, 1971, cited in (Gandolfo 1998)). This theory argues that the characteristics 
available are more relevant to the choice of consumers rather than the commodity itself.  
 
A theory explaining preferences, developed by Dixit, Stiglitz (1977, cited in (Gandolfo 1998)) 
and Spence (1976, cited in (Gandolfo 1998)), suggests that behind the demand for 
differentiated goods lies the attractiveness of variety as such. This implies that consumers 
prefer intermediate combinations of all possible differentiated commodities. This theory has 
been used by Krugman to explain international trade in differentiated goods based on 
monopolistic competition (also neo-Chamberlinian monopolistic competition). It is observed 
that both approaches of differentiated products lead to an equilibrium of monopolistic 
competition, where different firms produce differentiated products and possess monopolistic 
power without necessarily earning monopolistic profits (Gandolfo 1998). 
 
3.1.6. Porter  
Classical trade theory explains national success and trade flow based on factor endowments. 
However, classical trade theory was further developed by Michael Porter to explain how 
globalisation of competition and the power of technology also contributes to trade. He stresses 
the need for a new theory that explains “why a nation provides a favourable home base for 
companies that compete internationally”. This theory should also develop other motives but 
the cost theory to explain why companies in some nations are more successful to create  
advantages based on quality, specific characteristics and product innovation (Porter 1998). 
 
In The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990), Porter argues that “national prosperity is 
created, not inherited” and that a country‟s competitiveness is not created by or dependent on 
natural endowments, but rather on the capacity of its industry to improve and innovate. The 
theory of competitive advantage therefore differs from the classical theories of relative 
advantage and trade. Porter continues by claiming that companies benefit from competition 
and pressure from rival companies and that competitive success is gained through differences 
in national value, culture, government policy and history. These factors constitute the primary 
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impacts on a nation‟s productivity, and contribute to a more modern concept of 
competitiveness (Porter 1998).  
 
3.2. The gains from trade 
Trade theory suggests that countries have the opportunity to specialise in the production of the 
commodity in which they are relatively efficient, export it and consequently import the 
commodity in which they have a comparative disadvantage. Specialisation therefore allows 
for both countries to reallocate resources into relatively efficient production. This efficiency 
implies that more commodities are produced and consumed under free trade rather than in a 
situation of self-sufficiency. 
 
The gains from trade can be demonstrated by depicting a production possibility frontier with 
an indifference curve and thereby representing both supply and demand, as in figure 1. The 
production possibility frontier illustrates the maximum production of two commodities with 
given resources and the indifference curve depicts the combination of commodities rendering 
a given level of utility. In autarky, the single country reaches equilibrium in point a, where the 
indifference curve (I1) is tangent to the production possibility frontier at the same point as the 
price line (P), which illustrates the relative price between the two commodities. In equilibrium 
the relative price hence equals the marginal rate of technical substitution (the slope of the 
price line) and the marginal rate of transformation (the slope of the production possibility 
frontier). This point demonstrates the maximum utility of consumers and the maximum profit 
of producers and thus the point where production equals consumption. The production 
possibility frontier is curved because of diminishing marginal returns (each additional unit of 
input yields a diminishing level of output) as the production inputs are substituted for each 
other (Salvatore 2005). 
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Figure 3: Single country in autarky  
 
Source: Salvatore, D. (2005). Introduction to International Economics. Fordham University: 
John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
 
 
By introducing a second country to trade with the first country, higher levels of production 
and consumption can potentially be reached. With trade, production increases in both 
countries, since it allows them to specialise in their relatively most efficient production. The 
production of the two countries is subsequently demonstrated by two different production 
possibility frontiers (PPFf and PPFc), due to relative efficiencies in different places, but since 
preferences are homogenous for both countries the same indifference curve applies. Because 
of different relative efficiencies, the countries move from the production points Pc1 and Pf1 to 
produce at the points Pc2 and Pf2 respectively, closer to complete specialisation, presenting 
two different price ratios. The indifference curve has shifted outwards (from I1 to I2) and the 
new common point of consumption is therefore determined by C‟. With trade, only one price 
line appears (P‟), tangent to the highest possible indifference, presenting the new international 
terms of trade. Both countries will conclusively benefit from trade in terms of more  
commodities and a higher utility (from I1 to I2) (Salvatore 2005).  
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Figure 4: Two countries trading 
 
Source: Salvatore, D. (2005). Introduction to International Economics. Fordham University: 
John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
 
As long as the international terms of trade are different compared to the autarky price ratio, 
the potential welfare of a country is higher with international trade than without it. The effect 
of trade is essentially to increase the price of exportable products and hence promote a 
reallocation of resources towards the relatively efficient industry and thereby raising the 
relative price of the factor used intensively in that production. The real income of that 
production factor is increased while the income of the factor used in production of the 
importable good is consequently reduced. Free trade can therefore be considered to benefit 
one factor of production while reducing production, and hence the factor of production, of the 
other. The change in social welfare determines to what extent a country is better or worse off 
in a situation with free international trade (Krauss and Johnson 1974). 
 
3.3. Impact of trade restrictions in the kiwifruit market 
In previous sections the gains from free trade in terms of maximised world production and 
consumer utility have been discussed. Although free trade is argued to make countries better 
off, almost every country imposes some type of restriction on international trade. The 
following section will introduce some of the most commonly used restrictions within the 
global trade of kiwifruit and their general effect on the international market. A theoretical as 
well as a graphical analysis of how a restriction effects production, consumption and trade 
will be presented in each case. 
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3.3.1. Tariffs 
The tariff is one of the most widely and historically used trade restrictions (Salvatore 2005). 
Tariffs may be specific, ad valorem or compound. The specific tariff is introduced as a fixed 
amount of money on every traded unit, the ad valorem tariff is a fixed percentage on the value 
of the traded commodity, and the compound tariff is a combination of both (Salvatore 2005). 
Imposing a tariff can be expressed by shifting the price in the market from free trade 
equilibrium, which is depicted in the following graph, where an import tariff is imposed by 
the importing country.  
 
Figure 5: Global effect of an import tariff 
 
 
Source: Salvatore, D. (2005). Introduction to International Economics. Fordham University: 
John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
 
Pe is the initial price in free trade equilibrium, which changes by the tariff and becomes Ptm in 
the importing country and Ptx in the exporting country. The price in the importing country 
increases with the tariff and decreases in the exporting country due to reduced excess demand 
(ED to ED‟) for their commodity. The government gains revenue collected through the tariff. 
Production in the exporting country decreases from Qsx to Qsx‟ (because of less exported 
products) and increases from Qsm to Qsm‟ in the importing country (due to a less competitive 
domestic market). Consumption, on the other hand, increases in the exporting country from 
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Qdx to Qdx‟ (more commodities at a lower price) and decreases from Qdm to Qdm‟ in the 
importing country (less commodities at a higher price).  
 
3.3.2. Sanitary and Phytosanitary policies 
International trade in kiwifruit is currently distorted by several measures. Import tariffs are 
still the most commonly exercised policy, but another import restriction that has been used 
more frequently falls under the classification of a Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measure, 
as defined by the WTO (World Trade Organisation 2005). The SPS Agreeement is an 
agreement recognising what measures a government can execute in order to protect domestic 
animal and plant health and food safety. Member countries of the WTO are allowed to set 
their own standards, provided that the regulations are scientifically justifiable. If countries use 
international standards, guidelines and directives, they should unlikely be challenged legally 
in a WTO dispute. Introducing an SPS policy may be legitimate when it is considered 
necessary to protect human, animal and plant life and health. The measure is considered 
inappropriate (or illegal) if it discriminates between countries with similar conditions and 
standards. If an exporting country can justify that health protecting measures applied to 
exports achieve the same level as in the importing country, the importing country is expected 
to accept the level of protection in the exporting country and hence accept imports (World 
Trade Organisation 2005). According to Voss (2005), SPS measures are considered highly 
efficient in order to prevent kiwifruit below domestic standards from entering a health-aware 
and environmentally and safety concerned market. Countries can use the measure to legally 
prevent substandard commodities from being imported. This could be relevant if imported 
kiwifruit proves to contain certain pests that are not domestically found or wanted or if 
pesticide levels prove to be too high for domestic standards. Issues like these are the reason 
for several trade disputes in progress.  
 
To satisfy WTO obligations, SPS measures have to be introduced based on scientific 
principles, but the temptation to use them illegitimately seems to have been expected from the 
first negotiations in the Uruguay Round (Anderson 2004). Member states set their own 
appropriate protection levels and have the right to determine levels that are higher than 
international standards (Anderson 2004). The policy itself could be executed as a restriction 
on imports and depicted as an import quota, imposing a limit on the amount that can be 
imported. Although an import quota is a quantitative restriction (on imports) and an import 
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tariff is imposed as a price-based measure their effects are similar in that they restrict supply 
to the domestic market. 
 
Figure 6: Global effect of an SPS measure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own illustration, 2007 
 
Producers in the importing country are better off, since the SPS policy restricts imports and 
thereby protects domestic producers from international competition. Consumers in the 
importing country are worse off, due to fewer products at a higher price (PSPS). Consumers on 
the world market receive more products at a lower price (P‟SPS). Producers in the exporting 
country suffer from reduced exports and hence lower returns.  
 
3.3.3. Supply increase 
Factors other than tariffs or other trade policies can impact the market, causing a new 
equilibrium to appear. Another trade-related issue concerning the global kiwifruit market is 
the consequence of a significant increase in production by a producing and exporting country. 
An increase in the volume of a major producing and exporting country will have a significant 
impact on the world price of the produced commodity, provided that the commodities from 
different producing countries are considered homogenous and that there is no change in 
demand. 
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Figure 7: Global effect of a supply increase 
 
 
Source: Own illustration, 2007 
 
Domestic consumers in the producing country are better off because of more products at a 
lower price. On one hand an increase in supply consequently reduces the world price (from 
Pw to Pw‟), which could have a negative impact on producer surplus domestically. On the 
other hand, more exported products are demanded (x to x‟), which improves the situation for 
domestic producers. Hence, producer welfare depends on by how much the price reduces. The 
consumers in the rest of the world are better off with more commodities at a lower price 
whereas producers suffer from the reduced market price because of more competition.  
 
Trade restrictions in the kiwifruit industry encompass more than just the tariffs and SPS 
measures focused on in this chapter, but quotas for example do not have a significant impact 
on the kiwifruit market (or for New Zealand exporters) and is therefore not further detailed in 
this research. Due to unavailability of data, subsidies and consumer support
7
 will also be 
excluded in this research. 
 
3.2. Conclusion of chapter 
The New Zealand kiwifruit industry, which is country reliant on trade, is currently challenged 
by several trade-related issues that may have a significant impact on the global market. The 
                                                 
7
 Producer subsidies are excluded only due to lack of data, not because of insignificance to the industry; as producer 
and consumer supports most likely exist within the global kiwifruit industry.  
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previous section reviewed the major and most common trade related issues impacting the 
global kiwifruit industry and applied trade theory to facilitate the comprehension of these 
threats and challenges. 
 
Some of the agricultural and trade policy issues will become more apparent in the nearest 
future and the risks, in terms of different trade restrictions, will be assessed through the 
development of potential scenarios and subsequently supported by a quantitative modelling 
analysis. The following chapter will include an assessment of the analytical framework 
relevant to this research and the selection of an appropriate approach. 
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4. Defining equilibrium theory: Analytical framework 
 
The previous section examined trade theory, the development thereof and finally the potential 
effects of trade. The analysis of the implications of trade related issues concerning the 
kiwifruit market on New Zealand producer returns require the application of an international 
trade model.  
 
Different endowments and consumer preferences are the main motives to why nations trade. It 
is thus possible to examine effects of trade related changes using an either general or partial 
equilibrium analysis of supply and demand. Following, a presentation of the two different 
equilibrium theories is given in order to compare and contrast the advantages and 
disadvantages with using either an economy-wide general equilibrium (GE) approach or a 
partial-economy partial equilibrium (PE) approach. Both frameworks seek to determine 
equilibrium prices and quantities on specific markets that are affected by different policy 
measures. The timeframe of the two approaches can vary from short-term to long-term and 
can specify a comparative static (at a certain point in time) or dynamic (process over time) 
solution (van Tongeren, van Meijl et al. 2000). 
 
4.1. General equilibrium theory 
GE theory aims to explain supply, demand and prices by examining the economy as a whole 
taking into account all interrelated segments and industry sectors as well as the flow of 
income and expenditure (van Tongeren, van Meijl et al. 2000). Since equilibrium in each 
market is determined by situations in other markets the establishment of one general 
equilibrium solution is analysed through a simultaneous determination of equilibria in all 
other markets (University of Melbourne Department of Economics 2000). The theory of 
general equilibrium was first established by Lèon Walras who, through Walras‟ Law, 
explained that if one market is in equilibrium, the other markets must consequently be in 
equilibrium as well (Gandolfo 1998). He also argued that a market cannot be in 
disequilibrium by itself without being matched by a disequilibrium in another market 
(University of Melbourne Department of Economics 2000). 
 
Simple GE theory is necessarily based on some restrictive assumptions in order to simplify 
and facilitate the analysis. The theory assumes that factors of production are mobile between 
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industries, but not between countries. It further assumes that players on the market are 
competitive and that technology is available and constant in all countries with production 
functions illustrating constant returns to scale and diminishing marginal products
8
. To explain 
factor endowment and demand similarity, factor endowments vary across industries and 
consumption is maximised under identical utility functions (Leamer 1987).  
 
4.2. Partial equilibrium theory 
Because the economy as a whole constitutes of so many different actors, factors and 
commodities a partial equilibrium approach is therefore also commonly and widely applied. 
In a PE analysis, attention is directed at a smaller number of variables directly affecting a 
market, or a group of related markets, while influences of other factors are generally ignored. 
An analysis based on a partial equilibrium approach can therefore be seen as a technique that 
simplifies an economy in general equilibrium (Simpson 1975) and allows for the examination 
of commercial policy issues to be sectoral specific, relatively rapid and transparent (Francois 
and Hall 1997). The theory of partial equilibrium also generally assumes a competitive world 
market, homogenous commodities and that technology is held constant (van Tongeren, van 
Meijl et al. 2000).  
 
Homogeneity and perfect competition simplify the practicality of trade modelling. The 
assumption of homogeneity implies that products are homogenous across markets and only 
one world price exists on the world market. When perfect competition is assumed the world 
market is divided into either importers or exporters for practical reasons. This enables tracing 
trade patterns at country and commodity level and hence facilitates an easier interpretation of 
the results (Cagatay and Saunders 2003). By excluding intra-industry trade however, and 
limiting the analysis to net trade, partial models do not perfectly illustrate how countries 
interact (van Tongeren, van Meijl et al. 2000).  
 
In the economic literature, many different partial equilibrium models, specific to different 
purposes, can be found. Examples are the FAPRI model with a focus on the United States, the 
AGLINK model used by governments of OECD member countries, SWOPSIM developed by 
the USDA specifically for the Uruguay Round, GAPSI emphasising the EU, VOMM 
                                                 
8
 Although GE models have now been built that relax some of these assumptions including many that incorporate 
imperfect competition ( Francois, van Meijl et al. 2003).  
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developed by the World Bank and WFM developed by the FAO (van Tongeren, van Meijl et 
al. 2000).  
 
There are several reasons for why a PE approach is considered the best option for the purpose 
of this research. A PE approach allows for much more product detail (such as different 
kiwifruit varieties) and a more specific trade policy analysis. The fact that there has been 
marginal research carried out in the kiwifruit industry concentrating on similar issues 
contributes to the aggregation problems of relevant data. Limited research time is also an 
issue and the collection of enough data for a GE approach would not be within the timeframe 
of the thesis. The unavailability of relevant data therefore means that a GE specification 
would be relatively unrealistic. However, the aim of this research is to address the sectoral 
effects of policy and market changes to a specific product, rather than economy wide impacts.  
 
4.3. Conclusion of chapter 
This chapter presented the analytical framework of this research. It investigated the main 
characteristics as well as the advantages and disadvantages of a general equilibrium and a 
partial equilibrium approach respectively. The area of application of this research is a detailed 
trade policy and market change analysis to specific countries for a specific product. For this 
reason, a partial equilibrium model has proven most relevant and useful. Next chapter will 
provide a summary of research focusing on the kiwifruit industry and similar trade-related 
issues. It concludes by determining how this particular research contributes to current 
literature. 
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5. Literature review 
 
Since trade related issues in the kiwifruit industry have been rarely modelled so far, studies 
carried out in related industries will be reviewed together with the trade modelling literature 
in order to establish a relevant framework for future examination and analysis in this study. 
Parallels from trade in kiwifruit can be drawn to other valuable sources of horticultural export 
revenue for New Zealand and other countries, since other horticultural industries are 
concerned with similar trends and strategic challenges both currently and ahead.  
 
A few criteria for article selection were established before selecting relevant literature. First of 
all, articles focusing on the kiwifruit industry were of primary interest to this research. Only 
when this literature had been identified, the potential gap where this research may provide 
value could be established. It was therefore investigated what had been done so far in the area 
in terms of modelling (preferably trade modelling) or investigation of trade-related issues. 
 
Secondly, the trade modelling literature was reviewed and evaluated. The search for 
relevantarticles was kept as close to the kiwifruit sector as possible. The essence of this thesis 
constitutes the different hypotheses and therefore literature of PE modelling of similar issues 
on similar products was examined. Trade-related issues such as non-tariff trade barriers, trade 
liberalisation and the impact of a supply increase on other horticultural or agricultural 
markets, and/or how they are modelled, were taken into account in this chapter. 
 
Protective trade restrictions such as SPS measures are increasingly affecting the current trade 
in kiwifruit (Voss 2005). A global expansion of kiwifruit production constitutes another issue 
that is likely to have a significant impact on future trade patterns. This section will further 
explain the effects of these trade related issues based on previous studies carried out in the 
kiwifruit industry and studies using relevant trade modelling methodology in related 
industries.  
 
5.1. Kiwifruit literature 
Saunders and Cagatay (2003) investigate the short to medium term impact of commercially 
releasing Genetically Modified (GM) food and food production in New Zealand. The impact 
of different levels of GM food on producers, consumers and trade in New Zealand is 
simulated through scenarios using the GEMO, a trade model developed based on the Lincoln 
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Trade and Environment Model (LTEM) framework. The results of the analysis illustrate the 
impact of GM introduction on New Zealand producer returns. A 20 percent change in 
preferences for GM food, for example, simulates an increase in producer returns by 20 
percent for kiwifruit.  
 
Peterson and Willett (2000) analysed the U.S. kiwifruit industry and its determinants of 
supply, demand and the price received by growers, through the use of a dynamic industry 
model. The study provides a quantitative description of the U.S. kiwifruit industry and a 
framework for decision making in production and marketing of fresh horticultural products. 
The study was the first economic analysis of the U.S. kiwifruit industry and is divided into a 
production sector component and a demand sector.  
 
The model framework in Peterson and Willett (2000) is based on an annual component 
representing the production process and a monthly component expressing the marketing 
process. Profitability between sectors is compared and the model simulates relevant 
information for growers of whether to stay in production of kiwifruit, alter to another crop 
(peach) or convert to non-farm uses. The study shows that early plantings of kiwifruit are 
quite speculative and as the orchard matures expected profitability and potential performance 
are increasingly significant parameters in the decision-making of future production and aim 
for increased returns (Peterson and Willett 2000) .  
 
The above model is not a model of trade. However, it mentions imports as one of the main 
factors affecting the production of US kiwifruit, which emphasises the significance of 
international trade on domestic markets.  
 
An article by Fournier and Hassan (2003) investigates the pricing factors throughout the 
French kiwifruit channel and stresses that the type of margin (constant or proportional) at one 
stage strongly influences demand price elasticity and hence upstream turnover. Demand price 
elasticity is calculated for each of the three stages of the supply chain (production, shipping 
and retail). The demand function Q=Cp
ε
 is calculated, where ε is the demand price elasticity 
at the level considered. The results of the estimations illustrate the highest elasticity on retail 
level (1.71), a positive elasticity at shipping level (1.26) and a steady elasticity at production 
level (0.81).  
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Again, the research in Fournier and Hassan (2003) is focused on production and does not 
include other countries or varieties.  
 
5.2. Trade modelling literature 
A study by Bakshi (2003) examines the impacts on demand, supply, imports and prices when 
Mexican avocados are allowed into the U.S. through the alleviation of U.S. SPS barriers. 
Results, through the use of a partial equilibrium trade model, show that Mexican imports 
increase significantly (as expected) when the U.S. market opens up. Imports from New 
Zealand and Chile as well as domestic U.S. supply fall when Mexican avocados enter the 
market. Consumption and total supply increase. The price of Mexican avocados increases 
whereas the prices of Californian, Chilean and New Zealand avocados decrease. As a result 
when the price on Mexican avocados increases, U.S. consumption subsequently falls. From 
the areas where Mexican access is granted, avocados from the U.S., New Zealand and Chile 
are generally redistributed. The supply of avocados with domestic or non-Mexican origin rises 
in the areas where Mexican avocados have no access, since the price of avocados falls across 
the entire country and the total supply, foreign and domestic, is displaced from approved 
Mexican access regions to other parts of the country. The result of this study demonstrates an 
increase of total supplies of avocado in the U.S. by 12 percent when Mexican avocados are 
imported. This consequently causes the price of domestic avocados to fall by 12.5 percent.  
 
A report by Calvin and Krissoff (2005) explains the trade relationship between the world‟s 
largest apple exporters and the Japanese market. New Zealand used to export apples to Japan 
during five years (1993-1998) under a phytosanitary protocol, but found that the costs 
exceeded the benefits with the protocol. The report recognises a phytosanitary technical 
barrier as a measure that alters the relative price between the domestic market and the rest of 
the world and hence creates a price wedge between potential traders. The analysis concludes 
that exporters will enjoy increased opportunities due to the adjustment of the Japanese 
phytosanitary protocol, with domestic production decreasing by approximately 11 percent. 
Japanese consumers, on the other hand, would gain from lower prices and greater availability 
of varieties (Calvin and Krissoff 2005). 
 
Research by Arthur (2006) examines the Australian SPS measure which restricts apple 
imports from New Zealand, and consider the economic impact that liberalisation would have 
on Australian welfare. The import ban was introduced in the 1920s in order to prevent the 
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disease fireblight to enter the Australian production system via imports from New Zealand. 
The import barrier restricts market supply and competition and thereby raises the domestic 
price of the commodity, affecting consumers negatively yet benefiting domestic producers. 
The potential liberalisation of the Australian-New Zealand apple market was assessed through 
a Markov Chain Analysis. The paper‟s conclusion was that if the Australian apple market is 
liberalised through a relaxation of its SPS measures, regardless of the severity and the impact 
of a disease entry, social welfare increases relative to the current situation.  
 
Research carried out by the Economic Research Service of the USDA (n.d.) investigates 
three different ways of analysing the effect of a technical barrier to trade through trade 
modelling. One of them constitutes a demand-shift element, which should be used if a trade 
regulation has been introduced to improve information to the consumer. Such information can 
be related to factors such as country of origin and quality and allows for the regulation to have 
a beneficial impact on producers or consumers. The demand-shift model implies a shift of the 
demand curve from an initial assumption of limited information to a situation where 
information targeted at consumers increases. Consumers, being better informed, are better off 
and demand for imported products either increases or decreases (shifts the demand curve 
outwards or inwards). 
 
A research report on liberalisation in global dairy trade carried out by Saunders et al. (2004), 
utilises a partial equilibrium modelling approach to investigate three different scenarios in 
dairy trade, an industry where New Zealand is a significant global actor. The scenarios 
include: no liberalisation, EU liberalisation and OECD liberalisation. The simulated results 
through the Lincoln Trade and Environment Model (LTEM) suggest that EU liberalisation 
leads to a rise in producer prices of raw milk in the main countries, except for the EU itself, 
suffering a price drop of 20 percent. EU production falls as well. The same scenario causes 
raw milk prices to rise by 11 percent in New Zealand and Australia. Under OECD 
liberalisation, production drops by three percent in the EU, eight percent in Japan and 2.5 
percent in the United States. Australian and New Zealand outputs, however, rise by four and 
three percent, due to their comparative advantage in dairy production. This research suggests 
that New Zealand and Australia appear to gain most from full OECD liberalisation in global 
dairy trade. 
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According to current literature the introduction of an SPS measure results in domestic 
producers benefiting from the introduction of the restriction and exporters are worse off when 
facing the trade restriction. If supply increases on the domestic market consumers are 
subsequently better off due to lower prices and greater availability. It is also concluded that 
complete trade liberalisation would benefit New Zealand producers. 
 
There are very few quantitative models in the international literature that consider kiwifruit, 
let alone different varieties of kiwifruit, and those that do exist do not adequately incorporate 
trade aspects. There has been no specific analytical framework available to examine changes 
in the dynamics of the kiwifruit industry in New Zealand.  
 
5.3. Conclusion of chapter 
This section examined some of the present literature relevant to this research and how similar 
studies have been carried out in the past. It explains how they contribute to this study and also 
provides an understanding of the gaps in the literature where this research will be of 
significant value. 
 
In order to investigate and answer the research questions of this thesis, a modified and 
industry-specific version of a partial equilibrium framework will be developed and used. The 
approach taken is novel in two ways. Firstly, a model specific to the kiwifruit sector is 
developed to simulate various trade conditions. Secondly, the study considers key aspects of 
the kiwifruit industry and links these to international trade in the sector. 
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6. Methodology 
 
Having outlined in chapter five why PE modelling is the best option, it is in this chapter 
possible to present the specifics of the model chosen, developed and calibrated for this 
research. 
 
The empirical model, KIWI, is based on the framework for the Lincoln Trade and 
Environment Model (LTEM) (Saunders and Cagatay 2003). The KIWI model is a multi-
country, three-commodity partial equilibrium model focusing on the kiwifruit industry 
ignoring linkages with the rest of the economy. The framework is used to analyse the impacts 
of various domestic and border policies on the country and commodity-based price, demand, 
supply and net trade levels. KIWI is a price equilibrium, non-spatial model, which implies 
that focus is put on net trade of commodities between countries rather than trade flows based 
on country size, borders and geographical proximity. It is only observable what actors 
(countries) bring to the market and what each actor takes form the market. The non-spatial 
approach is therefore also referred to as the pooled market approach. The opposite approach is 
the one of bilateral specification, where representation of the complete set of interactions 
between each buyer and seller and for each commodity is defined (van Tongeren, van Meijl et 
al. 2000). The model framework also assumes that the structure of markets is competitive 
(Saunders and Cagatay 2003). 
 
KIWI is a synthetic model with parameters adopted from the literature. There are mainly two 
methods for estimating parameters in an applied trade model. The economic estimation 
approach, where parameters are derived through simultaneous equation estimation provides 
the most accurate result. However, this method is in some cases unfeasible, due to size of the 
model, identification problems and data unavailability. Instead, the calibration method, or the 
synthetic approach, is more widely used. For this purpose, data for the model is collected from 
existing literature and adjusted for the relevant model.  (Saunders and Cagatay 2003). 
 
The model is used to quantify price, supply, demand and net trade effects of various policy 
changes. The model is calibrated to year 2003 and simulations are carried out up to 2013. This 
implies that policy impacts are derived in a comparative static fashion, based on the year 
 58 
2003 (Saunders and Cagatay 2003). A dynamic approach, on the other hand, would provide 
results based on the process over time (Francois and Hall 1997).  
 
The commodities included in KIWI are green kiwifruit, gold kiwifruit, and organic green 
kiwifruit. Commodities in the model are treated as homogenous with respect to country of 
origin and destination and to the physical characteristics of each product. Therefore, 
commodities are considered as substitutes in consumption on international markets
9
 (Saunders 
and Cagatay 2003). 
 
The coverage of the KIWI model includes the major kiwifruit producers and consumers, 
specified by 13 countries: Australia (AU), Belgium (BE), China (CI), Chile (CL), France 
(FR), Germany (GM), Greece (GR), Italy (IT), Japan (JP), New Zealand (NZ), Spain (SP), 
United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). It further considers three additional trading 
regions: the old European Union (EO), including the first 15 member states, the new 
European Union (EN), including the subsequent member states acceded through 2004, and 
rest of the world (RW). Some of the actual EO members are accounted for separately in the 
model (significant independent producers or consumers) and therefore not included in the EO 
variable as to avoid accounting for the same value twice. Therefore, the countries included in 
the EO are Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Sweden. The EN variable includes Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The rest of the world (RW) conclusively 
encompasses all countries not elsewhere included in the model.  
 
                                                 
9
 As previously mentioned, New Zealand can command a premium in global markets due to various long standing 
industry factors, which would suggest that all kiwifruit are not the same. However, for simplicity and modelling 
purposes all green kiwifruit will be considered as homogenous and further differentiation between IPM kiwifruit and 
other kiwifruit will instead be suggested for future research. 
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Table 4: General characteristics of the KIWI model 
Model KIWI 
Modelling approach Partial equilibrium 
Solution type Non-spatial, net trade 
Parameters Synthetic 
Commodity coverage 3 
Country coverage 16 
Behavioural equations  Domestic supply 
(per commodity and country) Domestic demand 
 Stocks 
 Producer price 
 Consumer price 
 Trade price 
Economic identity Net trade 
Source: Saunders and Cagatay, 2003 
 
The framework of the KIWI model allows the application of various domestic and border 
policies explicitly such as production quotas, set-aside policies, input and/or output related 
producer subsidies/taxes, consumer subsides/taxes, minimum prices, import tariffs and 
quotas, export subsidies and taxes (Saunders and Cagatay 2003). However, only some of the 
policies are currently of interest in kiwifruit trade.  
 
6.1. Equations 
The general equation structure of each commodity at country level (see appendix A4 for 
country specific equations) in KIWI is represented by six behavioural equations and one 
economic identity as defined in the equations 1 to 7 (Saunders and Cagatay 2003). 
 
),( jiij exWDptfpt         (1) 
),( jijij smptgpp         (2) 
),( jijij cmpthpc          (3) 
),( ikjijij ppfplqp          (4) 
),( ijijij pcfcmqc          (5) 
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),( , ijijij qpfenqe          (6) 
ijijijij qeqcqpqt         (7) 
 
The trade price (pt) of a commodity (i) in a country (j) is determined as a function of world 
market price (WDpti) of that commodity and the exchange rate (exj). The domestic producer 
and consumer prices are determined by the trade prices of the related commodity and the 
country‟s domestic and border policies. The trade price therefore constitutes the producer 
price excluding trade restrictions. The total effect of a change in world market price on the 
trade price of the country is determined by the price transmission elasticity.  
 
The domestic producer (ppij) and consumer prices (pcij) are defined as functions of the 
commodity‟s trade price and specific production and consumption related domestic 
support/subsidy policies, (smij) and (cmij). The domestic production and consumption 
equations are specified as constant elasticity functions that incorporate both the own and 
cross-price effects. Domestic production (qpij) is specified as a function of producer price 
(ppij) and a productivity (fpij) shifter, which represents the economic factors and policies that 
result in production shifts. Domestic consumption (qcij) is specified as a function of consumer 
price (pcij) and a consumption function (fcij) shifter, representing the economic factors and 
policies that result in consumption shifts. The ending stocks (qeij) are determined as a function 
of the stock shifter (feij) and quantity produced (qpij). The shift variables in these equations 
allow exogenous shocks to produce pivotal shifts of the related functions. The equations also 
include cross-price effects from the kiwifruits in the model.  Finally, net trade (qtij) of the 
country (j) in commodity (i) is determined as the difference between domestic production and 
the sum of domestic consumption and stock changes in the related year (Saunders and 
Cagatay 2003). 
 
6.2. Supply 
In the KIWI framework, a uniform aggregate domestic supply function is used for each 
variety and country, specified as a function of own- and cross prices. Interdependencies 
between substitutes are reflected by cross-price elasticities (Saunders and Cagatay 2003). 
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6.3. Demand 
The behavioural relationship is assumed to be derived from the consumers maximising utility, 
acting under perfect competition. Therefore, demand is specified as a function of own- and 
substitute prices, per capita income and population growth rate (Saunders and Cagatay 2003). 
 
6.4. Economic identity 
The economic identity is the net trade equation, which equals trade through excess supply or 
excess demand in the domestic economy, identifying the country as either a net-exporter or a 
net-importer (Saunders and Cagatay 2003). Countries therefore make up the difference 
between domestic supply and domestic demand through trade. 
 
Markets are linked to each other through net trade. A basic assumption of the model states 
that world imports have to equal world exports in all regions involved so that net trade equals 
zero in equilibrium. If a market is distorted from equilibrium (net trade ≠ 0), a new 
equilibrium is calculated so that all markets are cleared. The new world equilibrium 
subsequently affects all relevant and connected market structures, through the adjustment of 
domestic price structures (Francois and Hall 1997). 
 
Trade policies affect the international market and hence adjust the price linkage between 
domestic and trade prices. Domestic policies, on the other hand, primarily affect supply and 
demand structures, which in turn have a consequent effect across regions and on international 
trade (Francois and Hall 1997). The market clearing equations close world markets for the 
relevant commodities and provide a mechanism to find a new world equilibrium if any (or all) 
markets are out of balance. Each world trade equation (for each commodity or region) 
defines/calculates net world trade as a sum of net trade from all regions (Francois and Hall 
1997). 
 
The model basically operates by simulating the commodity based world market clearing price 
on the domestic quantities, prices and trade in each country. The different equations in the 
model are parameterised to reproduce the 2003 base data for each country‟s supply, demand, 
prices and trade (Saunders and Cagatay 2003). The method for establishing world equilibrium 
and calculating market prices after a shock follows a certain structure. First of all, the model 
recalculates the domestic equations for supply, demand and trade, after the market has been 
exposed to an exogenous change/modification. The model consequently recalculates world 
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net trade, which in turn leads to the estimation of a new world price and the establishment of a 
new world equilibrium. The impact of the new equilibrium on domestic prices in relevant 
markets is then determined, which in turn has an effect on domestic supply and demand 
schedules. When all these changes have been calculated world trade markets have found their 
new equilibria and a new solution in the model has been established (Francois and Hall 1997). 
KIWI can capture the disequilibrium situations in the economy that may result from 
temporary shortages or excess supply situations by allowing the determination of stock levels 
endogenously. The pattern of prices and quantities observed in the base year is then compared 
to the pattern that emerges when the model is being exposed to changes. 
 
6.5. Data required 
The LTEM framework facilitates the selection and implementation of a preferred model 
structure. The framework hence makes it possible to construct a specific model in terms of 
product and country coverage and through the specification and adaptation of equations and 
policies. 
In order to construct the KIWI model, the following data was required to develop a suitable 
framework for industry-specific scenarios: 
 
Prices:  producer, consumer and trade prices for selected countries and varieties. 
 
Quantities:  production, consumption, exports and imports for selected countries and 
varieties. 
 
Elasticities: Demand, supply, cross-price and income elasticities were required. 
 
Policies: Trade restricting policies such as import tariffs were collected for each 
country. Non-tariff trade barriers are not included per se, but can be 
modelled through shifts in either supply or demand (shift-parameters). 
 
Macroeconomic  data in terms of GDP, population and their growth rates. 
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6.5.1. Data sources 
Much of the data for green kiwifruit has been sourced from the statistical database of the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations. The year 2003 was set as the base 
year for the model, since the LTEM was already calibrated to this year. Data available beyond 
2003 were also included. In order to maintain consistency data would ideally have been 
sourced from one single source. This was however unfeasible, since no one single database 
provides all required data for all varieties and countries involved. Therefore, a series of 
databases were used for different purposes and the most commonly utilised include: the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations, World Kiwifruit Reviews 
(Belrose 2004-2007), ZESPRI, European Commission Agricultural database, United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), the New Zealand Ministries of Agriculture and Forestry 
(MAF) and Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT). 
 
Data on kiwifruit trade have been relatively difficult to obtain and some primary data coud not 
be obtained. Data on gold and green organic kiwifruit were particularly difficult to obtain. 
The FAO data on green kiwifruit therefore provided a basis for several assumptions about the 
other two varieties. In all cases, the most current data have been projected up until 2013. 
 
It should be mentioned that the FAO database does not distinguish between green, gold or 
green organic in its data on prices, production, consumption and trade. It has therefore been 
assumed that the data reflect total world quantity of all kiwifruit varieties. Given the 
proportion of green kiwifruit on the world market, the price data has been treated as 
representative of the green kiwifruit sector only. 
 
6.5.2. Prices 
The domestic producer (ppij) and consumer prices (pcij) are, as earlier mentioned, defined as 
functions of the commodity‟s trade price and specific production and consumption related 
domestic support/subsidy policies, (smij) and (cmij). No producer subsidies
10
 or consumer 
support were estimated or considered in this research. The FAO statistics for producer price 
was uniformly used for all countries. 
                                                 
10
 Due to unavailability of data this parameter was not considered in this research, even if producer subsidies may be 
implemented by some kiwifruit producing countries. 
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Green Kiwifruit 
Kiwifruit producer prices were sourced from FAOSTAT. Where available, producer price 
(US$/tonne) was used.  The availability of data, however, necessitated the substitution of 
average import unit value (US$/tonne) for the importing countries Belgium, France, 
Germany, Japan, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
 
For New Zealand, total fruit and service payment including premium ($ per tray equivalent) 
was used as a proxy for producer/consumer price data (ZESPRI International Limited 2005) 
and converted into US$/tonne, using an exchange rate of 0.70 US$/NZ$. 
 
Among major kiwifruit producers, China is the only country in the FAO database that does 
not have a representative producer price.  This exclusion creates a unique problem for China.  
Among non-producing countries, average import unit values are sufficient because they do 
not affect domestic production. Because China is a major producer, using import prices has 
the potential to overstate returns to domestic producers. Therefore, a base year 2003 average 
ratio of producer price/import price was calculated for three major kiwifruit producing 
countries that record both statistics – New Zealand, Italy and the United States. The average 
producer price in these three countries was 74 percent of the import price. The 74 percent 
value was then multiplied by the FAO 2003 average import unit value (US$/tonne) to find the 
producer price for China.       
 
Gold Kiwifruit 
Gold kiwifruit is mainly produced in New Zealand and China (Huang and Ferguson 2003; 
ZESPRI International Limited 2005).  Pricing data for China was unobtainable.  Prices for 
New Zealand were available in the ZESPRI Annual Report (2005) and converted to 
US$/tonne using the exchange rate of 0.70 US$/NZ$. To establish gold producer and 
consumer prices for each country, ZESPRI gold orchard gate returns were averaged over 
growing seasons 2002 to 2006, resulting in a gold premium of 29 percent over green 
kiwifruit. This premium was subsequently multiplied by the FAO green producer and 
consumer prices for each country (ZESPRI International Limited 2005; FAO 2007).  
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Green organic 
Green organic price data is very difficult to obtain. Numbers are usually restricted to prices 
quoted within one place and time and are not representative of yearly average producer price. 
Additionally, price premiums for organic kiwifruit vary considerably from country to country.   
 
ZESPRI is the single largest world marketer of kiwifruit (ZESPRI nd). Since approximately 
four percent of the total kiwifruit marketed by ZESPRI is organic (Dryden, Hughes et al. 
2002), ZESPRI orchard gate returns are again observed as a reliable proxy for determining a 
consistent worldwide market premium for organic kiwifruit (ZESPRI International Limited 
2005). The resulting price average of four growing seasons (2002-2006) yields a premium of 
41 percent for green organic over green kiwifruit which sits well within the range of organic 
premiums recorded in the literature (FAS 1999; Boto, Kortbech-Olesen et al. 2001; Dimitri, 
Greene et al. 2005). The premium is multiplied by the green producer and consumer prices to 
yield the organic green producer and consumer prices for each country.          
 
 
Table 5: ZESPRI premiums for gold and organic 
 Season Gold/Green Organic/Green 
2002-2003 17% 34% 
2003-2004 14% 37% 
2004-2005 27% 40% 
2005-2006 58% 54% 
Average 2002-2006 29% 41% 
       Source: ZESPRI Annual Report 2005-2006  
 
 
Trade price 
FAO data for producer price includes the value of country-specific tariffs. In order to obtain 
the trade price, the value of each country‟s tariff was removed (New Zealand Fruitgrowers 
Federation 2003; Skilton 2005). Table 3 provides a sample calculation of trade price for 
Belgium where:  producer price * (100% - tariff rate) = trade price. 
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Table 6: Belgium producer/consumer/trade price 
Commodity 
Producer/Consumer 
price 
Tariff 
rate 
Trade price 
Green  $1,400.86 8% $1,288.79 
Gold  $1,807.11 8% $1,662.54 
Organic  $1,975.21 8% $1,817.19 
Source: FAOSTAT 
 
6.5.3. Quantities 
Green kiwifruit 
FAOSTAT provides worldwide trade data for kiwifruit including production, consumption 
and import and export statistics. As previously mentioned, net traded quantities for each 
country is defined by the difference between domestic production and consumption. Net trade 
is also defined as the difference between exports and imports. 
 
FAO consumption data do not consider fruit loss/waste or processed kiwifruit  (Belrose Inc. 
2006). For modelling purposes, FAO production, import and export data are therefore used to 
derive consumption figures as to balance the net trade equation. Where quantities were given 
in the unit trays, the value was converted into the generic unit of metric tonnes based on the 
assumption that one tray weighs 3.6 kg (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 2004), (ZESPRI 
2004-2005), (Oppenheimer Group 2003). 
 
Gold kiwifruit 
New Zealand and China are considered to be the sole world producers of gold kiwifruit in 
2003 (Huang and Ferguson 2001). Production data for New Zealand are provided in 
ZESPRI‟s Annual Report. China‟s production has been based on a comprehensive survey 
conducted in 2002, providing detailed acreages and a list of varieties, three of which have 
been identified as golden - Jinkui, Jinfeng and Lushanxiang (Huang and Ferguson 2003).  
This review also provides data on overall average yield per hectare which, when multiplied by 
total gold hectares planted, resulted in the estimate used for Chinese gold production.                
 
Both New Zealand and China are developing overseas relationships in order to be able to 
supply gold kiwifruit all year round (12 month supply programmes). New Zealand has 
licensed nearly 840 hectares of Hort16A in several countries around the world, beginning in 
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the early part of this decade (ZESPRI International Limited 2005). ZESPRI reports some data 
on country-specific acreages planted, but production and yield data are not available. Actual 
yields are believed to be small in base year 2003 and have been projected forward through 
2013 at zero due to lack of reliable data. In 2000, China licensed the worldwide propagation 
rights to a gold variety known as Jin Tao to an Italian company, the Kiwigold Consortium 
(Chinese Academy of Sciences 2003). Evidence suggests that significant quantities of Jin Tao 
were produced in Italy by 2005 and that production has also been licensed to France, Uruguay 
and Chile (China News 2005; Belrose Inc. 2006; Kiwigold Consortium 2007).        
          
ZESPRI‟s production and export distribution is published in annual reports, although it does 
not break out country-specific statistics (with the exception of Japan). To calculate country-
specific consumption for European countries, total EU gold exports were allocated to 
importing countries in direct proportion to their consumption of green kiwifruit according to 
the following example (where BE = Belgium): 
 
BE green consumption / total EU green consumption = BE % of EU 
green consumption 
 
Total EU gold consumption (ZESPRI EU exports) x BE % of EU 
green consumption = BE gold consumption 
 
The following table illustrates consumption (production less net trade) of kiwifruit in different 
EU countries. The first column shows total consumption of green kiwifruit and the second 
column shows the different countries‟ share of total EU consumption of green kiwifruit. 
Finally, the third column illustrates quantities of Gold consumption for each EU country in 
the model, derived from each country‟s consumption of green kiwifruit (as explained above). 
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Table 7: EU green/gold kiwifruit consumption in metric tonnes 
   2002     2003    2004   
Country Green % EU   Gold  Green % EU   Gold  Green  % EU   Gold  
BE 92.04 12.8% 1.20 97.73 14.7% 1.4 110.42 13.4% 2.13 
EO 53.67 7.5% 0.70 61.19 9.2% 0.9 62.67 7.6% 1.21 
EN 42.03 5.8% 0.55 47.48 7.2% 0.7 77.38 9.4% 1.49 
FR 82.04 11.4% 1.07 83.64 12.6% 1.2 93.44 11.4% 1.80 
GE 102.41 14.2% 1.33 84.74 12.8% 1.2 87.33 10.6% 1.68 
GR 44.00 6.1% 0.57 44.63 6.7% 0.6 34.71 4.2% 0.67 
IT 181.37 25.2% 2.36 115.01 17.3% 1.6 222.64 27.1% 4.29 
SP 91.96 12.8% 1.20 97.82 14.7% 1.4 100.9 12.3% 1.94 
UK  29.69 4.1% 0.39 31.94 4.8% 0.5 33.32 4.1% 0.64 
Total 719.21 100.0% 9.36 664.18 100.0% 9.4 822.81 100.0% 15.84 
Source: FAOSTAT 
 
Green organic 
Country-specific data on organic kiwifruit is very limited. A literature review of the general 
organic agricultural markets in individual countries proved useful in guiding production and 
consumption data assumptions for these markets. Countries that are significant producers of 
kiwifruit tend to also be significant producers of organic kiwifruit (Boto, Kortbech-Olesen et 
al. 2001; ZESPRI International Limited 2005). Organic kiwifruit production figures in the 
model are based on two basic assumptions. First of all, conventional and organic green 
kiwifruit realise the same yield.  Conflicting data suggest the occurrence of both higher yields 
and lower repack losses for organic kiwifruit (Hasey, Johnson et al. nd), while other sources 
suggest organic kiwifruit yields are less than conventional kiwifruit (Hugh 1997). Secondly, 
organic kiwifruit production is five percent of conventional green kiwifruit production. This 
assumption likely overstates production for some countries in the model but is supported in 
the literature for the major world producers of kiwifruit (Boto, Kortbech-Olesen et al. 2001; 
Klonsky and Carmen 2004; ZESPRI International Limited 2005; California Kiwifruit 
Commission nd). Table 5 demonstrates the level of organic production for two major kiwifruit 
producers.   
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Table 8: Production ratio: green organic to conventional (total yield) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Average 
United States 4.3% 5.8% 4.6% 5.4%       5.1% 
New Zealand         4.9% 4.6% 4.6% 4.7% 
Source: California Kiwifruit Commission & ZESPRI Annual Report 2005-2006 
 
Organic consumption has been observed to be growing at double-digit rates annually for 
much of the developed world (Boto, Kortbech-Olesen et al. 2001; Organic Trade Association 
2007) and organic kiwifruit consumption as a percentage of green kiwifruit consumption 
averages between one and five percent of green kiwifruit consumption (Boto, Kortbech-
Olesen et al. 2001; ZESPRI International Limited 2005; van der Wiel 2006). Where available, 
consumption statistics of fresh organic fruits and vegetables are observed to be even higher 
(van der Wiel 2006). It was therefore assumed that organic kiwifruit consumption is five 
percent of conventional green kiwifruit consumption.  
 
New Zealand quantities were mainly sourced from ZESPRI, both annual reports and other 
documents. For other countries, data on production, consumption and trade were mostly 
extracted from the FAO Statistic Database. USDA database also provided some country-
specific information on quantities.  
 
6.4.4. Elasticities 
The elasticity parameters are key variables in the model since they determine the 
responsiveness of domestic supply and demand to changing prices and policy measures. The 
framework assumes that price sensitivity varies by country and across the three varieties. 
Assumptions and calculations of elasticities (own-price, supply, income and cross-price) had 
to be made (see appendix A7). Each country in the model has an individual demand and 
supply (possibly zero) for each kiwifruit variety.  
 
Elasticities for the KIWI model are synthesised from the literature. Demand elasticities were 
mainly sourced from the World Kiwifruit Review (2004) and the articles by Fournier and 
Hassan (2003) and Hanawa Peterson and Willett (2000). In the case of insufficient data on 
elasticities for specific countries, basic assumptions such as classifying a country as 
producing or non-producing or as developed or developing were made and elasticities of 
similar countries were applied. When two elasticities were found for the same country 
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(kiwifruit specific), they were averaged. Demand elasticity for organic fruit is assumed to be 
twice the value of conventional fruit, according to a study of the U.K. organic market by 
ADAS (2003). Since gold and green organic kiwifruit are both charged with significantly 
higher premiums than green, the demand elasticities for both varieties were, for simplicity, 
considered to be twice the value of the country-specific conventional demand elasticity. The 
elasticities in the original LTEM for producing countries appear to lie between 0.3 and 0.5. 
The assumption was therefore made to set supply elasticity for these countries to 0.4 in the 
KIWI model. For non-producing countries supply elasticity was assumed to be 0.1 (for 
modelling purposes). It was further assumed that supply elasticities would equal across 
varieties. The value of income elasticity in the original LTEM is represented by the value of 
0.18 in all countries. Based on income elasticities allocated in the World Kiwifruit Review of 
2004 (Belrose Inc 2004) and the LTEM number, new elasticities were calculated by setting 
the lowest number equal to 0.18 and allowing the following numbers to increase 
proportionally. Income elasticities were further assumed to equal across varieties. The value 
for cross-price elasticity was assumed to be 0.5 across all varieties, directly extracted from the 
original LTEM, assuming that the different kiwifruit varieties are substitutes. 
 
Where data on elasticities for specific countries were unobtainable, basic assumptions such as 
classifying a country as producing or non-producing or as developed or developing were 
made and elasticities of most similar countries were applied. Greece is an example of such a 
country where the closest applicable economy was assumed to be the EU region. Belgium, a 
non-producing yet large kiwifruit consuming country was assumed to be most similar to 
Germany, another European non-producing country with a similarly developed economy. 
Chile was assumed to be most comparable to China, due to its significant kiwifruit producing 
and developing economy characteristics. The model incorporates the “rest of world” as a 
separate country variable, which was assumed to be mostly related to China, since it includes 
India, another significant developing country. 
 
Sensitivity analyses were carried out to test the robustness of the estimated elasticities. 
Results illustrate that alterations in prices change the quantity demanded as expected and 
according to theory. The estimated elasticities therefore appear legitimate. 
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6.4.5. Policies 
Import tariffs for relevant countries were obtained from different sources, ranging from a high 
of 20 percent imposed by China, to eight percent introduced by the EU. The policies are 
represented by the parameters sm (producer market subsidies, fees, levies, direct payments, 
etc.) and cm (consumer market subsidies). See appendix and table A5 for details on import 
tariffs. Subsidies are not included in the model due to insufficient information. When there are 
no policies affecting domestic prices for a certain commodity, then the variables sm and cm 
take the value 0. Alternatively, if a complete free market policy is introduced, then sm and cm 
equal 1. 
 
6.4.6. Macroeconomic data 
Macroeconomic data for each country on population, Gross Domestic Product and 
productivity levels and their respective growth rates were sourced from the OECD statistical 
database. 
 
6.5. Conclusion of chapter 
This chapter gave a brief description of the theoretical considerations underlying the new 
KIWI model. The new kiwifruit model was constructed so as to include the different industry-
specific countries and varieties, allowing for consumers to be able to substitute between the 
different varieties of kiwifruit for each other. The section further identified data requirements 
and sources of the data obtained to facilitate the construction and further analysis of the KIWI 
model. Additional necessary assumptions and estimations, where lack of data was an issue, 
were also presented. Following is a description of the scenarios developed for this research. 
The purpose of these scenarios is to provide an understanding of potential trade-related issues 
facing the New Zealand kiwifruit industry, and their impacts. 
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7. Description of the scenarios 
 
The LTEM was adapted to develop a three-commodity world kiwifruit trade model. The 
model will be used to investigate potential impacts of trade-related issues on production, 
consumption and trade for various scenarios. The potential changes, outlined in chapter two, 
are reproduced through the development of relevant scenarios. The final impact on producer 
returns will reflect the results of the different scenarios. 
 
Scenarios have been selected and simulated according to potential future scenarios facing the 
global trade in general and the domestic New Zealand industry in particular. These scenarios 
constitute the most central and probable situations potentially influencing New Zealand trade 
in kiwifruit. This section initially describes the scenarios, their relevance and expected results. 
The results of the different scenarios are then evaluated and compared to the results of the 
reference scenario. The KIWI model was hence initially run with existing conditions for the 
base year 2003 with iterations to the year 2013. Three scenarios were developed; an EU 
introduction of an SPS policy, an expansion of Chinese production and finally a full trade 
liberalisation scenario. The objective of this research is to quantify and analyse the possible 
effects that these changes might have on the kiwifruit industry especially in New Zealand. 
The effects of the different scenarios will therefore be measured in changes in New Zealand 
producer returns
11
. 
 
7.1. Reference Scenario 
The reference scenario, to which all other scenarios are compared, is set according to actual 
conditions in 2003. The reference scenario represents the situation with factual production, 
consumption and traded quantities at trading conditions (tariffs and prices) in 2003 (see 
Appendix A5). The results of the scenarios are presented for the year 2013 and compared to 
the reference scenario‟s results in 2013 (see Appendix A6). 
 
                                                 
11
 Given the specific focus on the New Zealand kiwifruit industry, no macroeconomic results (changes in national 
welfare, GDP growth, etc) are reported. 
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7.2. EU consumption drop, reducing New Zealand imports through an SPS 
policy. 
The European Union, if taken as a whole, is the largest consumer of kiwifruit in the world.  
According to FAO consumption data for 2004, the European Union alone accounts for 64 
percent of world kiwifruit consumption (FAO 2006; FAOSTAT 2006).  
 
This scenario will illustrate a large drop in EU consumption, as a result of a stricter SPS 
policy. The scenario targets New Zealand imports and is modelled through a shift in EU 
consumption
12
, assuming that all EU countries are affected by the import restriction, but still 
accepting trade within the EU and with other countries. Since New Zealand‟s share of EU 
imports constitute approximately 60 percent of green kiwifruit and this is the number by 
which the consumption shift parameter (fcKW=0.4) will be reduced in this scenario.  
 
The expected result of this scenario, according to theory, would suggest that the import 
restriction to the European market, due to an introduction of an SPS measure, reduces the 
imported quantity. Producers in the importing country are better off, since the SPS policy 
restricts imports and thereby protects domestic producers from international competition. 
Consumers in the importing country are worse off, due to fewer products at a higher price. 
Producers in the exporting country suffer from reduced exports and hence lower returns. New 
Zealand producers are hence negatively affected by a potential EU introduction of an SPS 
policy
13
.  
 
7.3. Chinese production doubles by 2013. 
Huang & Ferguson (2003) estimate that one fifth to one third of production is processed 
domestically. As previously discussed, this could be due to the lack of infrastructure 
necessary to support the grading, storage and distribution of fresh fruit, but also because of the 
relatively low quality of the country‟s fruit. Commercial orchards continue to grow, making 
wild harvests less important and recent growth in kiwifruit exports may indicate that 
infrastructure is being improved (FAO 2007). Since the country previously managed to solve 
the quality problems facing the apple and pear industries, it is likely to perform similarly in 
the kiwifruit industry (Belrose Inc 2006). In 1999, the total production of kiwifruit from 
                                                 
12
 Since SPS measures are not included under the trade restriction parameter (sm) in the model, this scenario is 
modelled through a consumption shift. 
13
 The effect on EU consumers depends on how easily other kiwifruit exporters might fill the gap in the EU market 
created by the stricter SPS regime on New Zealand exports. 
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China reached 165,000 metric tonnes. In 2003, production totalled 300,000 metric tonnes 
(FAO 2007) and was estimated to have reached 400,000 metric tonnes per year by 2006. If 
productivity approaches the level of other countries, Chinese annual production could 
potentially reach 700 000 metric tonnes per year (Huang and Ferguson 2001). China is 
currently the largest volume producer of kiwifruit, yet productivity was still very low at 
around 8.5 metric tonnes/hectare according to the last comprehensive survey conducted in 
2003 (Huang and Ferguson). No productivity improvements will be incorporated in the 
scenario modelled, which probably understates the output expansion that might be possible.  
 
If China, being considered as a major producing and exporting country, contributes to an 
increased supply of kiwifruit on the world market, theory suggests that world prices of 
kiwifruit will be reduced due to a significant increase in global supply. This scenario is 
modelled through increasing Chinese production (and hence output) twofold from 2003 to 
2013, based on historical development of the industry and estimations by Huang and 
Ferguson (2001). If New Zealand kiwifruit is considered homogenous with Chinese kiwifruit, 
and thus competes for the same market share, a Chinese expansion will have a negative 
impact on New Zealand producers in terms of lower returns. 
 
7.4. Trade liberalisation through the elimination of all import tariffs. 
This scenario will be examined through changing all the trade restricting variables in all 
countries in the model from current import tariffs to zero, demonstrating complete trade 
liberalisation within the industry. With all import barriers eliminated worldwide, an increase 
in import demand will occur. Theoretically, exporters will respond to the change by offering 
exports at a higher price. World prices in kiwifruit consequently increase and, as a result, New 
Zealand producers are better off through higher returns. The outcome of trade liberalisation 
on producers depends upon the tariff levels of the different countries. In countries with 
relatively high tariffs, complete trade liberalisation would result in kiwifruit being imported 
on the expense of domestic production. 
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Table 9: Research scenarios 
0. Reference scenario  Actual conditions in 2003 
1. EU import ban  Tighter SPS policy on New Zealand exports 
 Consumption drop of 60% 
2. Chinese expansion  Chinese production doubles by 2013 
3. Trade liberalisation  All tariffs eliminated by 2013 
Source: own illustration 
 
7.5. Conclusion of chapter 
This section introduced the four main scenarios investigated in this research. The scenarios 
are run through the KIWI model as suggested and subsequently presented are the modelling 
results followed by specific discussions for each scenario 
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8. Results and discussion 
 
This research is based on a methodology utilising three different versions of the same 
commodity included in a new trade model with kiwifruit industry-specific countries, statistics 
and assumptions. The results, focusing mainly on New Zealand producer returns, of the three 
different scenarios are given below. Other key results are also presented. All scenario 
outcomes are compared to the baseline scenario predictions in 2013. 
 
8.1. EU consumption drop, reducing New Zealand imports through an  
SPS policy 
This scenario illustrates a large reduction in EU demand for New Zealand kiwifruit, through 
the introduction of an SPS policy. This import restricting measure is a form of a non-tariff 
trade barrier, and is introduced to protect the domestic market from imports that could 
potentially be a threat to human, animal or plant health. The implementation of such a 
measure occurred in 1992, when Italian authorities threatened to take the New Zealand 
kiwifruit industry to court, claiming that the chemical residue levels of the imported shippings 
from New Zealand were significantly above Italy‟s allowed standards. As a result, imports 
were completely cut off and New Zealand producers suffered greatly in terms of reduced 
producer returns. The SPS measure is in this case targeting New Zealand exports to the EU, 
which represent 60 percent of total New Zealand kiwifruit exports in 2003. 
 
By 2013, the effects of this dramatic reduction in European Union consumption of New 
Zealand kiwifruit result in a 28 percent reduction (compared to baseline scenario in 2013) in 
producer returns for green kiwifruit and 11 and 21 percent reductions in producer returns for 
gold and organic green kiwifruit respectively. New Zealand kiwifruit exports in 2013 will 
have fallen by 13 percent, three percent, and 17 percent respectively for green, gold and 
organic green kiwifruit. 
 
The EU constitutes a significant player on the international kiwifruit market. It is the main 
kiwifruit consuming region and any potential import ban it introduces would have a 
significant negative impact on the New Zealand industry. The green and green organic sectors 
are especially affected, since a substantial share of total New Zealand exports of these 
varieties are shipped to Europe. An EU introduction of an SPS policy does not affect the New 
 77 
Zealand gold kiwifruit industry as significantly as the other two varieties. Changes in exports 
and producer returns are projected to be significantly smaller for gold than for green and 
green organic. This could possibly be explained by the fact that New Zealand is the world‟s 
sole exporter of this variety and there would be other potential destinations for New Zealand 
gold kiwifruit, should the EU completely ban imports of all varieties.  
 
Other kiwifruit consuming and producing countries appear to be significantly affected by this 
policy shock as well. Consumption logically falls in the EU countries, whereas in countries 
such as the U.S., Japan and Australia consumption of green kiwifruit rises. This could 
possibly be due to a redistribution of New Zealand exports to other consuming markets, when 
access is denied to the EU. 
 
Table 10: Scenario 1 – EU consumption drop through an SPS policy 
2013 
  Producer Price Producer Returns Quantity Produced Quantity Consumed 
Country Green Gold Organic Green Gold Organic Green Gold Organic Green Gold Organic 
AU 21% 8% 16% -26%   -20% 7%   5% 31% 8% 53% 
BE 21% 8% 16%             -48% -89% -39% 
CI 21% 8% 16% -28% -11% -21% -9% -3% -7% 31% 8% 53% 
CL 21% 8% 16% -28%   -21% -9%   -7% 31%   14% 
EO 21% 8% 16%    -21% -9%   -7% -48% -89% -39% 
EN 21% 8% 16%    -21% -9%   -7% -48% -89% -39% 
FR 21% 8% 16%    -21% -9%   -7% -48% -89% -36% 
GM 21% 8% 16%            -48% -89% -39% 
GR 21% 8% 16%    -21% -9%   -7% -48% -89% -39% 
IT 21% 8% 16%    -21% -9%   -7% -38% -88% -22% 
JP 21% 8% 16% -28%   -21% -9%   -7% 31% 8% 53% 
NZ 21% 8% 16% -28% -11% -21% -9% -3% -7% 31% 8% 53% 
SP 21% 8% 16%    -21% -9%   -7% -68% -89% -36% 
UK 21% 8% 16%             -45% -89% -34% 
US 21% 8% 16% -28%   -21% -9%   -7% 70% 8% 136% 
RW 21% 8% 16% -28%   -21% -9%   -7% 50% 8% -7% 
Source: own illustration, 2007 
 
8.2. Chinese production doubles by 2013.  
This scenario illustrates the effects of a Chinese production expansion, doubling the country‟s 
kiwifruit output by 2013, compared to the 2003 base year. This is modelled through 
increasing Chinese production (qp) twofold gradually from base year 2003 to 2013. No 
productivity improvements are incorporated in the scenario modelled, which probably 
understates the output expansion that might be possible.  
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The production increase causes world producer and consumer prices to fall and world 
kiwifruit consumption to increase, resulting in a new equilibrium. Chinese producer returns 
increase dramatically at the expense of the world kiwifruit industry. China consequently 
moves from being a net importer to a net exporter. The effects of increased availability of 
Chinese kiwifruit are simulated to reduce both New Zealand producer returns and exported 
quantities, as theory would predict. New Zealand grower returns for green, gold and green 
organic kiwifruit are consequently reduced by 16 percent, 19 percent and nine percent 
respectively. New Zealand kiwifruit export quantities in 2013 will have fallen by seven 
percent, six percent, and five percent respectively for green, gold and organic green kiwifruit. 
 
The primary variety currently being expanded in China is conventional green kiwifruit, which 
could potentially constitute the country‟s strongest chance of success on the international 
market. Therefore, New Zealand market access and future exports of green conventional 
kiwifruit could be the variety that is threatened the most by China‟s potential expansion. This 
can be confirmed through the result of this scenario, where New Zealand exports for green 
kiwifruit are reduced by the most (compared to the other varieties).  
 
China is the only other country, apart from New Zealand, that presently produces gold 
kiwifruit. New Zealand is currently the only exporter of this variety. However, the above 
scenario shifts China to being a net exporter of gold kiwifruit. This constitutes a challenge for 
the New Zealand kiwifruit industry, suddenly facing a direct competitor on the world market 
in this variety. The scenarios result in reduced New Zealand gold kiwifruit exports and the 
largest fall in New Zealand producer returns out of  the three varieties considered.  
 
The organic sector is the least affected variety in New Zealand. The model projects a 
reduction in New Zealand producer returns of around half the magnitude of the falls seen in 
the other two varieties (20 percent compared to 36 and 37 percent). This could potentially be 
due to the fact that the organic kiwifruit industry is not particularly developed in China and 
does not pose a significant threat to the New Zealand organic industry. The scenario still 
affects the organic sector negatively, but not nearly as significantly. The quality issues 
mentioned earlier would be a reason why the organic sector is not as developed in China as in 
other major producing countries. 
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Kiwifruit producers worldwide are similarly negatively affected in this scenario. This shows, 
yet again, the significant impact China could have on the world market. Due to increased 
availability of kiwifruit, consumption increases worldwide. The expansion of the gold variety 
changes China to a net exporter thereof and subsequently provides the world market with the 
first competitor to New Zealand in terms of exports of golden kiwifruit. This increases 
consumption dramatically worldwide, but consequently also affects New Zealand producer 
returns of golden kiwifruit more negatively than the other two scenarios. 
 
Table 11: Scenario 2 – Chinese production doubles by 2013. 
2013 
  Producer Price Producer Returns Quantity Produced Quantity Consumed 
Country Green Gold Organic Green Gold Organic Green Gold Organic Green Gold Organic 
AU -12% -14% -6% -15%   -8% -4%   -2% 12% 49% 9% 
BE -12% -14% -6%             11% 48% 8% 
CI -12% -14% -6% 67% 63% 83% 90% 89% 95% 12% 49% 9% 
CL -12% -14% -6% -16%   -9% -5%   -3% 12%   -3% 
EO -12% -14% -6% -16%   -9% -5%   -3% 12% 49% 9% 
EN -12% -14% -6% -16%   -9% -5%   -3% 12% 49% 9% 
FR -12% -14% -6% -16%   -9% -5%   -3% 14% 55% 10% 
GM -12% -14% -6% -16%   -9% -5%   -3% 11% 48% 8% 
GR -12% -14% -6% -16%   -9% -5%   -3% 12% 49% 9% 
IT -12% -14% -6% -16%   -9% -5%   -3% 22% 83% 19% 
JP -12% -14% -6% -16%   -9% -5%   -3% 12% 49% 9% 
NZ -12% -14% -6% -16% -19% -9% -5%   -3% 12% 49% 9% 
SP -12% -14% -6% -16%   -9% -5%   -3% 15% 57% 11% 
UK -12% -14% -6%       -5%   -3% 15% 59% 12% 
US -12% -14% -6% -16%   -9% -5%   -3% 12% 49% 9% 
RW -12% -14% -6% -16%   -9% -5%   -3% 12% 49% 9% 
Source: own illustration, 2007 
 
8.3. Trade liberalisation through the elimination of all import tariffs 
By removing all tariffs in all countries by 2013, a trade liberalisation scenario was modelled. 
This was expected to increase world prices due to an increase in import demand and 
consequently increase producer returns for exporting countries with low tariffs. Due to the 
multi-lateral removal of trade barriers, New Zealand grower returns increase for green, gold 
and green organic kiwifruit by 14 percent, 19 percent and 14 percent respectively. World 
market prices rise significantly for green, gold and green organic by ten percent, 13 percent 
and 10 percent respectively. This gives New Zealand an incentive to increase production by 
four percent for green, five percent for gold and four percent for green organic. New Zealand 
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export quantities for green, gold, and green organic kiwifruit increase similarly by five 
percent, five percent and eight percent respectively. 
 
In China, where the relatively high tariff (20 percent) is removed, the domestic price falls and 
consumption increases by eight percent for green, 11 percent for gold and 26 percent for 
green organic. China stays a net importer and increases imports as well. China is the largest 
consumer of gold kiwifruit, which is illustrated by the increase in quantity consumed were 
trade to be liberalised. Since New Zealand is the only current exporter of gold kiwifruit, the 
increase in Chinese demand is largely met by increased New Zealand exports. 
 
Europe drops its relatively low tariff (eight percent) and as a result of complete trade 
liberalisation domestic EU price rises for both consumers and producers. Producer returns 
actually increase by two percent, which indicates that EU producers are better off if the world 
kiwifruit market were to be completely liberalised. 
 
The implication of trade liberalisation relative to countries‟ different import tariff levels are 
clearly illustrated in this scenario. The following table demonstrates how producers in 
countries with no current trade restrictions on kiwifruit; New Zealand, Australia and Chile; 
are similarly better off from trade liberalisation. Japan, with its relatively low tariff of seven 
percent, will enjoy a four percent increase on green kiwifruit producer returns. Grower returns 
for EU green kiwifruit producers (current import tariff of eight percent) will increase by two 
percent. The United States will experience the lowest positive effect on green kiwifruit 
returns, only one percent, due to their import tariff level of nine percent. 
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Table 12: Scenario 3 – Trade liberalisation  
 
  Producer Price Producer Returns Quantity Produced Quantity Consumed 
Country Green Gold Organic Green Gold Organic Green Gold Organic Green Gold Organic 
AU 10% 13% 10% 13%   13% 3%   3% -5% -28% -19% 
BE 2% 5% 2%             0% -13% -2% 
CI -9% -6% -9% -12% -8% -12% -4% -2% -4% 8% 11% 26% 
CL 10% 13% 10% 14%   14% 4%   4% -5%   -5% 
EO 2% 5% 2% 2%   2% 1%   1% 0% -14% -2% 
EN 2% 5% 2% 2%   2% 1%   1% 0% -14% -2% 
FR 2% 5% 2% 2%   2% 1%   1% 0% -15% -2% 
GM 2% 5% 2%             0% -13% -2% 
GR 2% 5% 2% 2%   2% 1%   1% 0% -14% -2% 
IT 2% 5% 2% 2%   2% 1%   1% -1% -19% -4% 
JP 3% 6% 2% 4%   4% 1%   1% 0% -16% -4% 
NZ 10% 13% 10% 14% 19% 14% 4% 5% 4% -5% -28% -19% 
SP 2% 5% 2% 2%   2% 1%   1% 0% -15% -3% 
UK 2% 5% 2%             0% -15% -3% 
US 1% 4% 1% 1%   1% 0%   0% 1% -12% 0% 
RW 10% 13% 10% 14%   14% 4%   4% -5% -28%   
Source: own illustration, 2007 
 
The rise in EU prices can be explained through the increase in Chinese imports. The 
consumption drop in the EU compared to the consumption increase in China reflects that most 
increase in production worldwide is consumed by China. The model calculates the difference 
in population between the EU and China to be as much as 70 million by 2013, indicating that 
it is not unlikely that Chinese demand for kiwifruit will increase to the extreme of affecting 
EU prices. This result may seem slightly unrealistic, as theory suggests that a complete trade 
liberalisation would reduce prices and hence benefit consumers and make producers in 
countries with high tariffs worse off. However, with China being such a significant and 
influential player it is theoretically defendable that the model predicts a consumption drop in 
countries where tariffs are relatively low and a significant boost in consumption levels where 
the eliminated import tariff was initially relatively high. 
 
The following table summarises the effects on New Zealand producer returns for the different 
scenarios. It illustrates that the scenario with the most harmful impact on the New Zealand 
kiwifruit industry proved to be the EU introduction of an SPS policy. In this case the green 
kiwifruit sector experiences the most significant negative impact on grower returns (-28 
percent). Out of the three scenarios the one on trade liberalisation proves to have the most 
positive impact on the New Zealand kiwifruit industry in terms of higher producer returns of 
golden kiwifruit (+19 percent).  
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Table 13: Summarised effects on New Zealand producer returns 
Variety  1. EU SPS policy 2. China production x 2 3.Trade liberalisation 
Green -28% -16% +14% 
Gold -11% -19% +19% 
Organic -21% -9% +14% 
Source: own illustration, 2007 
 
8.4. Conclusion of chapter 
This section introduced the model scenarios developed for this research. The objective of this 
thesis has been to study trade related issues concerning the global kiwifruit industry and their 
impact on New Zealand producers. Relevant scenarios were developed in order to investigate 
the most likely potential future challenges facing the industry. They were consequently run 
through the KIWI trade model and impacts on New Zealand producer returns were finally 
quantified in order to evaluate the scope of these particular changes. 
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9. Conclusion 
 
New Zealand was the first country in the world to develop a commercial kiwifruit industry.  
The emergence and development of competitors in Italy, France, Japan and the USA during 
the 1980s put pressure on New Zealand to maintain market access. This became even more 
important as a significant threat appeared with the development of a Chilean kiwifruit 
industry, representing direct competition to New Zealand in the Southern hemisphere.  
 
New Zealand has developed its kiwifruit industry over several decades and currently enjoys a 
competitive advantage in several areas. The KiwiGreen production management system, the 
development of the Gold variety and the twelve month supply plan are some of the main 
strategies and production programmes leading to these advantages that constitute the reason 
for the relatively high international price premiums that New Zealand kiwifruit benefits from 
today. ZESPRI is the country‟s worldwide kiwifruit distributor through a single desk seller 
system. 
 
The global kiwifruit industry is currently undergoing changes on both the demand and supply 
sides. The most fundamental challenge the industry will be confronted by shortly is the 
increasing global supply of kiwifruit. China constitutes the country with the most potential to 
increase the supply of Green kiwifruit on the world market in the nearest future. The import 
tariff is still the most widely applied trade restriction within the kiwifruit industry. However, 
other non-tariff trade barriers such as the SPS measure are becoming more commonly used 
and therefore one of the focal points of this research. 
 
The analysis of current trade-related issues in the kiwifruit market is well suited to a partial 
equilibrium model approach. However, there are very few quantitative models in the 
international literature that consider kiwifruit, let alone different varieties of kiwifruit, and 
those that do exist do not adequately incorporate trade aspects. There has been no specific 
analytical framework available to examine changes in the dynamics of the kiwifruit industry 
in New Zealand.  
 
In order to investigate and answer the research questions of this thesis, a modified and 
industry-specific version of a partial equilibrium framework was developed and used. The 
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KIWI model is a multi-country, three-commodity partial equilibrium model focusing on the 
kiwifruit industry. The model is used to quantify price, supply, demand and net trade effects 
of various policy changes and is calibrated to year 2003 and simulations are carried out up to 
2013. The KIWI model includes the major kiwifruit producers and consumers, specified by 13 
countries, and the commodities included are green kiwifruit, gold kiwifruit, and organic green 
kiwifruit.  
 
Three cases, illustrating potential scenarios that may face the global kiwifruit industry in the 
near future, have been modelled and analysed in this thesis. The scenarios included a potential 
EU drop in demand due to a stricter SPS policy towards New Zealand kiwifruit, a scenario 
where Chinese production doubles by the year 2013 and finally a trade liberalisation scenario 
where all tariffs currently imposed on the global kiwifruit industry were removed. The results 
illustrate interesting effects on countries included in the new kiwifruit model and New 
Zealand in particular. The consequences of the potential scenarios on New Zealand producer 
returns were estimated in order to quantify changes executed by the model. 
 
A considerable drop in EU demand for New Zealand kiwifruit, due to an introduction of an 
SPS measure, significantly reduces total exports to the world from New Zealand and lowers 
producer returns. New Zealand producers are hence negatively affected by a potential EU 
introduction of an SPS policy. Italy has utilised this measure before, and with the increasing 
use of non-tariff trade barriers worldwide, it is therefore not unlikely that this scenario could 
take place in the near future.  
 
China is currently expanding its kiwifruit production at a significant pace. A scenario was 
developed where total production doubles by 2013. This may potentially be an 
understatement of the likely expansion in Chinese kiwifruit production, as it does not include 
productivity changes. The effects of increased availability of Chinese kiwifruit have a 
significant negative impact on New Zealand producer returns and exported quantities, albeit 
not as dramatically as in the scenario that considers the EU‟s introduction of an SPS policy. 
 
A trade liberalisation scenario was modelled through the removal of all tariffs in all countries 
by 2013. World market prices rise significantly for all varieties giving New Zealand an 
incentive to increase production and exports. New Zealand producer returns increase as a 
result. China increases its imports and consumption significantly, which could possibly 
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explain the rise in EU prices. The scenario, interestingly enough, illustrates that EU producers 
are better off, through higher producer returns, if the world kiwifruit market were to be 
completely liberalised. 
 
The result of this scenario also illustrates the importance of using a trade model, including 
several interacting actors and factors. A simple partial equilibrium supply and demand 
diagram of any of the European kiwifruit consuming countries would suggest an outcome of 
increased demand and higher imports if tariffs were to be removed completely. The 
calculations and simulations by the model clearly show the complex and important 
interlinkages between various producing and consuming countries. This highlights how an 
appropriately-calibrated trade model can more accurately simulate a result that is closer to a 
real world situation. 
 
It is clearly observed, through both the Chinese expansion scenario and the trade liberalisation 
scenario, what a potential impact and future role China has as a world market player. It is 
projected that a significant expansion of the industry will change the country from being a net 
importer to a net exporter, establishing itself on the world market as a significant provider of 
especially green and gold kiwifruit. The organic sector is still under development and not as 
likely to affect the world market as significantly as the other two varieties. 
 
Regular import tariffs are increasingly being substituted by non-tariff trade barriers such as 
SPS measures. The introduction of such a non-tariff trade barrier against kiwifruit imports 
could potentially restrict future trade of the commodity, especially if introduced by a 
significant consumer market such as the EU. Import restrictions, classified as SPS measures, 
have had a detrimental impact on the New Zealand industry in the past and could come to 
play a more significant role on the future world market of kiwifruit. 
 
With several issues challenging world trade in kiwifruit it becomes important to highlight the 
advantages of the New Zealand industry. The varieties where New Zealand benefits from high 
premiums (green organic and gold) generally appear to be the least affected by various 
international production and policy shocks. In the scenario where production expands in the 
Chinese industry, the New Zealand organic industry is the least affected variety in terms of 
loss in producer returns. The EU import ban scenario causes the least significant effect on the 
New Zealand gold variety sector. These results illustrate and confirm the competitive 
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advantage that New Zealand has built up over the past decades and emphasise the importance 
of constantly maintaining and improving these qualities.  
 
Out of the three scenarios in this research, the second one illustrating an expansion of the 
Chinese kiwifruit industry may be considered as the most realistic. New Zealand, and other 
major producing countries, needs to be prepared for global expansion by differentiating 
themselves from China through continued investment in quality assurance and the 
development of new varieties and branding strategies. 
 
New Zealand, and other countries, needs to take caution against possible introduction of non-
tariff trade barriers such as SPS policies, especially if potentially imposed by main consuming 
economies like the EU. 
 
One way of overcoming potential threats and challenges would be to keep pushing for trade 
liberalisation in the kiwifruit sector, which according to this research, has a significant 
positive impact on New Zealand producer returns (and those in most other regions).  
 
Limitations 
This study has some limitations. It is important to mention that the KIWI model is still under 
construction. Data has been difficult to obtain, especially for the green organic and gold 
sectors. Several assumptions and estimations had to be made (presented in chapter six), which 
limits the robustness of the model and hence the study. The production costs and quantities, 
consumption prices and quantities and price elasticities considered in this model would 
benefit from further empirical investigation. The thesis has tried to maintain consistency 
through the use of as few and as neutral databases as possible. This proved to be difficult, and 
data had to be obtained from many different and individual country-specific sources.  
 
Data on kiwifruit policies were also difficult to obtain. There was assumed no producer and 
consumer support or taxes for kiwifruit worldwide. The import tariff constitutes the single 
trade policy included in this research and was obtained from a few different sources 
(presented in chapter five). No SPS or TBT measures are included at this stage. 
 
In this research three different varieties of kiwifruit (green, gold and green organic) have been 
considered. Other varieties can be found on the world market as well, but are not as 
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prominent. The objective of this research has also been to estimate impacts on New Zealand 
producer returns, and New Zealand specific varieties were hence selected.  
 
There are also other countries influencing world trade in kiwifruit, such as Iran, Mexico, 
South Korea and Taiwan. Due to their relative insignificance in the global kiwifruit market, 
compared to other countries included in the model, they were excluded and accounted for 
under the “rest of world” grouping. 
 
Implications for further research 
Future research may include the development of an improved dataset with revised quantities, 
prices, policies and elasticities. This would add robustness and accuracy to modelling results.  
 
As previously mentioned, New Zealand can command a premium in global markets due to 
various long standing industry factors, which would suggest that all kiwifruit are not the 
same. However, for simplicity and modelling purposes all green kiwifruit are considered as 
homogenous in this study. Further differentiation between varieties and quality of kiwifruit is 
therefore suggested for future research. 
 
One possible option for future research would be to include further policies such as non-tariff 
trade barriers and environmental policies such as carbon taxes. 
 
Another approach to take in the future would include adding seasonality as a factor in the 
model. This does indeed play a significant role in how world trade in kiwifruit is composed 
today.  
 
Another area for future research involves including monopolistic competition in the model. 
This would facilitate an investigation of the impacts of New Zealand potentially losing 
ZESPRI as a single desk seller. 
 
 
Policy implications 
The approach taken in this research is novel in two ways. Firstly, this represents the first use 
of an international trade model focused specifically on kiwifruit. Secondly, the study 
considers key aspects of the kiwifruit industry and links these to international trade in the 
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sector. The realistic scenarios developed in this research provide an understanding of the 
potential threats and opportunities facing the industry. This study identifies the possible 
impacts on producer returns and thus may provide decision-makers with important insights 
for future investment and policy developments. 
 
A potential expansion of the Chinese kiwifruit industry may be considered as the most 
realistic scenario in this research.  New Zealand, and other major producing countries, needs 
to be prepared for global expansion and maintain market access through product 
differentiation and intense marketing. 
 
Given the potentially significant impacts of non-tariff barriers such as punitive SPS measures, 
the New Zealand kiwifruit industry should continue to support the New Zealand government 
in its efforts to maintain an open, transparent and robust global trading system. 
 
According to this research, multilateral trade liberalisation has a significant positive impact on 
not only New Zealand producer returns, but on those of other major producing countries as 
well. One way of balancing potential threats and challenges would therefore be to keep 
advocating further trade liberalisation of the kiwifruit sector in future trade negotiations. 
.
 89 
 10. References 
 
ADAS (2003). Organic Food Markets. Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs. 
  
Agriquality. (n.d.). "Horticulture - Quality Assurance Programmes for the Horticulture 
Industry - EUREPGAP certification."   Retrieved July 31, 2006, from 
http://www.agriquality.com/horticulture/quality_assurance_programmes_for_the_horticulture
_industry/eurepgap_certification.cfm. 
  
Anderson, G. (2004). Quarantine and the SPS Agreement - Maintaining a Balance between 
Protection and Protectionism. Symposium on WTO Law & Economic Welfare Effects. 
Adelaide. 
  
Arthur, M. (2006). An Economic Analysis of Quarantine: The Economics of Autralia's Ban 
on New Zealand Apple Imports. H. Associates. Sydney. 
  
Bakshi, N. (2003). Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: The Case of Mexican Avocados. 
Agriculture and Applied Economics. Blacksburg, Virginia, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
State University. Master of Science: 69. 
  
Belrose Inc (2004). World Kiwifruit Review 2004 Edition. Pullman, U.S.A: 94. 
  
Belrose Inc (2006). World Kiwifruit Review 2006 Edition. Pullman, U.S.A.: 98. 
  
Belrose Inc (2007). World Kiwifruit Review 2007 Edition. Pullman, United States: 98. 
  
Boto, I., R. Kortbech-Olesen, et al. (2001). World Markets for Organic Fruit and Vegetables - 
Opportunities for Developing Countries in the Production and Export of Organic Horticultural 
Products. FAO Corporate Document Repository. Retrieved 26 April 2007, from 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/Y1669E/y1669e00.HTM 
  
Brookes, R., W. Cartwright, et al. (1994). Kiwifruit Industry Marketing Review. University of 
Auckland. Auckland. New Zealand. 
  
Cagatay, S. and C. Saunders (2003). Lincoln Trade and Environment Model (LTEM): An 
Agricultural Multi-Country, Multi-Commodity Partial Equilibrium Framework. Lincoln 
Univeristy. 
  
California Kiwifruit Commission. (2000). " HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA KIWIFRUIT."   
Retrieved July 28, 2005, from http://www.kiwifruit.org/history.htm. 
  
California Kiwifruit Commission. (2003). "2004/2005 CROP SEASON - Marketing Policy 
Statement."   Retrieved 2006-12-07, 2006, from 
http://www.kiwifruit.org/NewIndustry/Mrktply_00.htm. 
  
California Kiwifruit Commission. (nd). "Organic Kiwifruit Production." Retrieved June 25, 
2006, from http://www.kiwifruit.org. 
  
 90 
Calvin, L. and B. Krissoff (2005). Resolution of the U.S.-Japan Apple Dispute, New 
Opportunities for Trade. Electronic Outlook Report from the Economic Research Service, 
United States Department of Agriculture. 
  
Campbell, H., J. Fairweather, et al. (1997). Recent Developments in Organic Food Production 
in New Zealand: Part 2, Kiwifruit in the Bay of Plenty. Dunedin, Department of 
Anthropology, University of Otago. 
  
China News. (2005, 12 August 2005). China patented kiwifruit got global transfer. China News. 
Retrieved 30 April 2007, from http://www.chinanews.cn/news/2005/2005-08-12/9278.shtml 
  
Chinese Academy of Sciences. (2003). New Kiwifruit Cultivar Carves a Firm Niche in European 
Market [Electronic version], 2007 (30 April). 
  
Choi, E. K., J. Harrigan, et al. (2003). Handbook of International Trade. Malden, Oxford, 
Carlton, Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
 
Coopers and Lybrand Ltd. (1988). Report on Kiwfruit Marketing: Final Report. Auckland: 
Coopers & Lybrand. 
  
Cullen, M. and P. Hodgson (2005). Implementing the carbon tax. P. A. D. o. t. I. R. 
Department. 
  
Dalgety, N. (2003). "Situation and Outlook for New Zealand Agriculture & Forestry, Apples, 
."   Retrieved June 24, 2006, from http://www.maf.govt.nz/mafnet/rural-nz/statistics-and-
forecasts/sonzaf/2003/2003-sonzaf-27.htm. 
  
Dimitri, C., Greene, C., & Olberholtzer, L. (2005). Price Premiums Hold on as U.S. Organic 
Produce Market Expands (No. VGS-308-01): USDA. 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/vgs/may05/VGS30801/VGS30801.pdf 
 
Dryden, G., Hughes, J., Ripley, J., Scarrow, S., Steiffel, H., & Underwood, R. (2002). Costs And 
Risks Of Conversion To Organic Kiwifruit And Apple Systems [Electronic version]. 
  
Economic Research Service USDA (n.d.). A modelling framework for assessing the trade 
effects of technical trade barriers. U. S. D. o. Agriculture. 
 
European Commission. (2004). Trade Issues. Bilateral Trade Agreements. Chile. Brussels, 
European Union. Retrieved June 5, 2006, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/chile/index_en.htm 
 
European Commission. (2006). Duty Rates. Taxation and Customs Union. Brussels, European 
Union. 
 
EurepGAP. (n.d). "EurepGAP Membership."   Retrieved July 31, 2006, from 
http://www.eurep.org/faqmembership.html. 
  
EurepGAP. (n.d.). "About EurepGAP."   Retrieved April 19, 2006, from 
http://www.eurepgap.org/Languages/English/about.html. 
  
 91 
FAO. (2006). "FAOSTAT Classic, Production, Crops Primary." FAOSTAT  Retrieved 
August 17, 2006, from http://faostat.fao.org/site/408/default.aspx. 
  
FAO (2007). FAOSTAT, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 
  
FAOSTAT. (2006). "Trade, crops & livestock primary & processed "   Retrieved August 17, 
2006, from http://faostat.fao.org/site/412/default.aspx. 
  
FAS (1999). Organic Perspectives. USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service. 
  
Fournier, J.-M. and D. Hassan (2003). Economic aspects of the French kiwifruit sector: 
impact of profit margin policy on channel operation. ISHS Acta Horticulturae 610: V 
International Symposium on Kiwifruit Wuhan, China ISHS Acta Horticulturae. 
  
Francois, J. F. and H. K. Hall (1997). Chapter 5 Partial equilibrium modeling. Applied 
methods for trade policy analysis. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Francois, J. F., van Meijl, H., et al. (2003). A Forward Looking Analysis of the Doha Round. 
GTAP Resource #1244.  Retrieved June 29, 2006, from 
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/res_display.asp?RecordID=1244 
  
Freshinfo (2006) Giant NZ co-op mooted. FreshInfo, London, United Kingdom. Retrieved 
November 25, 2006, from http://www.freshinfo.com/index.php?s=n&ss=nd&sid=38687  
  
Freshinfo (2006) ZESPRI Gold soon year-round. Retrieved on October 5, 2006, from 
http://www.freshinfo.com 
  
Gandolfo, G. (1998). International Trade Theory and Policy. Rome, Springer-Verlag Berlin. 
  
Gardiner, P. (2004). "Situation and Outlook for Horticulture."   Retrieved June 29, 2006, from 
http://www.fsanz.govt.nz/mafnet/rural-nz/statistics-and-forecasts/sonzaf/2004/2004-sonzaf-
24.htm. 
  
Growing Futures. (n.d.). "ZESPRI‟s KiwiGreen programme - world firsts in this vital crop 
management system." Growing Futures Case Study Series  Retrieved April 4, 2006, from 
http://www.growingfutures.com/files/the_kiwigreen_system.pdf. 
  
Hanawa Peterson, H. and L. Schertz Willett (2000). "U.S. Kiwifruit Industry Model: Annual 
Supply and Monthly Demand." Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 32(3 
(December 2000)): 479-491. 
  
Hardie Boys, M. (1999). "KIWIFRUIT EXPORT REGULATIONS 1999."   Retrieved July 
29, 2005, from http://rangi.knowledge-basket.co.nz/regs/regs/text/1999/1999310.txt. 
  
Hasey, J. K., Johnson, R. S., Klonsky, K., & Meyer, R. D. (nd). An Organic Versus A 
Conventional Farming System In Kiwifruit. Retrieved 26 April 2007, from 
http://fruitsandnuts.ucdavis.edu/crops/kiwifruit.pdf 
 
HortNews (2004). "Counterfeit labels a concern for NZ Investment". Retrieved July 31, 2006, 
from http://www.hortnet.co.nz/news/2004/n4788.htm. 
  
 92 
HortResearch (2005). Fresh Facts New Zealand Horticulture 2005: Ministry of Agriculture & 
Forestry. http://www.maf.govt.nz/statistics/primaryindustries/horticulture/2005-hort-ff.pdf
  
HortResearch (2006). Fresh Facts New Zealand Horticulture 2006. Retrieved July 26, 2006, 
from http://www.hortresearch.co.nz/files/aboutus/factsandfigs/ff2006.pdf 
  
Huang, H. and A. R. Ferguson (2001). "Kiwifruit in China." New Zealand Journal of Crop 
and Horticultural Science 29. 
  
Huang, H. and A. R. Ferguson (2001). "Kiwifruit in China." New Zealand Journal of Crop 
and Horticultural Science 29: 1-14. 
  
Huang, H. and A. R. Ferguson (2002). "Kiwifruit plantings and production in China, 2002." 
New Zealand Journal of Crop and Horticultural Science, 31. 
  
Huang, H. and A. R. Ferguson (2003). "Review: Kiwifruit (Actinidia chinesis and A. 
deliciosa) plantings and production in China, 2002 " New Zealand Journal of Crop and 
Horticultural Science 31: 197-202. 
  
Hugh, C. (1997). Case Study: Organic Kiwifruit Production. 
  
Johnston, W. and R. Sandrey (1990). Land Markets and Rural Debt. Farming without 
Subsidies, New Zealand‟s recent experience, a MAF Policy Services Project M. Wheatstone 
and I. F. Grant. Wellington, the New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries: chapter 
10, pp. 186. 
  
Kiwigold Consortium. (2007). "Products."   Retrieved 30 April 2007, 2007, from 
http://www.consorziofrutteto.it/prodotti_eng.html. 
  
Klonsky, K. M., and Carmen, H. F. (2004). California Handlers Describe Marketing Issues For 
Organic Kiwifruit California Agriculture, 58(3). Retrieved March 11, 2006, from 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/anrcs/californiaagriculture/v58/n3/p169  
  
Krauss, M. B. and H. G. Johnson (1974). General Equilibrium Analysis. London, George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd. 
  
Leamer, E. E. (1987). Sources of International Comparative Advantage. London, The MIT 
Press. 
  
Lees, N. (1993). Kiwifruit Industry 1980-1992: an Examination of the Development of the 
New Zealand Kiwifruit Industry under High Product Prices, its Subsequent Restructuring 
under Falling Returns, and the Effects of Government Policy. M. o. A. a. Fisheries, MAF 
Policy: 50. 
  
McAneney, J. (n.d.). Wealth Creation Case for Lincoln Ventures Ltd Application for PGSF 
Funding: Supply Chain Management Systems for Perishable Products. R. D. A. Strategic 
Valuations. Woollahra, Australia. 
 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. (1996). "Agriculture Industry Governance."   Retrieved 
July 13, 2006, from http://www.maf.govt.nz/mafnet/publications/1996-post-election-
brief/peb00004.htm. 
 93 
  
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. (2002). "Horticulture Monitoring - Kiwifruit."   
Retrieved July 20, 2006, from http://www.maf.govt.nz/mafnet/rural-nz/statistics-and-
forecasts/farm-monitoring/2002/horticulture/horticulture-04.htm#P151_8162. 
  
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2004). Situation and Outlook for Horticulture. 
Wellington. 
  
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2005). Kiwifruit. M. P. Monitoring and Evaluation, the 
New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. 
 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2006). "Horticulture Monitoring - Kiwifruit."   
Retrieved March 29, 2007, from http://www.maf.govt.nz/mafnet/rural-nz/statistics-and-
forecasts/farm-monitoring/2006/horticulture/horticulture-2006-03.htm. 
 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. (n.d.). "GATT Outcome."   Retrieved 2005-09-15, from 
http://www.maf.govt.nz/mafnet/rural-nz/profitability-and-economics/trends/gatt-
outcome/gatt0003.htm#E10E10. 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2007). Trade and Economic Relations. NZ and the 
WTO. Doha. Retrieved June 15, 2007, from http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-
Relations/NZ-and-the-WTO/Doha/0-what-happens-next.php 
  
New Zealand Fruitgrowers Federation (2002). "Japanese fumigation of New Zealand 
kiwifruit". Retrieved 2005-09-13, 2005, from 
http://www.fruitgrowers.org.nz/orchardist/articles/2002/10-14.htm. 
 
New Zealand Fruitgrowers Federation. (2003). "Market access a cost in dollars and 
opportunity."   Retrieved 2005-09-15, 2005, from 
http://www.fruitgrowers.org.nz/orchardist/articles/2003/11-36.htm. 
  
New Zealand Fruitgrowers Federation. (2004). "New Zealand Fruit Industry Structures."   
Retrieved July 31 2005, from http://www.fruitgrowers.org.nz/industry/. 
  
New Zealand Government. (1999). "Kiwifruit Industry Restructuring Act 1999."   Retrieved 
11 August, 2006, from 
http://legislation.govt.nz/libraries/contents/om_isapi.dll?clientID=292939&infobase=pal_stat
utes.nfo&jump=a1999-095&softpage=DOC. 
  
New Zealand Horticulture Export Authority. (2004). "Kiwifruit Exports to Australia now 
under the HEA Framework."   Retrieved June 29, 2006, from http://www.hea.co.nz/. 
  
New Zealand Kiwifruit Growers Inc. (n.d.). "What is KGI?"   Retrieved July 20, 2006, from 
http://www.nzkgi.org.nz/about-kgi.html?cu=hpgknf45kdzfup45a21tal45. 
  
New Zealand Kiwifruit Growers Inc Forum (1995). Kiwifruit Industry Review Stage III, 
Corporatisation - Collaborative Marketing - Industry  Operational Structure. Auckland. 
  
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2006). "New Zealand-China Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA)." Trade Agreements  Retrieved 2006-08-31, 2006, from 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/tradeagreements/nzchinafta/faqs.html. 
 94 
  
Opara, L. and F. Mazaud (2001) Food traceability from field to plate. Outlook on Agriculture 
Volume, pp 239-247 DOI:  
  
Oppenheimer Group (2003). Packaging/shipping kiwifruit. 
  
Organic Trade Association (2007) Organic Foods at 3% of Food and Beverage Retail Sales. 
FoodBusinessNews  
  
Patel, B. (2003). "EUREPGAP: The Global Partnership for Safe and Sustainable 
Agriculture,." Kiwifruit Jul/Aug 2003(158): 44. 
  
Peterson, H. H. and S. L. Willett (2000). "U.S. Kiwifruit Industry Model: Annual Supply and 
Monthly Demand." Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 32(3 (December 2000)): 
479-491. 
  
Porter, M. E. (1998). On Competition. Boston. 
  
Rayner, T. (1990). The Seeds of Change. Farming without Subsidies, New Zealand‟s recent 
experience, a MAF Policy Services Project, . M. Wheatstone and I. F. Grant, the New Zealand 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries: chapter 1, pp.15-24. 
  
Regulations Review Committee. (2002). "Activities of the Regulations Review Committee 
during 2000."   Retrieved 2005-07-29, 2005, from 
http://www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz/content/691/i16_i.pdf. 
  
Reynolds, R. and W. Moore (1990). Farm Prices and Costs. Farming without Subsidies, New 
Zealand‟s recent experience, a MAF Policy Services Project. M. Wheatstone and I. F. Grant, 
the New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries: chapter 8, pp. 137-156. 
  
Salvatore, D. (1999). International Economics. New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
  
Salvatore, D. (2005). Introduction to International Economics. Fordham Univeristy, John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
  
Saunders, C. and S. Cagatay (2003). Lincoln Trade and Environment Model (LTEM): An 
Agricultural Multi-Country, Multi-Commodity Partial Equilibrium Framework. Lincoln 
University, Agribusiness and Economics Research Unit: 33. 
 
Saunders, C., S. Cagatay, et al. (2003). Lincoln Trade and Environment Model (LTEM): 
Linking Trade and Environment. Lincoln University, Agribusiness and Economics Research 
Unit: 263. 
  
Saunders, C. and S. Cagatay (2003). Economic analysis of Issues Surrounding Commercial 
Release of GM Food Products in NZ. Lincoln University. 
  
Saunders, C., S. Cagatay, et al. (2004). Trade and the Environment: Economic and 
Environmental Impacts of Global Dairy Trade Liberalisation. Lincoln University, 
Agribusiness and Economics Research Unit: 21. 
  
 95 
Sayre, L. (2003, 2003-03-20). "Farming without subsidies? Some lessons from New 
Zealand." Farmer-to-Farmer-Know-How  Retrieved July 31 2005, from 
http://www.newfarm.org/features/0303/newzealand_subsidies.shtml. 
  
Seitz, W. D., G. C. Nelson, et al. (1994). Economics of Resources, Agriculture, and Food. 
Illinois, McGRAW-HILL, INC. 
  
Simpson, D. (1975). General Equilibrium Analysis. Oxford, Basil Blackwell & Mott Limited. 
  
Skilton, J. (2005). Tariff and Trade Barriers: New Zealand Horticulture Export Authority. Pg 
10. Retrieved May 4, 2007, from 
http://www.enterprisenorthland.co.nz/downloads/tariff_trade_barriers2005.pdf 
  
Statistics New Zealand. (2002). "Agriculture Statistics 2002."   Retrieved July 29, 2006, from 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/0FF31BC5-A08B-4217-81D0-
641035C6E7C0/0/PDFFile.pdf. 
 
Statistics New Zealand. (2007). "New Zealand External Trade Statistics."   Retrieved July 18, 
2007, from http://www.stats.govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/1C559AFD-693B-4932-B847-
2CB9408AF681/0/NewZealandExternalTradeStatisticsJune2007.pdf 
  
University of Melbourne Department of Economics. (2000, 2000-06-20). "Walras Law and 
Macroeconomics."   Retrieved 2006-10-04, 2006, from 
http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au/rdixon/wlaw.html. 
  
USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, Ed. (2000). Japan, Kiwifruit, Kiwifruit Annual Report 
2000. GAIN Report. Tokyo, FAS Online. 
  
USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (2004). Gain Report, New Zealand Kiwifruit Annual 
2004,. G. A. I. Network. Wellington, FAS Online. 
  
USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (2005). New Zealand Kiwifruit Annual 2005. G. A. I. 
Network. Wellington, FAS Online. 
  
van der Wiel, A. (2006, 24 March). "Spanish Organic Produce Consumption Increases 2%."   
Retrieved 26 April, 2007, from http://www.freshplaza.com/2006/24mrt/1_es_organic.htm. 
  
van Tongeren, F., H. van Meijl, et al. (2000). "Global models applied to agricultural and trade 
policies: a review and assessment." Agricultural Economics(26 (2001) 149-172). 
  
Voss, D. (2005). pers. comm. 
  
Wallace, R. (1990). The Macroeconomic Environment. Farming without Subsidies, New 
Zealand‟s recent experience, a MAF Policy Services Project. M. Wheatstone and I. F. Grant, 
the New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries: chapter 3, pp. 43-59. 
  
World Trade Organisation. (2005). "Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures."   Retrieved 2005-
09-04, 2005, from http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/sps_e.htm. 
  
Yerex, D. and W. Haines (1983). The Kiwifruit Story. Masterton, Agricultural Publishing 
Associates Limited. 
 96 
  
ZESPRI (2004). Celebrating 100 Years. New Zealand Kiwifruit Journal. J. Webby. Auckland: 
257. 
  
ZESPRI (2004-2005). Annual Report 2004-2005. 
  
ZESPRI (2005). Taste ZESPRI. 
  
ZESPRI (2005-06). Annual Report 2005-2006. 
  
ZESPRI. (n.d). "How We Struck Gold."   Retrieved June 23, 2006, from 
http://www.ZESPRI.com/moreinfo/environ.asp?zmoreinfoid=6. 
  
ZESPRI. (n.d.). "Green and Clean Systems."   Retrieved July 29, 2005, from 
http://www.ZESPRI.com/moreinfo/company.asp?zmoreinfoid=3. 
  
ZESPRI. (nd). "Frequenty Asked Questions."   Retrieved 15 May, 2007, from 
http://www.ZESPRI.com/faq.asp. 
  
ZESPRI International Limited (2005). 2005 Corporate Profile. ZESPRI. Auckland. 
  
Zwart, T. and W. Moore (1990). Marketing and Processing. Farming without Subsidies, New 
Zealand‟s recent experience, a MAF Policy Services Project. M. Wheatstone and I. F. Grant, 
the New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries: chapter 12, pp. 253-272. 
  
 
  
 97 
11. Appendix 
 
Table A1: Countries included in the model 
ID Country ID Country 
AU Australia GR Greece 
BE Belgium IT Italy 
CI China JP Japan 
CL Chile NZ New Zealand 
EO EU Old (15) SP Spain 
EN EU New (10) UK United Kingdom 
FR France US United States 
GM Germany RW Rest of World 
 
Table A2: Kiwifruit variety coverage of the model 
ID Variety 
KW Kiwifruit green 
KG Kiwifruit gold 
KO Kiwifruit green organic 
 
Table A3: Model variables
Variable Description 
pp Producer price ($/t) 
pc Consumer price ($/t) 
pt Trade price ($/t) 
qp Quantity production (000 mt) 
qc Quantity consumption (000 mt) 
qt Quantity net trade (000 mt) 
qe Quantity ending stocks (000 mt) 
fp Shift in production 
fc Shift in consumption 
fe Shift in ending stocks 
sm Producer market subsidy, fees, levies, direct payments, other ($/mt) 
cm Consumer market subsidy and other ($/mt) 
lib Liberalisation (0=lib, 1=continued full support)  
gdp Gross Domestic Producer index (1979=100) 
pop Population (000) 
xrt Exchange rate (local currency/$) 
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Table A4: Equations in model  
 
Australia 
AUptKW 1.506253*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/AUxrt)^1     
AUptKG 1.506251*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/AUxrt)^1     
AUptKO 1.506253*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/AUxrt)^1     
AUppKW 1*0+MAX(AUptKW*(1-AUlib)*(1+AUsmKW),1)    
AUppKG 1*0+MAX(AUptKG*(1-AUlib)*(1+AUsmKG),1)    
AUppKO 1*0+MAX(AUptKO*(1-AUlib)*(1+AUsmKO),1)    
AUpcKW 1*0+MAX(AUptKW*(1-AUlib)*(1+AUcmKW),1)    
AUpcKG 1*0+MAX(AUptKG*(1-AUlib)*(1+AUcmKG),1)    
AUpcKO 1*0+MAX(AUptKO*(1-AUlib)*(1+AUcmKO),1)    
AUqpKW 0.3333874*AUfpKW*AUppKW^.3     
AUqpKG 0*AUfpKG*AUppKG^.3      
AUqpKO 0.01539598*AUfpKO*AUppKO^.3     
AUqeKW 0.003412969*AUfeKW*AUqpKW     
AUqeKG 2007*AUfeKG*AUqpKG      
AUqeKO 0.06666667*AUfeKO*AUqpKO      
AUqtKW 0+0+AUqpKW-AUqcKW-(AUqeKW-AUqe:1KW)    
AUqtKG 0+0+AUqpKG-AUqcKG-(AUqeKG-AUqe:1KG)    
AUqtKO 0+0+AUqpKO-AUqcKO-(AUqeKO-AUqe:1KO)    
AUqcKW 
0.2450798*AUfcKW*AUpcKW^-
1.7*AUpcKG^.5*AUpcKO^.5*(AUgdp/AUpop)^.18*AUpop 
AUqcKG 1597.119*AUfcKG*AUpcKW^.5*AUpcKG^-3.4*AUpcKO^.5*(AUgdp/AUpop)^.18*AUpop 
AUqcKO 4267.716*AUfcKO*AUpcKW^.5*AUpcKG^.5*AUpcKO^-3.4*(AUgdp/AUpop)^.18*AUpop 
 
Belgium 
BEptKW 1.381579*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/BExrt)^1     
BEptKG 1.381574*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/BExrt)^1     
BEptKO 1.381579*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/BExrt)^1     
BEppKW 1.00644*0+MAX(BEptKW*(1-BElib)*(1+BEsmKW),1)    
BEppKG 1.006445*0+MAX(BEptKG*(1-BElib)*(1+BEsmKG),1)    
BEppKO 1.006441*0+MAX(BEptKO*(1-BElib)*(1+BEsmKO),1)    
BEpcKW 1.00644*0+MAX(BEptKW*(1-BElib)*(1+BEcmKW),1)    
BEpcKG 1.006445*0+MAX(BEptKG*(1-BElib)*(1+BEcmKG),1)    
BEpcKO 1.006441*0+MAX(BEptKO*(1-BElib)*(1+BEcmKO),1)    
BEqpKW 0*BEfpKW*BEppKW^.1      
BEqpKG 0*BEfpKG*BEppKG^.1      
BEqpKO 0*BEfpKO*BEppKO^.1      
BEqeKW 2007*BEfeKW*BEqpKW      
BEqeKG 2007*BEfeKG*BEqpKG      
BEqeKO 2007*BEfeKO*BEqpKO      
BEqtKW 0+0+BEqpKW-BEqcKW-(BEqeKW-BEqe:1KW)    
BEqtKG 0+0+BEqpKG-BEqcKG-(BEqeKG-BEqe:1KG)    
BEqtKO 0+0+BEqpKO-BEqcKO-(BEqeKO-BEqe:1KO)    
BEqcKW 
1.966542*BEfcKW*BEpcKW^-
1.67*BEpcKG^.5*BEpcKO^.5*(BEgdp/BEpop)^.18*BEpop 
BEqcKG 
13102.54*BEfcKG*BEpcKW^.5*BEpcKG^-
3.34*BEpcKO^.5*(BEgdp/BEpop)^.18*BEpop 
BEqcKO 
126366.3*BEfcKO*BEpcKW^.5*BEpcKG^.5*BEpcKO^-
3.34*(BEgdp/BEpop)^.18*BEpop 
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China 
CIptKW 0.6759459*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/CIxrt)^1     
CIptKG 0.6759381*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/CIxrt)^1     
CIptKO 0.6759422*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/CIxrt)^1     
CIppKW 1.041663*0+MAX(CIptKW*(1-CIlib)*(1+CIsmKW),1)    
CIppKG 1.041669*0+MAX(CIptKG*(1-CIlib)*(1+CIsmKG),1)    
CIppKO 1.041669*0+MAX(CIptKO*(1-CIlib)*(1+CIsmKO),1)    
CIpcKW 1.041663*0+MAX(CIptKW*(1-CIlib)*(1+CIcmKW),1)    
CIpcKG 1.041669*0+MAX(CIptKG*(1-CIlib)*(1+CIcmKG),1)    
CIpcKO 1.041669*0+MAX(CIptKO*(1-CIlib)*(1+CIcmKO),1)    
CIqpKW 16.96128*CIfpKW*CIppKW^.4      
CIqpKG 2.891054*CIfpKG*CIppKG^.4      
CIqpKO 0.7394373*CIfpKO*CIppKO^.4      
CIqeKW 0.00004096514*CIfeKW*CIqpKW     
CIqeKG 0.000217061*CIfeKG*CIqpKG      
CIqeKO 0.0008190008*CIfeKO*CIqpKO      
CIqtKW 0+0+CIqpKW-CIqcKW-(CIqeKW-CIqe:1KW)    
CIqtKG 0+0+CIqpKG-CIqcKG-(CIqeKG-CIqe:1KG)     
CIqtKO 0+0+CIqpKO-CIqcKO-(CIqeKO-CIqe:1KO)     
CIqcKW 0.08509478*CIfcKW*CIpcKW^-1.7*CIpcKG^.5*CIpcKO^.5*(CIgdp/CIpop)^.18*CIpop 
CIqcKG 3346.101*CIfcKG*CIpcKW^.5*CIpcKG^-3.4*CIpcKO^.5*(CIgdp/CIpop)^.18*CIpop 
CIqcKO 1254.574*CIfcKO*CIpcKW^.5*CIpcKG^.5*CIpcKO^-3.4*(CIgdp/CIpop)^.18*CIpop 
 
Chile 
CLptKW 0.1374042*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/CLxrt)^1     
CLptKG 0.1374048*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/CLxrt)^1     
CLptKO 0.1374014*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/CLxrt)^1     
CLppKW 1*0+MAX(CLptKW*(1-CLlib)*(1+CLsmKW),1)    
CLppKG 1*0+MAX(CLptKG*(1-CLlib)*(1+CLsmKG),1)    
CLppKO 1*0+MAX(CLptKO*(1-CLlib)*(1+CLsmKO),1)    
CLpcKW 1*0+MAX(CLptKW*(1-CLlib)*(1+CLcmKW),1)    
CLpcKG 1*0+MAX(CLptKG*(1-CLlib)*(1+CLcmKG),1)    
CLpcKO 1*0+MAX(CLptKO*(1-CLlib)*(1+CLcmKO),1)    
CLqpKW 17.9602*CLfpKW*CLppKW^.4      
CLqpKG 0*CLfpKG*CLppKG^.4      
CLqpKO 0.7827037*CLfpKO*CLppKO^.4      
CLqeKW 0.00000552868*CLfeKW*CLqpKW*CLqcKW    
CLqeKG 2007*CLfeKG*CLqpKG      
CLqeKO 0.0016*CLfeKO*CLqpKO      
CLqtKW 0+0+CLqpKW-CLqcKW-(CLqeKW-CLqe:1KW)    
CLqtKG 0+0+CLqpKG-CLqcKG-(CLqeKG-CLqe:1KG)    
CLqtKO 0+0+CLqpKO-CLqcKO-(CLqeKO-CLqe:1KO)    
CLqcKW 
0.05112034*CLfcKW*CLpcKW^-
1.7*CLpcKG^.5*CLpcKO^.5*(CLgdp/CLpop)^.18*CLpop 
CLqcKG 
0*CLfcKG*CLpcKW^.5*CLpcKG^-
3.4*CLpcKO^.5*(CLgdp/CLpop)^.18*CLpop  
CLqcKO 8.226361*CLfcKO*CLpcKW^.5*CLpcKG^.5*CLpcKO^-3.4*(CLgdp/CLpop)^.18*CLpop 
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EU (Old) 
EOptKW 1.5428*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/EOxrt)^1      
EOptKG 1.542801*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/EOxrt)^1      
EOptKO 1.542804*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/EOxrt)^1      
EOppKW 
1.006441*0+MAX(EOptKW*(1-
EOlib)*(1+EOsmKW),1)     
EOppKG 1.00644*0+MAX(EOptKG*(1-EOlib)*(1+EOsmKG),1)     
EOppKO 1.006443*0+MAX(EOptKO*(1-EOlib)*(1+EOsmKO),1)     
EOpcKW 
1.006441*0+MAX(EOptKW*(1-
EOlib)*(1+EOcmKW),1)     
EOpcKG 1.00644*0+MAX(EOptKG*(1-EOlib)*(1+EOcmKG),1)     
EOpcKO 1.006443*0+MAX(EOptKO*(1-EOlib)*(1+EOcmKO),1)     
EOqpKW 0.5572434*EOfpKW*EOppKW^.4      
EOqpKG 0*EOfpKG*EOppKG^.4       
EOqpKO 0.02428437*EOfpKO*EOppKO^.4      
EOqeKW 0.0009478673*EOfeKW*EOqpKW      
EOqeKG 2007*EOfeKG*EOqpKG       
EOqeKO 0.01895735*EOfeKO*EOqpKO       
EOqtKW 0+0+EOqpKW-EOqcKW-(EOqeKW-EOqe:1KW)     
EOqtKG 0+0+EOqpKG-EOqcKG-(EOqeKG-EOqe:1KG)     
EOqtKO 0.0025+0+EOqpKO-EOqcKO-(EOqeKO-EOqe:1KO)     
EOqcKW 0.0667418*EOfcKW*EOpcKW^-1.7*EOpcKG^.5*EOpcKO^.5*(EOgdp/EOpop)^.18*EOpop 
EOqcKG 
678.6533*EOfcKG*EOpcKW^.5*EOpcKG^-
3.4*EOpcKO^.5*(EOgdp/EOpop)^.18*EOpop  
EOqcKO 
4108.244*EOfcKO*EOpcKW^.5*EOpcKG^.5*EOpcKO^-
3.4*(EOgdp/EOpop)^.18*EOpop  
 
EU (New) 
ENptKW 0.8987237*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/ENxrt)^1      
ENptKG 0.8987281*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/ENxrt)^1      
ENptKO 0.8987296*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/ENxrt)^1      
ENppKW 
1.006439*0+MAX(ENptKW*(1-
ENlib)*(1+ENsmKW),1)     
ENppKG 1.006441*0+MAX(ENptKG*(1-ENlib)*(1+ENsmKG),1)     
ENppKO 1.00644*0+MAX(ENptKO*(1-ENlib)*(1+ENsmKO),1)     
ENpcKW 
1.006439*0+MAX(ENptKW*(1-
ENlib)*(1+ENcmKW),1)     
ENpcKG 1.006441*0+MAX(ENptKG*(1-ENlib)*(1+ENcmKG),1)     
ENpcKO 1.00644*0+MAX(ENptKO*(1-ENlib)*(1+ENcmKO),1)     
ENqpKW 0.005245129*ENfpKW*ENppKW^.4      
ENqpKG 0*ENfpKG*ENppKG^.4       
ENqpKO 0.0002285797*ENfpKO*ENppKO^.4      
ENqeKW 0.125*ENfeKW*ENqpKW       
ENqeKG 2007*ENfeKG*ENqpKG       
ENqeKO 2.5*ENfeKO*ENqpKO       
ENqtKW 0+0+ENqpKW-ENqcKW-(ENqeKW-ENqe:1KW)     
ENqtKG 0+0+ENqpKG-ENqcKG-(ENqeKG-ENqe:1KG)     
ENqtKO 0.006+0+ENqpKO-ENqcKO-(ENqeKO-ENqe:1KO)     
ENqcKW 0.01708097*ENfcKW*ENpcKW^-1.7*ENpcKG^.5*ENpcKO^.5*(ENgdp/ENpop)^.18*ENpop 
ENqcKG 
69.59186*ENfcKG*ENpcKW^.5*ENpcKG^-
3.4*ENpcKO^.5*(ENgdp/ENpop)^.18*ENpop  
ENqcKO 
326.2023*ENfcKO*ENpcKW^.5*ENpcKG^.5*ENpcKO^-
3.4*(ENgdp/ENpop)^.18*ENpop  
 
 
 101 
France  
FRptKW 1.735224*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/FRxrt)^1     
FRptKG 1.735218*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/FRxrt)^1     
FRptKO 1.735225*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/FRxrt)^1     
FRppKW 1.006441*0+MAX(FRptKW*(1-FRlib)*(1+FRsmKW),1)    
FRppKG 1.006443*0+MAX(FRptKG*(1-FRlib)*(1+FRsmKG),1)    
FRppKO 1.006442*0+MAX(FRptKO*(1-FRlib)*(1+FRsmKO),1)    
FRpcKW 1.006441*0+MAX(FRptKW*(1-FRlib)*(1+FRcmKW),1)    
FRpcKG 1.006443*0+MAX(FRptKG*(1-FRlib)*(1+FRcmKG),1)    
FRpcKO 1.006442*0+MAX(FRptKO*(1-FRlib)*(1+FRcmKO),1)    
FRqpKW 3.736172*FRfpKW*FRppKW^.4      
FRqpKG 0*FRfpKG*FRppKG^.4      
FRqpKO 0.1629523*FRfpKO*FRppKO^.4      
FRqeKW 0.00013488*FRfeKW*FRqpKW      
FRqeKG 2007*FRfeKG*FRqpKG      
FRqeKO 0.002695418*FRfeKO*FRqpKO      
FRqtKW 0+0+FRqpKW-FRqcKW-(FRqeKW-FRqe:1KW)    
FRqtKG 0+0+FRqpKG-FRqcKG-(FRqeKG-FRqe:1KG)    
FRqtKO 0+0+FRqpKO-FRqcKO-(FRqeKO-FRqe:1KO)    
FRqcKW 
1.525046*FRfcKW*FRpcKW^-
1.83*FRpcKG^.5*FRpcKO^.5*(FRgdp/FRpop)^.18*FRpop 
FRqcKG 
39970.21*FRfcKG*FRpcKW^.5*FRpcKG^-
3.65*FRpcKO^.5*(FRgdp/FRpop)^.18*FRpop 
FRqcKO 
272649.8*FRfcKO*FRpcKW^.5*FRpcKG^.5*FRpcKO^-
3.65*(FRgdp/FRpop)^.18*FRpop 
 
Germany 
GMptKW 1.529789*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/GMxrt)^1      
GMptKG 1.52979*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/GMxrt)^1      
GMptKO 1.529794*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/GMxrt)^1      
GMppKW 1.006443*0+MAX(GMptKW*(1-GMlib)*(1+GMsmKW),1)    
GMppKG 
1.006443*0+MAX(GMptKG*(1-
GMlib)*(1+GMsmKG),1)     
GMppKO 1.00644*0+MAX(GMptKO*(1-GMlib)*(1+GMsmKO),1)     
GMpcKW 1.006443*0+MAX(GMptKW*(1-GMlib)*(1+GMcmKW),1)    
GMpcKG 
1.006443*0+MAX(GMptKG*(1-
GMlib)*(1+GMcmKG),1)     
GMpcKO 1.00644*0+MAX(GMptKO*(1-GMlib)*(1+GMcmKO),1)     
GMqpKW 0*GMfpKW*GMppKW^.1       
GMqpKG 0*GMfpKG*GMppKG^.1       
GMqpKO 0*GMfpKO*GMppKO^.1       
GMqeKW 2007*GMfeKW*GMqpKW       
GMqeKG 2007*GMfeKG*GMqpKG       
GMqeKO 2007*GMfeKO*GMqpKO       
GMqtKW 0+0+GMqpKW-GMqcKW-(GMqeKW-GMqe:1KW)     
GMqtKG 0+0+GMqpKG-GMqcKG-(GMqeKG-GMqe:1KG)     
GMqtKO 0+0+GMqpKO-GMqcKO-(GMqeKO-GMqe:1KO)     
GMqcKW 0.4332858*GMfcKW*GMpcKW^-1.67*GMpcKG^.5*GMpcKO^.5*(GMgdp/GMpop)^.22*GMpop 
GMqcKG 3428.474*GMfcKG*GMpcKW^.5*GMpcKG^-3.34*GMpcKO^.5*(GMgdp/GMpop)^.22*GMpop 
GMqcKO 28621.36*GMfcKO*GMpcKW^.5*GMpcKG^.5*GMpcKO^-3.34*(GMgdp/GMpop)^.22*GMpop 
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Greece 
GRptKW 0.6698709*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/GRxrt)^1      
GRptKG 0.6698701*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/GRxrt)^1      
GRptKO 0.6698644*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/GRxrt)^1      
GRppKW 1.006435*0+MAX(GRptKW*(1-GRlib)*(1+GRsmKW),1)     
GRppKG 1.006436*0+MAX(GRptKG*(1-GRlib)*(1+GRsmKG),1)     
GRppKO 1.006447*0+MAX(GRptKO*(1-GRlib)*(1+GRsmKO),1)     
GRpcKW 1.006435*0+MAX(GRptKW*(1-GRlib)*(1+GRcmKW),1)     
GRpcKG 1.006436*0+MAX(GRptKG*(1-GRlib)*(1+GRcmKG),1)     
GRpcKO 1.006447*0+MAX(GRptKO*(1-GRlib)*(1+GRcmKO),1)     
GRqpKW 4.399508*GRfpKW*GRppKW^.4       
GRqpKG 0*GRfpKG*GRppKG^.4       
GRqpKO 0.1915356*GRfpKO*GRppKO^.4       
GRqeKW 0.0001676165*GRfeKW*GRqpKW      
GRqeKG 2007*GRfeKG*GRqpKG       
GRqeKO 0.003355705*GRfeKO*GRqpKO       
GRqtKW 0+0+GRqpKW-GRqcKW-(GRqeKW-GRqe:1KW)     
GRqtKG 0+0+GRqpKG-GRqcKG-(GRqeKG-GRqe:1KG)     
GRqtKO 0.01+0+GRqpKO-GRqcKO-(GRqeKO-GRqe:1KO)     
GRqcKW 0.6391731*GRfcKW*GRpcKW^-1.7*GRpcKG^.5*GRpcKO^.5*(GRgdp/GRpop)^.18*GRpop 
GRqcKG 
1128.994*GRfcKG*GRpcKW^.5*GRpcKG^-
3.4*GRpcKO^.5*(GRgdp/GRpop)^.18*GRpop  
GRqcKO 
3655.695*GRfcKO*GRpcKW^.5*GRpcKG^.5*GRpcKO^-
3.4*(GRgdp/GRpop)^.18*GRpop  
 
Italy 
ITptKW 1.10305*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/ITxrt)^1     
ITptKG 1.103056*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/ITxrt)^1     
ITptKO 1.103055*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/ITxrt)^1     
ITppKW 1.006445*0+MAX(ITptKW*(1-ITlib)*(1+ITsmKW),1)    
ITppKG 1.006437*0+MAX(ITptKG*(1-ITlib)*(1+ITsmKG),1)    
ITppKO 1.006441*0+MAX(ITptKO*(1-ITlib)*(1+ITsmKO),1)    
ITpcKW 1.006445*0+MAX(ITptKW*(1-ITlib)*(1+ITcmKW),1)    
ITpcKG 1.006437*0+MAX(ITptKG*(1-ITlib)*(1+ITcmKG),1)    
ITpcKO 1.006441*0+MAX(ITptKO*(1-ITlib)*(1+ITcmKO),1)    
ITqpKW 19.49895*ITfpKW*ITppKW^.4      
ITqpKG 0*ITfpKG*ITppKG^.4       
ITqpKO 0.8497551*ITfpKO*ITppKO^.4      
ITqeKW 0.00003097894*ITfeKW*ITqpKW      
ITqeKG 2007*ITfeKG*ITqpKG       
ITqeKO 0.0006195787*ITfeKO*ITqpKO      
ITqtKW 0+0+ITqpKW-ITqcKW-(ITqeKW-ITqe:1KW)     
ITqtKG 0+0+ITqpKG-ITqcKG-(ITqeKG-ITqe:1KG)     
ITqtKO 0+0+ITqpKO-ITqcKO-(ITqeKO-ITqe:1KO)     
ITqcKW 270.7224*ITfcKW*ITpcKW^-2.4*ITpcKG^.5*ITpcKO^.5*(ITgdp/ITpop)^.38*ITpop 
ITqcKG 396076600*ITfcKG*ITpcKW^.5*ITpcKG^-4.8*ITpcKO^.5*(ITgdp/ITpop)^.38*ITpop 
ITqcKO 6705455000*ITfcKO*ITpcKW^.5*ITpcKG^.5*ITpcKO^-4.8*(ITgdp/ITpop)^.38*ITpop 
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Japan 
JPptKW 1.816769*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/JPxrt)^1     
JPptKG 1.816769*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/JPxrt)^1     
JPptKO 1.816775*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/JPxrt)^1     
JPppKW 1.004925*0+MAX(JPptKW*(1-JPlib)*(1+JPsmKW),1)    
JPppKG 1.004924*0+MAX(JPptKG*(1-JPlib)*(1+JPsmKG),1)    
JPppKO 1.004924*0+MAX(JPptKO*(1-JPlib)*(1+JPsmKO),1)    
JPpcKW 1.004925*0+MAX(JPptKW*(1-JPlib)*(1+JPcmKW),1)    
JPpcKG 1.004924*0+MAX(JPptKG*(1-JPlib)*(1+JPcmKG),1)    
JPpcKO 1.004924*0+MAX(JPptKO*(1-JPlib)*(1+JPcmKO),1)    
JPqpKW 1.858429*JPfpKW*JPppKW^.4      
JPqpKG 0*JPfpKG*JPppKG^.4      
JPqpKO 0.08098941*JPfpKO*JPppKO^.4      
JPqeKW 0.0002673797*JPfeKW*JPqpKW     
JPqeKG 2007*JPfeKG*JPqpKG      
JPqeKO 0.005347594*JPfeKO*JPqpKO      
JPqtKW 0+0+JPqpKW-JPqcKW-(JPqeKW-JPqe:1KW)    
JPqtKG 0+0+JPqpKG-JPqcKG-(JPqeKG-JPqe:1KG)    
JPqtKO 0+0+JPqpKO-JPqcKO-(JPqeKO-JPqe:1KO)    
JPqcKW 0.3576792*JPfcKW*JPpcKW^-1.7*JPpcKG^.5*JPpcKO^.5*(JPgdp/JPpop)^.18*JPpop 
JPqcKG 55452.59*JPfcKG*JPpcKW^.5*JPpcKG^-3.4*JPpcKO^.5*(JPgdp/JPpop)^.18*JPpop 
JPqcKO 43854.09*JPfcKO*JPpcKW^.5*JPpcKG^.5*JPpcKO^-3.4*(JPgdp/JPpop)^.18*JPpop 
 
New Zealand 
NZptKW 1.844027*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/NZxrt)^1     
NZptKG 1.76705*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/NZxrt)^1     
NZptKO 1.632681*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/NZxrt)^1     
NZppKW 1*0+MAX(NZptKW*(1-NZlib)*(1+NZsmKW),1)    
NZppKG 1*0+MAX(NZptKG*(1-NZlib)*(1+NZsmKG),1)    
NZppKO 1*0+MAX(NZptKO*(1-NZlib)*(1+NZsmKO),1)    
NZpcKW 1*0+MAX(NZptKW*(1-NZlib)*(1+NZcmKW),1)    
NZpcKG 1*0+MAX(NZptKG*(1-NZlib)*(1+NZcmKG),1)    
NZpcKO 1*0+MAX(NZptKO*(1-NZlib)*(1+NZcmKO),1)    
NZqpKW 13.25873*NZfpKW*NZppKW^.4      
NZqpKG 1.446327*NZfpKG*NZppKG^.4      
NZqpKO 0.3852864*NZfpKO*NZppKO^.4      
NZqeKW 0.00003835238*NZfeKW*NZqpKW     
NZqeKG 0.0003229974*NZfeKG*NZqpKG      
NZqeKO 0.001207729*NZfeKO*NZqpKO      
NZqtKW 0+0+NZqpKW-NZqcKW-(NZqeKW-NZqe:1KW)    
NZqtKG 0+0+NZqpKG-NZqcKG-(NZqeKG-NZqe:1KG)    
NZqtKO 0+0+NZqpKO-NZqcKO-(NZqeKO-NZqe:1KO)    
NZqcKW 1.596514*NZfcKW*NZpcKW^-1.7*NZpcKG^.5*NZpcKO^.5*(NZgdp/NZpop)^.18*NZpop 
NZqcKG 8763.511*NZfcKG*NZpcKW^.5*NZpcKG^-3.4*NZpcKO^.5*(NZgdp/NZpop)^.18*NZpop 
NZqcKO 62736.81*NZfcKO*NZpcKW^.5*NZpcKG^.5*NZpcKO^-3.4*(NZgdp/NZpop)^.18*NZpop 
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Spain 
SPptKW 1.354032*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/SPxrt)^1      
SPptKG 1.354027*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/SPxrt)^1      
SPptKO 1.354027*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/SPxrt)^1      
SPppKW 1.006439*0+MAX(SPptKW*(1-SPlib)*(1+SPsmKW),1)     
SPppKG 1.006442*0+MAX(SPptKG*(1-SPlib)*(1+SPsmKG),1)     
SPppKO 1.006442*0+MAX(SPptKO*(1-SPlib)*(1+SPsmKO),1)     
SPpcKW 1.006439*0+MAX(SPptKW*(1-SPlib)*(1+SPcmKW),1)     
SPpcKG 1.006442*0+MAX(SPptKG*(1-SPlib)*(1+SPcmKG),1)     
SPpcKO 1.006442*0+MAX(SPptKO*(1-SPlib)*(1+SPcmKO),1)     
SPqpKW 0.5565001*SPfpKW*SPppKW^.4      
SPqpKG 0*SPfpKG*SPppKG^.4       
SPqpKO 0.02425202*SPfpKO*SPppKO^.4      
SPqeKW 0.001*SPfeKW*SPqpKW       
SPqeKG 2007*SPfeKG*SPqpKG       
SPqeKO 0.02*SPfeKO*SPqpKO       
SPqtKW 38.11+0+SPqpKW-SPqcKW-(SPqeKW-SPqe:1KW)     
SPqtKG 0+0+SPqpKG-SPqcKG-(SPqeKG-SPqe:1KG)     
SPqtKO 0+0+SPqpKO-SPqcKO-(SPqeKO-SPqe:1KO)     
SPqcKW 200.2682*SPfcKW*SPpcKW^-1.88*SPpcKG^.5*SPpcKO^.5*(SPgdp/SPpop)^.94*SPpop  
SPqcKG 6154608*SPfcKG*SPpcKW^.5*SPpcKG^-3.76*SPpcKO^.5*(SPgdp/SPpop)^.94*SPpop  
SPqcKO 
57563520*SPfcKO*SPpcKW^.5*SPpcKG^.5*SPpcKO^-
3.76*(SPgdp/SPpop)^.94*SPpop  
 
United Kingdom 
UKptKW 1.434212*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/UKxrt)^1     
UKptKG 1.434211*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/UKxrt)^1     
UKptKO 1.43422*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/UKxrt)^1     
UKppKW 1.006443*0+MAX(UKptKW*(1-UKlib)*(1+UKsmKW),1)    
UKppKG 1.006444*0+MAX(UKptKG*(1-UKlib)*(1+UKsmKG),1)    
UKppKO 1.00644*0+MAX(UKptKO*(1-UKlib)*(1+UKsmKO),1)    
UKpcKW 1.006443*0+MAX(UKptKW*(1-UKlib)*(1+UKcmKW),1)    
UKpcKG 1.006444*0+MAX(UKptKG*(1-UKlib)*(1+UKcmKG),1)    
UKpcKO 1.00644*0+MAX(UKptKO*(1-UKlib)*(1+UKcmKO),1)    
UKqpKW 0*UKfpKW*UKppKW^.1      
UKqpKG 0*UKfpKG*UKppKG^.1      
UKqpKO 0*UKfpKO*UKppKO^.1      
UKqeKW 2007*UKfeKW*UKqpKW      
UKqeKG 2007*UKfeKG*UKqpKG      
UKqeKO 2007*UKfeKO*UKqpKO      
UKqtKW 0+0+UKqpKW-UKqcKW-(UKqeKW-UKqe:1KW)    
UKqtKG 0+0+UKqpKG-UKqcKG-(UKqeKG-UKqe:1KG)    
UKqtKO 0+0+UKqpKO-UKqcKO-(UKqeKO-UKqe:1KO)    
UKqcKW 64.00703*UKfcKW*UKpcKW^-1.91*UKpcKG^.5*UKpcKO^.5*(UKgdp/UKpop)^.87*UKpop 
UKqcKG 3189353*UKfcKG*UKpcKW^.5*UKpcKG^-3.83*UKpcKO^.5*(UKgdp/UKpop)^.87*UKpop 
UKqcKO 
10417250*UKfcKO*UKpcKW^.5*UKpcKG^.5*UKpcKO^-
3.83*(UKgdp/UKpop)^.87*UKpop 
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United States 
USptKW 0.834629*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/USxrt)^1      
USptKG 0.8346308*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/USxrt)^1      
USptKO 0.8346272*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/USxrt)^1      
USppKW 1.008166*0+MAX(USptKW*(1-USlib)*(1+USsmKW),1)     
USppKG 1.008163*0+MAX(USptKG*(1-USlib)*(1+USsmKG),1)     
USppKO 1.00817*0+MAX(USptKO*(1-USlib)*(1+USsmKO),1)     
USpcKW 1.008166*0+MAX(USptKW*(1-USlib)*(1+UScmKW),1)     
USpcKG 1.008163*0+MAX(USptKG*(1-USlib)*(1+UScmKG),1)     
USpcKO 1.00817*0+MAX(USptKO*(1-USlib)*(1+UScmKO),1)     
USqpKW 1.46379*USfpKW*USppKW^.4       
USqpKG 0*USfpKG*USppKG^.4       
USqpKO 0.08380478*USfpKO*USppKO^.4      
USqeKW 0.0004593477*USfeKW*USqpKW      
USqeKG 2007*USfeKG*USqpKG       
USqeKO 0.006993007*USfeKO*USqpKO       
USqtKW 0+0+USqpKW-USqcKW-(USqeKW-USqe:1KW)     
USqtKG 0+0+USqpKG-USqcKG-(USqeKG-USqe:1KG)     
USqtKO 0+0+USqpKO-USqcKO-(USqeKO-USqe:1KO)     
USqcKW 0.05507465*USfcKW*USpcKW^-1.7*USpcKG^.5*USpcKO^.5*(USgdp/USpop)^.18*USpop 
USqcKG 442.549*USfcKG*USpcKW^.5*USpcKG^-3.4*USpcKO^.5*(USgdp/USpop)^.18*USpop  
USqcKO 1095.605*USfcKO*USpcKW^.5*USpcKG^.5*USpcKO^-3.4*(USgdp/USpop)^.18*USpop  
 
Rest of World 
RWptKW 0.8007376*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/RWxrt)^1      
RWptKG 0.8007402*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/RWxrt)^1      
RWptKO 0.8007458*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/RWxrt)^1      
RWppKW 1*0+MAX(RWptKW*(1-RWlib)*(1+RWsmKW),1)     
RWppKG 1*0+MAX(RWptKG*(1-RWlib)*(1+RWsmKG),1)     
RWppKO 1*0+MAX(RWptKO*(1-RWlib)*(1+RWsmKO),1)     
RWpcKW 1*0+MAX(RWptKW*(1-RWlib)*(1+RWcmKW),1)     
RWpcKG 1*0+MAX(RWptKG*(1-RWlib)*(1+RWcmKG),1)     
RWpcKO 1*0+MAX(RWptKO*(1-RWlib)*(1+RWcmKO),1)     
RWqpKW 6.565275*RWfpKW*RWppKW^.4      
RWqpKG 0*RWfpKG*RWppKG^.4       
RWqpKO 1.854397*RWfpKO*RWppKO^.4       
RWqeKW 0.0001081315*RWfeKW*RWqpKW      
RWqeKG 2007*RWfeKG*RWqpKG       
RWqeKO 0.000333667*RWfeKO*RWqpKO      
RWqtKW -53.1+0+RWqpKW-RWqcKW-(RWqeKW-RWqe:1KW)     
RWqtKG 0+0+RWqpKG-RWqcKG-(RWqeKG-RWqe:1KG)     
RWqtKO 0+0+RWqpKO-RWqcKO-(RWqeKO-RWqe:1KO)     
RWqcKW 0.026887*RWfcKW*RWpcKW^-1.7*RWpcKG^.5*RWpcKO^.5*(RWgdp/RWpop)^.18*RWpop 
RWqcKG 206.3968*RWfcKG*RWpcKW^.5*RWpcKG^-3.4*RWpcKO^.5*(RWgdp/RWpop)^.18*RWpop 
RWqcKO 0*RWfcKO*RWpcKW^.5*RWpcKG^.5*RWpcKO^-3.4*(RWgdp/RWpop)^.18*RWpop  
 
World 
WDqtKW 
14.99+AUqtKW+BEqtKW+CIqtKW+CLqtKW+EOqtKW+ENqtKW+FRqtKW+GMqtKW+GRqtKW+ITqtKW+ 
JPqtKW+NZqtKW+SPqtKW+UKqtKW+USqtKW+RWqtKW 
WDqtKG 
-0.01+AUqtKG+BEqtKG+CIqtKG+CLqtKG+EOqtKG+ENqtKG+FRqtKG+GMqtKG+GRqtKG+ITqtKG+ 
JPqtKG+NZqtKG+SPqtKG+UKqtKG+USqtKG+RWqtKG  
WDqtKO 
0+AUqtKO+BEqtKO+CIqtKO+CLqtKO+EOqtKO+ENqtKO+FRqtKO+GMqtKO+GRqtKO+ITqtKO+ 
JPqtKO+NZqtKO+SPqtKO+UKqtKO+USqtKO+RWqtKO   
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Table A5: Basedata for KIWI model (year 2003) 
KIWI AU BE CI CL EO EN FR GM GR IT JP NZ SP UK  US RW WD 
ppKW 1400.86 1396.64 
785.81 
127.79 1559.62 908.52 1754.14 1546.47 677.17 1115.08 1816.83 1715 1368.79 1449.85 853 744.71 930.03 
ppKG 1807.11 1801.67 
1013.69 
164.85 2011.91 1172 2262.84 1994.95 873.55 1438.45 2343.71 2120 1765.74 1870.31 1100.37 960.68 1199.74 
ppKO 1975.21 1969.26 
1107.99 
180.18 2199.07 1281.02 2473.34 2180.52 954.81 1572.26 2561.73 2141 1929.99 2044.29 1202.73 1050.05 1311.34 
pcKW 1400.86 1396.64 
785.81 
127.79 1559.62 908.52 1754.14 1546.47 677.17 1115.08 1816.83 1715 1368.79 1449.85 853 744.71 930.03 
pcKG 1807.11 1801.67 
1013.69 
164.85 2011.91 1172 2262.84 1994.95 873.55 1438.45 2343.71 2120 1765.74 1870.31 1100.37 960.68 1199.74 
pcKO 1975.21 1969.26 
1107.99 
180.18 2199.07 1281.02 2473.34 2180.52 954.81 1572.26 2561.73 2141 1929.99 2044.29 1202.73 1050.05 1311.34 
ptKW 1400.86 1284.91 
628.65 
127.79 1434.85 835.84 1613.81 1422.75 623 1025.87 1689.65 1715 1259.29 1333.86 776.23 744.71 930.03 
ptKG 1807.11 1657.53 
810.95 
164.85 1850.96 1078.24 2081.81 1835.35 803.67 1323.38 2179.65 2120 1624.48 1720.68 1001.34 960.68 1199.74 
ptKO 1975.21 1811.72 
886.39 
180.18 2023.14 1178.54 2275.47 2006.08 878.42 1446.48 2382.41 2141 1775.59 1880.75 1094.48 1050.05 1311.34 
qpKW 2.93 0.00 244.11 125.00 10.55 0.080 74.14 0.00 59.66 322.80 37.40 260.74 10.00 0.00 21.77 92.48 1261.66 
qpKG 0.00 0.00 46.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 30.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 77.03 
qpKO 0.15 0.00 12.21 6.25 0.53 0.0040 3.71 0.00 2.98 16.14 1.87 8.28 0.50 0.00 1.43 29.97 84.01 
qcKW 16.65 97.73 264.31 14.47 61.19 47.48 83.64 84.74 44.63 115.01 87.11 23.61 97.82 31.94 46.48 144.85 1261.66 
qcKG 0.18 1.37 46.07 0.00 0.86 0.67 0.95 1.19 0.45 2.12 14.40 0.18 1.29 0.45 1.44 5.40 77.03 
qcKO 0.34 9.39 12.21 0.16 3.68 2.22 4.48 7.06 1.03 22.40 8.05 1.24 8.26 1.00 2.52 0.00 84.01 
qmKW 15.36 105.94 23.83   76.92 48.03 39.90 89.89 1.47 51.22 49.71 1.08 95.99 33.71 34.87 129.53   
qxKW 1.64 8.21 3.63 110.53 26.28 0.63 30.40 5.15 16.50 259.01 0.00 238.21 8.17 1.77 10.16 24.06   
qtKW -13.72 -97.73 -20.20 110.53 -50.64 -47.40 -9.50 -84.74 15.03 207.79 -49.71 237.13 -49.71 -31.94 -24.71 -105.47 0.00 
qtKG -0.18 -1.37 0.00 0.00 -0.86 -0.67 -0.95 -1.19 -0.45 -2.12 -14.40 30.78 -1.29 -0.45 -1.44 -5.40 0.00 
qtKO -0.19 -9.39 0.00 6.09 -3.15 -2.21 -0.77 -7.06 1.96 -6.26 -6.18 7.04 -7.76 -1.00 -1.09 29.97 0.00 
qeKW 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
qeKG 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
qeKO 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
fpKW 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
fpKG 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
fpKO 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
fcKW 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
fcKG 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
fcKO 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
feKW 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
feKG 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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feKO 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
smKW 0.00 0.080 0.20 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.070 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.090 0.00   
smKG 0.00 0.080 0.20 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.070 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.090 0.00   
smKO 0.00 0.080 0.20 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.070 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.090 0.00   
cmKW 0.00 0.080 0.20 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.070 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.090 0.00   
cmKG 0.00 0.080 0.20 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.070 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.090 0.00   
cmKO 0.00 0.080 0.20 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.070 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.090 0.00   
lib 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
gdp 133.59 132.55 125.79 95.90 135.46 143.41 133.60 128.36 154.42 136.39 90.82 147.53 148.94 124.82 111.47 112.72 115.17 
pop 19732 10331 1291496 15663 515122 1240469 60181.00 82398 10626 57998 127214 3951 40217 60095 290343 2473392 6299228 
xrt 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Table A6: Basedata scenario for KIWI model (year 2013) 
KIWI AU BE CI CL EO EN FR GM GR IT JP NZ SP UK US RW WD 
ppKW 1616,42 1601,24 870,46 147,45 1788,09 1041,61 2011,11 1773,02 776,38 1278,43 2086,13 1978,90 1569,31 1662,24 976,29 859,31 930,03 
ppKG 1995,74 1976,99 1074,72 182,06 2207,70 1286,05 2483,04 2189,08 958,56 1578,44 2575,66 2341,29 1937,57 2052,31 1205,39 1060,96 1199,74 
ppKO 2144,59 2124,45 1154,88 195,63 2372,37 1381,97 2668,25 2352,36 1030,05 1696,17 2767,78 2324,60 2082,08 2205,40 1295,29 1140,10 1311,34 
pcKW 1616,42 1601,24 870,46 147,45 1788,09 1041,61 2011,11 1773,02 776,38 1278,43 2086,13 1978,90 1569,31 1662,24 976,29 859,31 930,03 
pcKG 1995,74 1976,99 1074,72 182,06 2207,70 1286,05 2483,04 2189,08 958,56 1578,44 2575,66 2341,29 1937,57 2052,31 1205,39 1060,96 1199,74 
pcKO 2144,59 2124,45 1154,88 195,63 2372,37 1381,97 2668,25 2352,36 1030,05 1696,17 2767,78 2324,60 2082,08 2205,40 1295,29 1140,10 1311,34 
ptKW 1616,42 1482,63 725,39 147,45 1655,64 964,46 1862,14 1641,68 718,87 1183,73 1949,65 1978,90 1453,07 1539,11 895,68 859,31 1073,14 
ptKG 1995,74 1830,54 895,60 182,06 2044,16 1190,79 2299,11 2026,92 887,56 1461,51 2407,16 2341,29 1794,04 1900,28 1105,86 1060,96 1324,97 
ptKO 2144,59 1967,08 962,40 195,63 2196,64 1279,61 2470,60 2178,11 953,75 1570,52 2586,71 2324,60 1927,86 2042,03 1188,34 1140,10 1423,79 
qpKW 3,06 0,00 254,31 132,37 11,14 0,08 78,31 0,00 63,01 340,94 39,53 276,10 10,56 0,00 22,98 97,93 1453,10 
qpKG 0,00 0,00 47,16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 32,21 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 99,46 
qpKO 0,15 0,00 12,41 6,46 0,54 0,00 3,82 0,00 3,07 16,64 1,93 8,56 0,52 0,00 1,47 30,97 87,51 
qcKW 16,91 92,37 293,49 15,36 61,13 48,21 78,31 79,58 42,36 105,77 76,89 24,70 143,31 40,79 46,58 164,56 1453,10 
qcKG 0,17 1,22 51,01 0,00 0,81 0,64 0,83 1,05 0,40 1,77 11,92 0,18 1,76 0,53 1,36 5,71 99,46 
qcKO 0,34 8,92 14,45 0,19 3,69 2,27 4,21 6,67 0,98 20,49 7,12 1,29 12,13 1,28 2,55 0,00 87,51 
qmKW 19,71 117,31 35,65   89,69 96,48 50,52 114,81 3,37 50,18 59,44 0,78 114,39 37,93 41,10 186,54   
qxKW 1,19 6,89 7,52 129,07 32,20 10,54 24,41 10,08 37,99 291,78 0,00 313,68 9,45 1,67 12,10 31,09   
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qtKW -13,85 -92,37 -39,18 117,00 -49,99 -48,12 0,00 -79,58 20,65 235,17 -37,36 251,40 -94,64 -40,79 -23,60 -119,73 0,00 
qtKG -0,17 -1,22 -3,85 0,00 -0,81 -0,64 -0,83 -1,05 -0,40 -1,77 -11,92 32,04 -1,76 -0,53 -1,36 -5,71 0,00 
qtKO -0,19 -8,92 -2,03 6,26 -3,15 -2,26 -0,39 -6,67 2,10 -3,85 -5,19 7,27 -11,61 -1,28 -1,07 30,97 0,00 
qeKW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
qeKG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
qeKO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
fpKW 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
fpKG 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
fpKO 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
fcKW 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
fcKG 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
fcKO 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
feKW 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
feKG 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
feKO 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
smKW 0,00 0,08 0,20 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,00   
smKG 0,00 0,08 0,20 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,00   
smKO 0,00 0,08 0,20 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,00   
cmKW 0,00 0,08 0,20 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,00   
cmKG 0,00 0,08 0,20 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,00   
cmKO 0,00 0,08 0,20 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,00   
lib 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
gdp 235,19 204,42 337,35 199,64 211,45 299,20 206,07 184,66 246,43 206,32 106,75 291,22 268,47 201,88 170,38 214,66 188,66 
pop 21395 10452 1374558 17280 558927 1288071 61811 82514 10780 58254 126471 4331 40663 61457 317209 3021681 7055854 
xrt 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
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Table A7: Elasticities used in the model 
Country/Region Elasticity KW KG KO 
AU   demand  -1.70 -3.40 -3.40 
 income  0.18 0.18 0.18 
  supply  0.30 0.30 0.30 
BE, GM  demand  -1.67 -3.34 -3.34 
 income  0.22 0.22 0.22 
  supply  0.10 0.10 0.10 
CI, RW demand  -1.70 -3.40 -3.40 
 income  0.49 0.49 0.49 
  supply  0.40 0.40 0.40 
CL demand  -1.70 -3.40 -3.40 
 income  0.49 0.49 0.49 
  supply  0.40 0.40 0.40 
EN,EN,GR demand  -1.70 -3.40 -3.40 
 income  0.30 0.30 0.30 
  supply  0.40 0.40 0.40 
FR demand  -1.83 -3.66 -3.66 
 income  0.18 0.18 0.18 
  supply  0.40 0.40 0.40 
IT demand  -2.40 -4.80 -4.80 
 income  0.38 0.38 0.38 
  supply  0.40 0.40 0.40 
JP demand  -1.70 -3.40 -3.40 
 income  0.37 0.37 0.37 
  supply  0.40 0.40 0.40 
NZ demand  -1.70 -3.40 -3.40 
 income  0.18 0.18 0.18 
  supply  0.40 0.40 0.40 
SP demand  -1.88 -3.76 -3.76 
 income  0.94 0.94 0.94 
  supply  0.40 0.40 0.40 
UK demand  -1.91 -3.83 -3.83 
 income  0.87 0.87 0.87 
  supply  0.10 0.10 0.10 
US demand  -1.70 -3.40 -3.40 
 income  0.29 0.29 0.29 
  supply  0.40 0.40 0.40 
 
 
